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Santhosh Madhavan @ Swami Amritha Chaithanya Vs. State

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Contents

  1. 1 Sections 342 and 376 of Indian Penal Code 
    1. 1.1 Keisam Kumar Singh v. State of Manipur (AIR 1985 SC 1664) 
    2. 1.2 State of Kerala v. Aboobacker (2006(3) ILR Kerala 672)
    3. 1.3 Madan Lal v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1997 KHC 521) 
    4. 1.4 Neel Kumar @ Anil Kumar v. State of Haryana (2012 KHC 4275)
    5. 1.5 Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010 KHC 4268) 
    6. 1.6 State of Maharashtra v. Praful B Desai (2003 KHC 581) 
    7. 1.7 Grant v. Southwestern Properties ((1974 ) 2 All.E.R. 465)
    8. 1.8 Taylor v. Chief Constable Cheshire ((1987) 1 All.E.R. 225)
    9. 1.9 R V Fowden and White [1982] Crim LR 588. 
    10. 1.10 R v. Khan(Sultan) ((1996) 3 All.E.R. 289) 
    11. 1.11 R v Sang [1979] 2 All ER 1222 
    12. 1.12 State of Maharashtra v. Praful B. Desai (AIR 2003 SC 2053) 
    13. 1.13 Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate ((2010) 4 SCC 329) 
    14. 1.14 Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra ((2011) 4 SCC 143) 
    15. 1.15 Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate ((2010) 4 SCC 329)
    16. 1.16 P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumal (1972 KHC 350)
    17. 1.17 Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1956 SC 415)
    18. 1.18 Keisam Kumar Singh v. State of Manipur (AIR 1985 SC 1664)
    19. 1.19 State of Kerala v. Aboobacker (2006(3) ILR Kerala 672) 
    20. 1.20 Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra ((2007) 2 SCC 170)
    21. 1.21 Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2012) 8 SCC 21)
    22. 1.22 Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala (2013) 9 SCC 113)
    23. 1.23 Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2012) 7 SCC 171) 
    24. 1.24 Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand ((2013) 3 SCC 791). 
      1. 1.24.1 State of M.P. v. Dayal Sahu ((2005) 8 SCC 122)
      2. 1.24.2 Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra (2006(1) K.L.T. SN 80) 
      3. 1.24.3 Kamalanantha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005 KHC 751).
      4. 1.24.4 Muniappan. C v. State of Tamil Nadu (2010 KHC 4621)
      5. 1.24.5 Chandrasekhar Sureshchandra Bhatt v. State of Maharashtra (2000 KHC 1674) 
      6. 1.24.6 Bhajan Singh @ Harbhajan Singh v. State of Haryana (2011 KHC 4542).
    25. 1.25 Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P. (AIR 2012 SC 1979) 
    26. 1.26 Thoti Manohar v. State of Andhra Pradesh ((2012) 7 SCC 723) 
    27. 1.27 Alagupandi v. State of T.N. ((2012) 10 SCC 451) 
    28. 1.28 Lallu Manjhi and Anr. v. State of Jharkhand (2003) 2 SCC 401 : (AIR 2003 SC 854 : 2003 AIR SCW 308)
    29. 1.29 Joseph v. State of Kerala (AIR 2003 SC 507) 
    30. 1.30 Tika Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2007) 15 SCC 760. 
    31. 1.31 Jhapsa Kabari and others v. State of Bihar (AIR 2002 SC 312) 
    32. 1.32 Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, [(2007) 14 SCC 150]. 
    33. 1.33 Satbir Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (AIR 2009 SC 2163)
    34. 1.34 Balraje alias Trimbak v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 6 SCC 673] : (2010 AIR SCW 3707)
    35. 1.35 Kuria v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 2013 SC 1085) 
    36. 1.36 State of Maharashtra v. Siraj Ahmed Nisar Ahmed ((2007) 5 SCC 161)
    37. 1.37 Subal Ghorai v. State of West Bengal ((2013) 4 SCC 607) 
    38. 1.38 Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2012) 7 SCC 171) 
    39. 1.39 Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P. and Anr., AIR 2003 SC 818 : (2003 AIR SCW 253)
    40. 1.40 Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2006 SC 508 : 2005 AIR SCW 6149)).
    41. 1.41 Suresh N. Bhusare and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 1 SCC 220 : (AIR 1998 SC 3131 : 1998 AIR SCW 3045)
    42. 1.42 Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT) of Delhi (AIR 2012 SC 3157)
    43. 1.43 State of Haryana v. Basti Ram (AIR 2013 SC 1307)
    44. 1.44 Vijay alias Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh ((2010) 8 SCC 191). 
    45. 1.45 Zindar Ali Sheikh v. State of West Bengal ((2009) 3 SCC 761)
    46. 1.46 Karan Singh v. State of Haryana (AIR 2013 SC 2348)
    47. 1.47 Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal (AIR 2012 SC 3046)
      1. 1.47.1 119. One has to remember that in a case of rape, it is extremely difficult to get corroborative items of evidence for, the act is done in secrecy. One should remember in this case, the appellant stood in a fiduciary capacity and he exploited the victim to his advantage. The victim was at his mercy. She had no choice.
      2. 1.47.2 120. It will be imprudent on the part of the court to insist for mathematical precision regarding the narration of incident by P.W.1. She was giving evidence after a long time and her statements were taken on several occasions by the police. Merely because there is some deviation from her previous statements, what is obvious, that is not sufficient to impeach her evidence. It is sad to note that the prosecution was betrayed by P.W.6. Such conduct was not expected from P.W.6 who has entered the holy order. Therefore, one is left with the solitary evidence of P.W.1 regarding the incident and medical evidence.
      3. 1.47.3 121. It is significant to notice that the evidence of P.W.1 is to a great extent in consonance with the first information statement given by her. The fact that there is no serious contradiction between the evidence in court and the statements contained in the FIS to a great extent guarantees the version given by P.W.1 in court.
      4. 1.47.4 122. There is no justifiable reason as to why one should doubt the version given by P.W.1. 
      5. 1.47.5 123. The court below was therefore perfectly justified in acting on the testimony of P.W.1 and finding the accused guilty. No grounds are made out to interfere with the conviction and sentence passed by the court below in this regard. The appeal is only to be dismissed. 

(2014) 387 KLR 121

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM 

PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.BHAVADASAN 

THURSDAY, THE 19TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2013/28TH AGRAHAYANA, 1935 

CRL.A.No. 1599 of 2009 (D)

(S.C. NO.369 AND 429 OF 2008 OF THE COURT OF THE VTH ADDITIONAL- SESSIONS JUDGE, ERNAKULAM DTD. 19/05/2009) 

[COMMON JUDGMENT IN S.C. NOS. 368 TO 371 OF 2008 & 428 & 429 OF 2008]

APPELLANT/ACCUSED NO.1:

SANTHOSH MADHAVAN @ SWAMI AMRITHA CHAITHANYA, S/O. MADHAVAN OF PARAYACHIRA HOUSE, IRUPATHEKKAR KARA, KATTAPPANA, UDUMPANCHOLA, IDUKKI DISTRICT, 4B, FLAT ROYAL STADIUM, MANSION APARTMENT, MARKET ROAD, KADAVANTHRA, ERNAKULAM. 

BY SRI.P.VIJAYA BHANU, SENIOR ADVOCATE, ADVS. SRI.P.M.RAFIQ, SRI.P.K.VARGHESE, SRI.THOMAS J.ANAKKALLUNKAL. 

RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:

STATE, REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM. 

BY ADDL. D.G.P. SRI. TOM JOSE PADINJAREKKARA, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR SRI. DHANESH MATHEW MANJOORAN.

JUDGMENT 

The appellant along with his driver were prosecuted for various offences in five cases, namely, S.C. Nos. 368, 369, 370, 371, 428 and 429 of 2008. The appellant was the first accused in all these cases. The second accused, his driver, was acquitted in all cases, but the appellant, who, as already stated, is the first accused in all cases, found himself convicted in S.C. 368, 369 and 429 of 2008. In S.C. 368 of 2008, he was convicted for the offences under 

Sections 342 and 376 of Indian Penal Code 

and he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months for the offence under Section 342 of I.P.C. For the offence under Section 376 of I.P.C., he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for eight years and to pay fine of Rs.2,10,000/-, in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. If the fine amount was realized, a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- was directed to be paid as compensation to P.W.1. In S.C. 369 and 429 of 2008, the appellant, who is the first accused, was found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 376 of I.P.C. and he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for eight years and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/- with a default sentence of rigorous imprisonment for two months. In the other cases, both the accused stood acquitted.

2. These appeals tell the shocking tale of a self made thantric, priest, astrologer and what not, who wielded considerable influence among the people and used his privileged position to commit one of the most heinous crimes namely rape, that too on minor girls.

3. As we are concerned with only S.C. 368 of 2008 which gives rise to Crl.Appeal. 1630/2009 and S.C.369 and 429 of 2008 which gave rise to Crl.Appeal. 1599/2009, facts necessary for the disposal of these appeals alone are being referred to. In Crl.Appeal 1630 of 2009 the victim is examined as P.W.1 and in Crl.Appeal 1599 of 2009 the victim is examined as P.W.2.

4. The allegations in S.C. 368 of 2008 are that the victim, namely, P.W.1, who was an inmate of Santhitheeram, 'House of kids' run by the Trust headed by the appellant herein who managed to procure the presence of the girl in his flat on 15.1.2006 and 16.1.2006, was sexually exploited. That was followed on one day in March also. In S.C.369 of 2008, the allegation is that there too the victim, a minor girl, was induced to go from her house to the flat on three holidays in June, 2006 and she was brutally raped.

5. After investigation, final report was laid and finding that the offences are exclusively triable by a court of Sessions, committed the case to Sessions Court, Ernakulam. The said court made over the case to Vth Additional Sessions Court, Ernakulam for trial and disposal. 6. On receipt of records, the latter court framed charges in all cases, to which, the accused pleaded not guilty. It may be noticed here that the accused had filed a petition under Section 218(1) of Cr.P.C. for joint trial of all the cases. After hearing both sides, the court below allowed that petition and all the cases were jointly tried treating S.C. 368 of 2008 as the main case. Though the second accused moved an application to treat him as an approver, that was rejected. On denial of charges by the accused, the prosecution examined P.Ws.1 to 43 and had Exts.P1 to P104(a) marked. M.Os. I to XI were got identified and marked. The court below also viewed A4 and A5 cassettes and C13 multi media card in the presence of the accused and their counsel. After the prosecution evidence was closed, the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C. They denied all the incriminating circumstances brought out in evidence against them and maintained that they are innocent. The first accused, who is the appellant herein, has filed a detailed statement of defence. According to him, while he was studying for B.Com., he gained admission in the Bhrahma Vidyalaya, Sivagiri where he underwent a course in Bharathiya Vedas and Sasthras. He gained proficiency in poojas and homas from Advaidasramam, Aluva. For a brief period, he worked as the Chief Priest in few temples in and around Ernakulam. He gained knowledge in astrology and thantrik vidya and soon he came to be known as an expert astrologer. He claims to have attained popularity within a short span of time and he says that he was invited to various countries for conducting astrology classes, prasnams, poojas and homas. He also conducted discourses on Indian philosophy. People from all walks of life and all religions approached him for redressal of their grievances and for various other matters. He would say that he unfortunately got involved in real estate business and earned substantial profit also. Some persons who were envious about the prosperity and prominence acquired by the appellant, conspired together and he was depicted as Santhosh Madhavan who was involved in shady dealings and who was on the run from the interpol. The appellant claims to have met Shri. Vincent Paul, I.G. of Police, Ernakulam and convinced him that he was not the person whom they were looking for. It was confirmed that there were no proceedings against the appellant pending in any police station. He then gave interview to various news channels clearing his position and the assurance given by the I.G. This annoyed certain people and also the I.G. of Police, who, according to the appellant, conspired to trap him. On 8.5.2008 without any provocation, Santhitheeram Trust run by him was raided, but without much success by the police. His close association with Ministers and families worked to his detriment. On 10.5.2008 without even following the necessary legal procedures, his flat at Kadavanthra was broken open and a search was conducted. All senior police officers of City Police including C.I. Venu was present for search and the search was given wide publicity by the media. In the search so conducted, except his cloths, all the other articles were taken into custody. However, the police included only a few items in the search list. Under the guise that ganja was recovered from the flat, Crime No. 433 of 2008 was registered under the NDPS Act. Finding sandal wood in his flat, offence under the Forest Act was also registered. On the ground that tiger skin was seized from his flat, which was synthetic, crime under the Wild Life Protection Act was also registered. The police force was on the look out to gather materials as against him and register as many cases as possible against him. In fact he would say that he came to understand that they were threatening a lady to come down to India and file a false case against him. 7. The appellant claims that he moved this Court for anticipatory bail. He claims to have contacted the Assistant Commissioner of Police, who assured him that there was no substance in the complaints against him, and that the complaints have been filed only to shut the mouth of the media, and he was asked to meet the Assistant Commissioner on 13.5.2008 at early morning. When he reached the residence of the Assistant Commissioner at 7 a.m. he was taken to the Police Club. His body was searched and articles were seized. According to the appellant, since the police officers knew that in all probability anticipatory bail will be granted to the petitioner, he was falsely implicated in these cases. He narrates about the various illegalities committed by the police officers and also says that the cassettes alleged to have been seized from the locker were played there. He denied having been involved in the sexual exploits of the girls as alleged. His further grievance is that since his 'House of kids' was being run in a proper and disciplined manner, that was not liked by the parallel institutions who were out to destroy the institution. He had visited the Santhitheeram only twice, on one occasion when he received information that one of the inmates was indisciplined and he summoned the inmate and expelled the indisciplined inmate. It is also stated that P.W.1 was expelled in December, 2005 and thereafter she never came to Santhitheeram. He asserted that P.Ws. 1, 5 and 7 are speaking total falsehood and all what they say are untrue. He would conclude by saying that he has been unnecessarily implicated with ulterior motive.

8. The court below found that the accused could not be acquitted under Section 232 of Cr.P.C. and they were asked to enter on their defence. They examined D.Ws.1 to 4 and had Exts.D1 to D20 marked. Later P.W.43 had to be recalled and examined. After doing so, the accused were again questioned under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. 9. On an appreciation of the evidence in the case, in S.C.368 of 2008, the court below found the evidence of P.Ws.1, 5, 6 and 7 to be convincing enough and held the appellant guilty of the offence already made mention of. As far as S.C. 369 of 2008 was concerned, even though the principal witnesses including the victim turned hostile, the learned Judge viewed A4 and A5 cassettes and C13 multi media card and was satisfied that the participants seen involved in the sexual exploit in those cassettes were none other than the appellant herein and P.W.2 and on that basis, found the accused guilty. Conviction and sentence in each of these cases as already mentioned followed.

10. As a matter of convenience, since the question involved in Crl.Appeal. 1599 of 2009 is extremely limited, the said appeal shall be considered first.

11. As already noticed, the victim in this case is P.W.2. The evidence in S.C. 369 of 2008 consists of the evidence of P.Ws.2, 8, 9, 14, 15, 26, 29, 33, 35, 38, 41 and 43. The documents relied on were Exts.P3, P4 to P4(b), P14 to 17, P23 to 25, P37, P44, P46, P49, P54, P59 to 64, 66, 68 and 77 to 100.

12. The evidence of P.W.2, who is the defacto complainant, indicated that she was born on 5.1.1992. She hails from a poor family. Her father is a tea vendor moving on a bicycle. They did not have a permanent place of abode. She was admitted as an inmate of House for Kids at Ponekkara along with eight other children. The expenses for education and such other matters of P.W.2 were being met by P.Ws.11 and 12 who were running the institution. When examined in court, P.W.2 resiled from the statements given to the police and she denied having been an object of sexual exploits at the hands of the appellant. She turned completely hostile to the prosecution and the prosecution did not find support from her evidence on any count. All that she admitted was that she was examined at Government Hospital, Ernakulam. Her parents examined as P.Ws.8 and 9 also betrayed the prosecution though they admitted that P.W.2 was an inmate of the House of Kids for a period of one year. However, they too accepted that their daughter was examined by the doctor at the Government Hospital, Ernakulam.

13. P.Ws.14 and 29 are Revenue Officers who claimed to have been witnesses to the seizure of various articles from the locker which belonged to the appellant herein. In their presence, locker No.7 of Federal Bank which belonged to the appellant was opened and seven cassettes were recovered. The cassettes were numbered as A1 to A7. Another cover contained seven cassettes of Hi8 which were marked as B1 to B7. The third cover contained 11 cassettes of Hi8 make which were marked as C1 to C11. Besides that, there was a pen drive and a multi media card in the third cover which were marked as C12 and C13 respectively. P.Ws.14 and 29 deposed that the seizure was made in their presence and they had occasion to view the cassettes at the Bank itself in the presence of the police officers. The pen drive and the multi media card were played on a lap top. As per their evidence, A4 and A5 cassettes contained visuals of sexual intercourse by the first accused and a lady and they have heard the first accused telling the Circle Inspector that the lady was P.W.2. P.W.15 is the Chief Manager of Federal Bank, M.G. Road Branch, from where the articles were seized. P.Ws.26 and 33 were examined to prove the age of P.W.2 and Exts. 37 and 44 certificates show that the date of birth of the victim was 15.1.1992.

14. P.W.35 is the Civil Surgeon who had examined P.W.2 on 13.5.2008 at 5.45 p.m. at the General Hospital, Ernakulam and issued Ext.P46 certificate. In her evidence, she narrates about the findings which were recorded in Ext.P46 and her final opinion and the findings are consistent with regard to the fact that there is evidence of penetration. The rest of the witnesses are the police officers who registered crime and investigated the crime.

15. The main items of evidence in this case are A4 and A5 cassettes and C13 multi media card. When P.W.2 was being examined, the Public Prosecutor moved the court for playing the cassettes which the court declined at that point of time and deferred that exercise. Later the court below had the cassettes played and viewed the same. The court, having viewed the cassettes, prepared a memorandum of the same which is extracted in paragraph 94 of the judgment and it is not necessary for the purpose of this case to reiterate it in this judgment.

16. The evidence in the case, in the light of the fact that P.Ws.2, 8 and 9 had turned hostile, remained confined to the cassettes produced and naturally the main issue involved was the admissibility, relevancy and evidentiary value of the cassettes. The court below found that the cassettes are admissible in evidence and fall within the definition of document contemplated under the Indian Evidence Act and on viewing the same, the learned Judge formed the opinion that the two persons who were seen involved in sexual activities in A4 and A5 and C13 were none other than the appellant herein and P.W.2, and based on the identification made by the court, entered a finding of guilt against the appellant.

17. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant very vehemently challenged the act of the learned Judge in viewing the cassettes and making an identification of the participants of the sexual exploits seen in the cassettes and based on his identification entering the finding of guilt as against the appellant. Learned Senior Counsel went on to point out that even assuming that the cassettes are admissible in evidence, and could be viewed by the learned Judge, it is absolutely essential that their authenticity should have been established and without establishing their authenticity and accuracy, they could not have been relied on. Apart from that, the learned Senior Counsel raised a more serious contention that even accepting that the learned Judge could view the cassettes, he can make use of the same only for the purpose of appreciation of evidence in the case and could not substitute himself as a witness in the case and enter a finding of guilt. In the case on hand, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant went on to contend that that had what happened in this case. None of the main witnesses, namely, P.Ws.2, 8 and 9 nor P.W.43 viewed the cassettes and had identified the participants as the appellant and P.W.2. In fact, learned Senior Counsel went on to point out that P.Ws.2, 8 and 9, the victim and her parents were not shown the cassettes and questioned on that basis. Learned Senior Counsel went on to contend that the mere fact that in Ext.P23 mahazar which evidenced the seizure of the cassettes, the investigating officer has stated that he had viewed the cassettes and was satisfied that it was P.W.2 and the appellant, will not be sufficient in law as long as the investigating officer has not deposed to that effect in court after viewing the cassettes in court. It was quite improper and illegal on the part of the Judge to have based a conviction solely on the basis that he was able to identify the participants in the cassettes and by doing so he has assumed the role of a witness and if that be so, he could not have continued considering the case. If he was transformed to the status of a witness, he would be subjected to cross examination, which was not done in the case on hand. It was contended that in the light of the said fact, the formation of opinion by the learned Judge could not have support in law and is quite illegal. For the said proposition, the learned Senior Counsel relied on the decisions reported in 

Keisam Kumar Singh v. State of Manipur (AIR 1985 SC 1664) 

and 

State of Kerala v. Aboobacker (2006(3) ILR Kerala 672)

According to the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant, if A4 and A5 cassettes and C13 multi media card are eschewed from consideration, there is absolutely no evidence at all in this case to prove the allegations against the appellant.

18. Learned Additional Director General of Prosecution appearing on behalf of the State pointed out that it is by now well settled that tape recorders and video cassettes fall within the category of documents as envisaged under the Indian Evidence Act and therefore, are admissible in evidence. It was pointed out by the learned Addl.D.G.P. that there have been innumerable cases where tape recorders have been treated as part of the evidence and video cassettes have been viewed as in this case. It is significant to notice, according to the learned Addl.D.G.P. that the cassettes which were played in court and also the multi media card were seized from the locker which exclusively belonged to the accused and therefore, there was no doubt that it belonged to him. The seizure of these items were sworn to by P.W.14 and 29 and the evidence of P.W.43 the investigating officer is sufficient to show that the seizure was proper and in accordance with law. It was also pointed out that a camera was seized from the flat which belonged to the accused and there is nothing to show that the cassettes are not authentic and accurate.

19. The learned Addl.D.G.P. also pointed out that since the cassettes have been seized from the locker which exclusively belonged to the accused, it was for him to explain if there was any defect in the cassette going by Section 106 of Indian Evidence Act because those matters are within his exclusive knowledge. For the said position, the learned Addl.D.G.P. relied on the decisions reported in 

Madan Lal v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1997 KHC 521) 

and 

Neel Kumar @ Anil Kumar v. State of Haryana (2012 KHC 4275)

For the proposition that video cassettes and tape recorders are admissible in evidence, the learned Addl.D.G.P. relied on the decisions reported in 

Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010 KHC 4268) 

and 

State of Maharashtra v. Praful B Desai (2003 KHC 581) 

According to the learned Addl.D.G.P., if there is any illegality or irregularity in the seizure, that is also not a ground to discard the evidence going by the decision reported in State Rep. By Inspector of Police v. N.M.T. Joy Immaculate (2004 KHC 1886). The learned Addl.D.G.P. went on to point out that the investigating officer, namely, P.W.43 has stated in Ext.P23, the mahazar by which the seizure of the cassettes were made, that they had occasion to view the cassettes and the first accused had told him that the lady involved was P.W.2. This is sufficient evidence, according to the learned Addl.D.G.P.

20. The core issue involved in the appeal is whether A4, A5 and C13 multi media card are admissible in evidence and if so, what is the criterion to be applied. It also falls for consideration as to whether the learned Judge was justified in viewing the cassettes and based on an identification made by him entering a finding that the offences have been committed.

21. For the present purpose, it shall be assumed that the seizure was proper and the articles were seized from the locker which belonged to the appellant herein. True, there is some controversy regarding the seizure. The appellant has a case that the cassettes were planted there and did not belong to him. There is also some controversy thrown up regarding the key of the locker also. It has come out in evidence that the Bank was informed about the loss of key on 13.5.2006. The accused was arrested and produced before the Magistrate and remanded to police custody only on 14.5.2006 and it is pointed out that it was on search of the accused on getting police custody that the key was recovered from his possession. A question is posed that if as a matter of fact the key was recovered only on 14.5.2013, how could the police report the loss of key to the Bank on 13.5.2006.

22. Assume that there is some anomaly in that respect and assume that, that may not have much force on the seizure of the cassettes from the locker and also assume that the locker belonged to the appellant herein, the question that still arises is whether they are admissible in evidence and what is the procedure to be followed. Recapitulating what the court has done in this case, it viewed the cassettes A4 and A5 and C13 multi media card. The court below in its judgment observed that no prosecution witness except the investigating officer P.W.43 identified the participants in A4 and A5 and C13. The lower court in its judgment gives a vivid description of what it had seen in the cassettes.

23. It is based on the viewing of cassettes that the court below initially draws a presumption that there was vaginal penetration in relation to P.W.2. The medical evidence does reveal that she was subjected to sexual intercourse and there is no other material to show that she was sexually assaulted by any other person.

24. But a far more important question remains to be answered. One needs to consider the category of evidence under which the cassettes fall? Are they admissible in evidence? If so, what are the conditions for receiving them in evidence? Finally, is the learned Judge justified in importing his views regarding the participants in the cassettes and also that there was vaginal penetration solely based on what he had seen in the cassettes. There is no other evidence regarding the identification of the victim or the act committed by the accused. As to what constitutes evidence and the rules of admissibility and relevancy of the evidence are covered by the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. The Act defines 'evidence' as follows: "Evidence" .-"Evidence" means and includes- (1) all statements which the Court permits or requires to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of fact under inquiry; such statements are called oral evidence; (2) all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the Court, such documents are called documentary evidence." 25. The Act defines 'document' also. The Indian Penal Code as well as the General Clauses Act also define 'document'. The definition of 'document' takes in photographs as could be seen from the illustration to the Section. Going by the definition, 'document' includes all materials or substance upon which thoughts of a man are represented by writing or any other specious of conventional mark or symbol. The essence of a document is that they record information of some sort. Though the definition of document in Indian Evidence Act and General Clauses Act are in pari materia, the definition in I.P.C. slightly differs. 26. In Halsbury's Laws of India, 2007 Reissue, Vol. 15 at page 343 Note 145.142, 'documentary evidence' is defined as follows: " 'Documentary evidence' means and includes all documents including electronic records produced for the inspection of the court. 'Document' means any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter. A writing is a document; as are words printed, lithographed or photographed; a map or a plan; an inscription on a metal plate or stone; and also a caricature." In the light of the long line of decisions and the principles laid down therein, it is clear that photographs, audio and video cassettes have all been treated as falling within the ambit of the term 'document'.

27. But there are two categories of such documents. They are, (i) those which fall within the pictorial testimony theory and (ii) those which fall under the silent witness theory category. Pictorial testimony theory or communication theory is based on the notion that any witness with knowledge that a photograph is a fair and accurate representation may testify to the fundamental facts. There is no requirement that the person who took the photograph should testify in order to authenticate the photograph. It is enough that the individual testifying recognises the subject that is depicted in the photograph. Authenticity of the photograph is to be established like in the case of any other document. It must be noticed that documentary testimony theory only covers the admissibility of evidence and it does not refer to the evidence of the photographer as a fact finder. Under the silent witness theory, the following factors will have to be established: "Under "silent witness" theory, testimony, establishing authenticity, integrity, and competency of video recording. Photograph expert's determination that video recording was not altered in any way, built-up or faked. Continuous chain of custody established. Video camera or camcorder was checked and property operating. Video recording is same as what witness saw on playback immediately after recording. No material alteration, surreptitious editing, or fabrications have taken place." 28. In Black's Law Dictionary , 9th Edition, at page 1508, 'silent witness theory' is mentioned as follows: "A method of authenticating and admitting evidence (such as a photograph), without the need for a witness to verify its authenticity, upon a sufficient showing of the reliability of the process of producing the evidence, including proof that the evidence has not been altered." 29. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol.17, at page 158, it is noticed as follows: "224. Photographs. Photographs properly verified on oath by a person able to speak to their accuracy are generally admissible to prove the identity of persons, or the configuration of land as it existed at a particular moment (scientific deductions from them being made by a witness both skilled and experienced in such a task, or radar echoes or the contents of a lost document. In the High Court a photograph is receivable in evidence at the trial only when certain provisions have been complied with." 30. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fifth Edition, Vol. 11, at page 723, it is noticed as follows: "958. Photographs, films, records, tape recordings and video recordings. At common law, photographs properly verified on oath by a person able to speak to their accuracy were generally admissible to prove the identity of persons, or the configuration of land as it existed at a particular moment (scientific deductions from them being made by a witness both skilled and experienced in such a task), or radar echoes or the contents of a lost document. For the purpose of Civil Evidence Act 1995, 'document' means anything in which information of any description is recorded and a similarly wide definition applies for the purposes of disclosure under the Civil Procedure Rules. Thus photographs, films, records, tape recordings and video recordings are all admissible in evidence, subject, if appropriate, to the statutory safeguards with regard to hearsay evidence. Prior notice must be given of a party's intention to put photographs and certain other items in evidence. The court has power to order the photographing of property which is, or may become, the subject matter of proceedings. A witness's evidence may be given by means of a video link where such facilities are available and in appropriate cases, court hearings may be conducted by means of such a link." 31. In Law of Evidence by C.D. Field, Vol.1, 13th Edition at page 355 it is mentioned as follows: "18. Documents.- Besides the Evidence Act, term "document" has been defined in the General Clauses Act, 1897, and Indian Penal Code, 1860, for purposes of comparison the definition given in both these statutes are reproduced below: Section 3(18), General Clauses Act.- "Document" shall include any matter written, expressed, or described upon any substances by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means which is intended to be used, or which may be used for the purpose of recording that matter. Section 29, Penal Code.- The word "document" denotes any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, as evidence of that matter Explanation 1. It is immaterial by what means or upon what substance the letters, figures or marks are formed, or whether the evidence is intended for, or may be used in a court of justice, or not." It is also clear that photographs, tape recorders, picture clips, video tapes can be used as evidence provided certain conditions are satisfied.

32. It could thus be seen that the tape recorders, audio and video cassettes fall within the definition of 'document'. Wigmore on Evidence, Chgadbourn Revision, Vol.III at page 220, it is observed as follows: 

"Given an adequate foundation assuring the accuracy of the process producing it, the photograph should then be received as a so-called silent witness or as a witness which "speaks for itself". "Until now, this court has not been called upon to state the theory upon which photographs are admitted into evidence. In doing so we recognize that photographs are useful for different purposes. When admitted merely to aid a witness in explaining his testimony they are, as Wigmore states, nothing more than the illustrated testimony of that witness. But they may also be used as probative evidence of what they depict. Used in this manner they take on the status of independent "silent" witnesses." "What quantum of authentication do courts require before a photograph may be admissible in evidence? It is simply this-that some witness (not necessarily the photographer) be able to give some indication as to when, where, and under what circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the photograph accurately portray the subject or subjects illustrated. The photograph need only be sufficiently accurate to be helpful to the court and the jury." 

33. In the decision reported in 

Grant v. Southwestern Properties ((1974 ) 2 All.E.R. 465)

it was held as follows: 

"A tape recording was a document if what was recorded was information or evidence and a tape recording of a conversation could properly be described as documentary evidence of the conversation. The interposition of necessity of an instrument for decyphering the information made no difference in principle. Further-more, although the tape recording provided no information to the eye. It was nonetheless a document that could be produced for inspection, within RSC Ord 24 r 10(1), since the word 'inspection' was not limited to occular inspection but included scrutiny or examination by any of the senses." 

34. In the decision reported in 

Taylor v. Chief Constable Cheshire ((1987) 1 All.E.R. 225)

it was held as follows: 

"The next case to which I would refer is the case of 

R V Fowden and White [1982] Crim LR 588. 

There two persons, the appellants, were alleged to have been photographed on a video film carrying out acts of theft. At their trial the Crown sought to call evidence from a police officer and a store detective who knew Fowden and While to say that the persons on the film were the accused. The judge admitted that evidence of identity, against the contention for the defence that it was purely a matter for the jury, looking at the film, to determine the question of identity. On appeal it was held (at 589)- 

'there was no difference in principle between a video film and a photograph or tape recording. Although it was not strictly necessary to decide the point the Court was of the opinion there was no reason in principle why the Crown should not be able to call a witness who knows someone to look at a photograph and give evidence to the effect that he knows the person, and it is the accused'. 

However, in the circumstances of that particular case the court held (at 589): 

'...the evidence should not have been admitted as the prejudicial value outweighed its probative effect, because the identifying witnesses knew the accused for a similar shoplifting case a week later, and accordingly the defence were deprived from testing the accuracy of the identification without causing prejudice and embarrassment'. It is to be noted therefore, in my judgment, that the court was proceeding on the basis that the evidence called was admissible in law, but subject to the discretionary power of the court to exclude it on well- known principles".

35. In the decision reported in 

R v. Khan(Sultan) ((1996) 3 All.E.R. 289) 

it was held as follows: 

"The appeal would be dismissed for the following reasons- 

(1) Under English law, there was in general nothing unlawful about a breach of privacy and the common law rule that relevant evidence obtained by the police by improper or unfair means was admissible in a criminal trial, notwithstanding that it was obtained improperly or even unlawfully, applied to evidence obtained by the use of surveillance devices which invaded a person's privacy. Accordingly, even if the right to privacy for which the appellant contended did exist (which was doubtful) the tape recording was, as a matter of law, admissible in evidence at the trial of the appellant subject, however, to the judge's discretion to exclude it in the exercise of his common law discretion or under s 78 of the 1984 Act (see p 291 c d, p 292 g, p 297 j to p 298 b d and p 302 d e, post); 

R v Sang [1979] 2 All ER 1222 

applied. 

(2) The fact that evidence had been obtained in circumstances which amounted to a breach of the provisions of art 8 of the convention was relevant to, but not determinative of, the judge's discretion to admit or exclude such evidence under s 78 of the 1984 Act. The judge's discretion had to be exercised according to whether the admission of the evidence would render the trial unfair, and the use at a criminal trial of material obtained in breach of the rights of privacy enshrined in art 8 did not of itself mean that the trial would be unfair. On the facts, the trial judge had been entitled to hold that the circumstances in which the relevant evidence was obtained, even if they constituted a breach of art 8, were not such as to require the exclusion of the evidence (see p 291 cd, p 292 g and p 301 g to p 302 a d e, post). Decision of the Court of Appeal [1994] 4 All ER 426 affirmed".

36. In the decision reported in 

State of Maharashtra v. Praful B. Desai (AIR 2003 SC 2053) 

video recording of evidence has held as proper mode of obtaining evidence. 

37. In the decision reported in 

Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate ((2010) 4 SCC 329) 

it was held as follows: 

"23. The second issue, in our opinion, is of greater importance than the first one. It is well settled that tape- records of speeches are "documents" as defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act and stand on no different footing than photographs.(See : Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra and Ors.4). There is also no doubt that the new techniques and devices are the order of the day. Audio and video tape technology has emerged as a powerful medium through which a first hand information about an event can be gathered and in a given situation may prove to be a crucial piece of evidence. At the same time, with fast development in the electronic techniques, the tapes/cassettes are more susceptible to tampering and alterations by transposition, excision, etc. which may be difficult to detect and, therefore, such evidence has to be received with caution. Though it would neither be feasible nor advisable to lay down any exhaustive set of rules by which the admissibility of such evidence may be judged but it needs to be emphasised that to rule out the possibility of any kind of tampering with the tape, the standard of proof about its authenticity and accuracy has to be more stringent as compared to other documentary evidence." 

38. In the decision reported in 

Nilesh Dinkar Paradkar v. State of Maharashtra ((2011) 4 SCC 143) 

it was held as follows: 

"31. In our opinion, the evidence of voice identification is at best suspect, if not, wholly unreliable. Accurate voice identification is much more difficult than visual identification. It is prone to such extensive and sophisticated tampering, doctoring and editing that the reality can be completely replaced by fiction. Therefore, the courts have to be extremely cautious in basing a conviction purely on the evidence of voice identification. This Court, in a number of judgments emphasised the importance of the precautions, which are necessary to be taken in placing any reliance on the evidence of voice identification.

32. In Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ramdass Mehra this Court made following observations: (SCC p. 26, para 19) 

"19. We think that the High Court was quite right in holding that the tape-records of speeches were `documents', as defined by Section 3 of the Evidence Act, which stood on no different footing than photographs, and that they were admissible in evidence on satisfying the following conditions: 

(a) The voice of the person alleged to be speaking must be duly identified by the maker of the record or by others who know it. 

(b) Accuracy of what was actually recorded had to be proved by the maker of the record and satisfactory evidence, direct or circumstantial, had to be there so as to rule out possibilities of tampering with the record. 

(c) The subject-matter recorded had to be shown to be relevant according to rules of relevancy found in the Evidence Act." 

33. In Ram Singh v. Col. Ram Singh, again this Court stated some of the conditions necessary for admissibility of tape-recorded statements, as follows: (SCC p. 623, para 32) 

"(1) The voice of the speaker must be duly identified by the maker of the record or by others who recognise his voice. In other words, it manifestly follows as a logical corollary that the first condition for the admissibility of such a statement is to identify the voice of the speaker. Where the voice has been denied by the maker it will require very strict proof to determine whether or not it was really the voice of the speaker. 

(2) The accuracy of the tape-recorded statement has to be proved by the maker of the record by satisfactory evidence-- direct or circumstantial. 

(3) Every possibility of tampering with or erasure of a part of a tape-recorded statement must be ruled out otherwise it may render the said statement out of context and, therefore, inadmissible. 

(4) The statement must be relevant according to the rules of the Evidence Act. 

(5) The recorded cassette must be carefully sealed and kept in safe or official custody. 

(6) The voice of the speaker should be clearly audible and not lost or distorted by other sounds or disturbances." 

34. In Ram Singh case this Court also notices with approval the observations made by the Court of Appeal in England in R. v. Maqsud Ali. In the aforesaid case, Marshall, J. observed thus: (QB p. 701 C-F) 

"... We can see no difference in principle between a tape recording and a photograph. In saying this we must not be taken as saying that such recordings are admissible whatever the circumstances, but it does appear to this Court wrong to deny to the law of evidence advantages to be gained by new techniques and new devices, provided the accuracy of the recording can be proved and the voices recorded properly identified; provided also that the evidence is relevant and otherwise admissible, we are satisfied that a tape recording is admissible in evidence. Such evidence should always be regarded with some caution and assessed in the light of all the circumstances of each case. There can be no question of laying down any exhaustive set of rules by which the admissibility of such evidence should be judged." 

35. To the same effect is the judgment in R. v. Robson, which has also been approved by this Court in Ram Singh case. In this judgment, Shaw, J. delivering the judgment of the Central Criminal Court observed as follows: (Robson case6, WLR p. 653 F-G) 

"... The determination of the question is rendered the more difficult because tape recordings may be altered by the transposition, excision and insertion of words or phrases and such alterations may escape detection and even elude it on examination by technical experts." 

36. Chapter 14 of Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice discusses the law in England with regard to evidence of identification. Section 1 of this Chapter deals with visual identification and Section 2 relates to voice identification. Here again, it is emphasised that voice identification is more difficult than visual identification. Therefore, the precautions to be observed should be even more stringent than the precautions which ought to be taken in relation to visual identification. Speaking of lay listeners (including police officers), it enumerates the factors which would be relevant to judge the ability of such lay listener to correctly identify the voices. These factors include: 

"(a) the quality of the recording of the disputed voice, 

(b) the gap in time between the listener hearing the known voice and his attempt to recognise the disputed voice, 

(c) the ability of the individual to identify voices in general (research showing that this varies from person to person), 

(d) the nature and duration of the speech which is sought to be identified, and 

(e) the familiarity of the listener with the known voice; and even a confident recognition of a familiar voice by a way listener may nevertheless be wrong." 

37. The Court of Appeal in England in R. v. Chenia and R. v. Flynn has reiterated the minimum safeguards which are required to be observed before a court can place any reliance on the voice identification evidence, as follows: 

"(a) the voice recognition exercise should be carried out by someone other than the officer investigating the offence; 

(b) proper records should be kept of the amount of time spent in contact with the suspect by any officer giving voice recognition evidence, of the date and time spent by any such officer in compiling any transcript of a covert recording, and of any annotations on a transcript made by a listening officer as to his views as to the identity of a speaker; and 

(c) any officer attempting a voice recognition exercise should not be provided with a transcript bearing the annotations of any other officer." 

38 . In America, similar safeguards have been evolved through a series of judgments of different courts. The principles evolved have been summed up in American Jurisprudence 2d (Vol. 29) in regard to the admissibility of tape-recorded statements, which are stated as under: 

"The cases are in general agreement as to what constitutes a proper foundation for the admission of a sound recording, and indicate a reasonably strict adherence to the rules prescribed for testing the admissibility of recordings, which have been outlined as follows: 

(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of taking testimony; 

(2) a showing that the operator of the device was competent; 

(3) establishment of the authenticity and correctness of the re-cording; 

(4) a showing that changes, additions, or deletions have not been made; 

(5) a showing of the manner of the preservation of the recording; 

(6) identification of the speakers; and 

(7) a showing that the testimony elicited was voluntarily made without any kind of inducement. 

... 

However, the recording may be rejected if it is so inaudible and indistinct that the jury must speculate as to what was said." 

39. This apart, in Mahabir Prasad Verma v. Dr. Surinder Kaur, this Court has laid down that tape-recorded evidence can only be used as corroboration evidence. In SCC para 22, it is observed as follows: (SCC p. 269) 

"22. ... Tape-recorded conversation can only be relied upon as corroborative evidence of conversation deposed by any of the parties to the conversation and in the absence of evidence of any such conversation, the tape-recorded conversation is indeed no proper evidence and cannot be relied upon. In the instant case, there was no evidence of any such conversation between the tenant and the husband of the landlady; and in the absence of any such conversation, the tape-recorded conversation could be no proper evidence." 

39. Going by the above decisions, though it is clear that tape recordings, video and audio are admissible in evidence, in the decision reported in 

Tukaram S. Dighole v. Manikrao Shivaji Kokate ((2010) 4 SCC 329)

the conditions to be satisfied before their acceptance have been laid down. Going by the literature on the subject and also the principle laid down in the various decisions, it is quite evident that even though the degree or probative value of such evidence may vary depending upon the facts. The method adopted may be the pictorial testimony theory or the silent theory. One fact is absolutely essential and that is, it should be established that they are authenticated copies and accurate copies. 

40. In the decisions relied on by the learned Addl.D.G.P. it is true that video recordings and audio cassettes have been accepted as evidence. There can be no quarrel that they fall under the category of documents and are admissible in evidence provided the conditions are satisfied.

41. In the case on hand, there is no authentication by any expert or any other person regarding the authenticity of the cassettes or in other words, there is no expert's evidence to show that there has not been any tampering with the cassettes. Further, Ext.P70 is the memorandum prepared by the Tahsildar concerned who was asked to view the cassettes as per the orders of the learned CJM Court. He had viewed the cassettes and recorded what he had seen in the cassettes. Shockingly and surprisingly, the said person was not examined and Ext.P70 was marked through the investigating officer and one fails to understand the mode adopted by the prosecution in doing so. 

42. It is stated that a camera was seized from the premises of the accused. But there is no evidence to show that the contents of A4, A5 and C13 multi media card were filmed through that camera. It is also surprising to note that P.Ws. 2, 8 and 9 were not shown the cassettes and questioned as to the other member apart from the accused who was seen in the cassettes.

43. The learned Addl.D.G.P. contended that in the light of the fact that cassettes have been recovered from the locker exclusively belonged to the accused, it was for him to explain its contents. It was further contended on behalf of the State that the evidence of P.W.43, the Investigating Officer, is sufficient.

44. True, in the decisions cited by the learned Addl.D.G.P., it has been held that the evidence of police officer cannot be brushed aside and that may be sufficient under certain circumstances. But that has no application to the case on hand for, in the case on hand, P.W.43 had not seen the cassettes and made identification of the participants in court. All that he says in his evidence is that Ext.P23 mahazar was prepared by him and in that he had stated that he had identified the participants.

45. The evidence furnished by P.W.43 to that effect may not be sufficient in law. Therefore, it follows that none of the prosecution witnesses have identified the participants who was seen along with the appellant herein in A4, A5 and C13 multi media card. Nor is there any authentication of the cassettes or confirmation about its accuracy.

46. Relying on the decision reported ion 

P.C. Purushothama Reddiar v. S. Perumal (1972 KHC 350)

it was contended that once a document is admitted, its contents are also deemed to have been admitted. 

47. It is well settled that admissibility of a document and proof of contents of a document are two entirely different things. More so because even if a document is admitted, it does not follow that contents are proved. Further here it is more a question of identification of the person in A4, A5 and C13.

48. Even assuming that all those infirmities can be overlooked, the question would be whether the court below was justified in viewing the cassettes and based on the identification made by the Judge, entering a finding of guilt.

49. There can be no quarrel regarding the right of the court to view the cassettes like the court is entitled to make a visit of the scene of offence etc. But those are all only for the purpose of appreciating the evidence in the case in a proper manner. However, in the case on hand, based on the identification made by the Judge on viewing the cassettes, a finding of guilt has been entered into. The learned Judge observed that on seeing the cassettes, he is satisfied that one of the participants in A4, A5 and C13 multimedia card is P.W.2.

50. By doing so, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, he transformed himself as a witness. In the decision reported in 

Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1956 SC 415)

it was held as follows: 

"A Magistrate is certainly not entitled to allow his view or observation to take the place of evidence because such view or observation of his cannot be tested by cross-examination and the accused would certainly not be in a position to furnish any explanation in regard to the same. In the absence of such test having been applied and an explanation sought from the accused in regard to the same under S. 342, it is not open to the judge to incorporate these observations of his in the judgment and base his conclusion on the same." 

51. In the decision reported in 

Keisam Kumar Singh v. State of Manipur (AIR 1985 SC 1664)

it was held as follows: 

"Normally, a Court is not entitled to make a local inspection and even if such an inspection is made, it can never take the place of evidence or proof but is really meant for appreciating the position at the spot." 

52. In the decision reported in 

State of Kerala v. Aboobacker (2006(3) ILR Kerala 672) 

it was held as follows: 

"17. Even though Sec.310 Cr.P.C gives power to the Judge at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings to conduct a local inspection of the place of occurrence, such power is given only for the purpose of properly appreciating the evidence already on record and it does not empower the judge to assume the role of a witness. In this case, the trial judge after conducting a local inspection on 19-10-2005 has prepared two diagrams which I have been incorporated in paras 22 and 58 of the judgment. In the second diagram the trial judge has shown the track chosen by the girl to cross the compound lying adjacent to the place of occurrence and from where the girl could have been carried to the spot on the upstairs of Beeran Koya's house from where the culprit allegedly had carnal knowledge of the victim and thereafter allegedly strangulated her to death. No witness has spoken about such a track leading to the spot where the alleged incident took place. During the course of local inspection the trial judge even made an inquisitive expedition at the scene of crime to locate a rubber basket kept in the room where the occurrence allegedly took place and made the following observation in para 59 of the judgment. 

"I have seen a rubber basket kept in this room. Other thing are also kept. Then possibility of getting coir pieces is seen disputed by the accused, as the prosecution has marked 5 coir pieces. These are marked as M.O.23(a), 23(b), 23(c), 23(d) and 23(e). The length of these pieces are measured before the court to see whether it is possible to tie the legs and hands of the girl by the offender as contended by the prosecution. I am convinced that these pieces of coir are strong enough and could be used for tying things. Curiously I have noticed the presence of similar coir kept in the rubber basket in this room. The vision I got is that this room, is being used for storing the implements and the incidental materials in connection with the house construction". 

We do not know whether the trial judge wanted to boast whether she had stumbled upon something which even the investigating officer had omitted to notice. But by indulging in such an exercise, the trial judge was virtually transforming herself into a witness". 

53. Following the principle laid down in the above decisions, it becomes clear that the act of the learned Judge in substituting himself in the place of a witness and entering a conclusive finding on that basis has no sanction of law. If he acts as a witness, he has necessarily to offer himself for cross-examination and that has not been done in the case on hand. In fact, the only substantive evidence is the impression formed by the learned Judge by viewing the cassettes.

54. The said act of the learned Judge suffers from serious legal infirmities and the said opinion cannot be accepted in evidence. If that evidence is eschewed, there is no evidence in this case to show that the offensive act has been committed by the appellant.

55. Therefore, Crl.Appeal No. 1599 of 2009 has necessarily to be allowed and the conviction and sentence of the accused for the offences under Section 376 of I.P.C are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge against him.

56. Crl.Appeal No. 1630 of 2009 This appeal arises from the conviction and sentence in S.C. 368 of 2008. The victim is P.W.1.

57. The evidence in this case consists of the oral testimony of P.Ws.1, 5 and 7. The court below chose to accept their evidence and also based on the medical evidence made available came to the conclusion that the offences have been committed.

58. Assailing the finding of the court below in this case, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the court below was not justified in accepting the evidence of P.W.1 as it does not stand scrutiny nor can it be termed as evidence of a sterling character which would justify a conviction on the sole basis of the evidence of P.W.1. The inherent discrepancies in her evidence, the contradictions brought out in her evidence and inconsistencies in her evidence compared to the evidence of P.Ws.5, 6 and 7 have not been properly considered and had her evidence been considered in the light of the other evidence, it could have been found that P.W.1 is not a reliable witness. The evidence of P.W.5, the father of the victim, is only with regard to what was told to him by his daughter and that does not advance the case of the prosecution much. The evidence of P.W.6 is of no help to the prosecution. The learned Senior Counsel went on to point out that unfortunately the evidence of P.W.7 has been treated as corroborating the evidence of P.W.1 taking aid of Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned Senior Counsel went on to point out that even going by the evidence of P.W.7, it was long after the incident that the so-called narration was made by P.W.1 about the incident and if that be so, Section 157 of Evidence Act cannot be attracted. In order to attract Section 157 Evidence Act, the learned Senior Counsel went on to point out that time when the fact took place has considerable relevance and importance. A statement made long after the fact does not fall within the ambit of Section 157 Evidence Act. Learned Senior Counsel went on to contend that it is another facet of res gestea evidence.

59. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant did not have any quarrel with the proposition that if the evidence of the prosecutrix is of a sterling character and convincing enough, a conviction can certainly be based on the same. But, according to the learned Senior Counsel, when the evidence suffers from intrinsic defects and is belied by other evidence in the case, then the court has to necessarily look for corroboration. If that be the position, in the case on hand, there is no evidence corroborating the version given by P.W.1 and the finding of guilt solely based on the evidence of P.W.1 cannot stand. For the said proposition learned counsel relied on the decisions reported in 

Ramdas v. State of Maharashtra ((2007) 2 SCC 170)

Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2012) 8 SCC 21)

Kaini Rajan v. State of Kerala (2013) 9 SCC 113)

Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2012) 7 SCC 171) 

and 

Rajesh Patel v. State of Jharkhand ((2013) 3 SCC 791). 

Accordingly, it is contended that the court below was not justified in coming to the conclusion that the offences have been made out.

60. Learned Senior Counsel also pointed out that the investigation conducted in this case, to say the least, is miserable and several aspects which would have been gone in favour of the accused were deliberately omitted to be looked into by the investigating officer. A reading of the evidence would disclose that there are serious flaws in the investigation which have caused considerable prejudice to the accused and that should have been taken note of by the court below. Viewed from this angle also, learned Senior Counsel went on to point out that the finding of guilt cannot stand. 

61. The learned Addl.D.G.P. on the other hand pointed out that the court below has analysed the evidence of P.Ws.1, 5, 6 and 7 and has come to the conclusion that the evidence of P.W.1 clearly shows that the offences have been made out. The evidence of P.W.7, according to the learned Addl.D.G.P. falls within the ambit of Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act and sufficiently corroborates the version given by P.W.1. According to the Addl.D.G.P., if the evidence of the prosecutrix is above board and is found to be convincing, certainly a conviction can be based on the same and the court need not look for corroboration. For the above proposition, learned Addl.D.G.P. relied on the decisions reported in 

State of M.P. v. Dayal Sahu ((2005) 8 SCC 122)

Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra (2006(1) K.L.T. SN 80) 

and 

Kamalanantha v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005 KHC 751).

62. As regards the discrepancies and inconsistencies in the evidence of P.W.1, the learned Addl.D.G.P. pointed out that such minor inconsistencies and contradictions are bound to arise and that only shows that P.W.1 is speaking the truth. She has properly explained the delay in lodging the FIS and that seems to be justified also. Learned Addl.D.G.P. pointed out that she is the victim of a most heinous crime and her evidence will have to be appreciated in the light of the said fact. She is an injured witness who now suffers a stigma as a result of the act committed by the accused. The court has to be sensitive in appreciating her evidence and contradictions and inconsistencies which do not affect the core of the prosecution case cannot be given undue importance to doubt the prosecution version. The age of the victim will have to be taken note of while appreciating her evidence. For the above proposition, learned Addl.D.G.P. relied on the decisions reported in 

Muniappan. C v. State of Tamil Nadu (2010 KHC 4621)

Chandrasekhar Sureshchandra Bhatt v. State of Maharashtra (2000 KHC 1674) 

and 

Bhajan Singh @ Harbhajan Singh v. State of Haryana (2011 KHC 4542).

63. The learned Addl.D.G.P. then contended that even assuming that there are some flaws in the investigation, that cannot be a ground to acquit the accused if it is found that the evidence furnished by P.W.1 is sufficient to warrant a conviction. According to the learned Addl.D.G.P. even accepting the contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, eschewing and discarding the portion of the evidence which consists of inconsistencies and contradictions etc., the core of the prosecution evidence still remains and the evidence of P.W.1 remains unimpeached as regards the actual incident. Relying on the principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus which does not apply in India, learned Addl.D.G.P. pointed out that there is no harm in eschewing those portions of the evidence which are unacceptable and relying on those portions of the evidence which are sufficient to establish the offence against the accused. Under such circumstances, there is no reason to discard her testimony because some of her statements are found to be false.

64. The main evidence in the case consists of the testimony of P.W.1. She says that she was born on 19.2.1991. Her mother had committed suicide and her sister was married and her father was a carpenter. Her step mother is Tessy. Upto the 4th standard she studied in L.P.School, Thattaram. From the 5th standard to 10th standard, she schooled at LMCC, Pachalam run by Christian nuns. While P.W.1 was studying in the 10th standard, she acquired friendship with one Preety, who came from Santhitheeram and she told her about the life at that place and also that the said institution met the necessary expenses of the poor girls. Food and accommodation are provided there and Preety found it comfortable to stay there. While she was studying in the 10th standard, marriage of her sister had taken place and that had resulted in financial burden to her father who found it difficult to make both ends meet. At that point of time, P.W.6 and Smt.Jannet came to her house and asked her to move to Santhitheeram. They told the father of P.W.1 that there were only a few students there and the institution needed more students. P.W.1 would say that on the next day her father went along with the Sisters to Santhitheeram and he was impressed by the state of affairs there. According to her, her father felt that there was a family atmosphere that prevailed in Santhitheeram. They were given to understand that P.Ws.10 and 11 were running the institution and Warden of the institution was one Santha. The children of P.W.10 and 11 were also staying there. Impressed by the conditions, P.W.1 would say that she was taken to the institution by her father and she joined the institution. She would say that after she joined the institution, three more students came to stay there. As per her evidence, three months after she joined Santhitheeram, the accused happened to come there and she came to know that Santhitheeram was run by a Trust of which the appellant was the President. He was popularly known as Amritha Chaithanya. He used to take children to the park. On one occasion, after taking the children to the park, five of them were taken to his flat including P.W.1. They were taken in the car owned by the appellant. The rest of the children were taken to Santhitheeram in the van owned by Santhitheeram. On reaching the flat, the children were made to stay overnight. P.W.1 would say that in the night the accused slept along with them. But he did no mischief. The next day, one of the children namely, Abhaya, informed P.W.6 about what had transpired on the previous night. P.W.1 would say that P.W.6 immediately contacted the appellant and told him that what he did was wrong. According to P.W.1, the reply given by the appellant was that he was running the Trust and the children were entrusted placing trust on him and no one needs to question his activities.

65. P.W.1 in her evidence says that it so happened that she was weak in mathematics. According to P.W.1, the accused used to verify her performance in examination quite often. Finding that she was weak in mathematics, he asked her to attend tuition class for the same. She was told that she need to attend tuition classes for two days staying in the tuition centre at Panampally Nagar. P.W.1 would say that the appellant contacted P.W.6 and obtained leave from the school. P.W.12 told P.W.1 that her father would come and take her to the tuition centre on the next day, otherwise, the appellant would take her to the tuition centre. According to P.W.1, on 5.1.2005, her father did not come and on getting into contact with the accused, she was told that the second accused would pick her up. The second accused arrived with the vehicle and she was taken to the flat of the appellant. When she asked about going for tuition, the accused is alleged to have told her that since it was afternoon, she could attend the tuition on the next day. P.W.1 would say that while she was being taken to the flat, the second accused bought her food. P.W.1 would further say that on reaching the flat of the accused, she did not find Smt.Princy working there who normally would be there on every day. She was taken to the room and TV was switched on. P.W.1 would say that she was asked to pick lice from his head. While she was doing that act, the accused began to caress her body. She warded off his act. At that time, a telephone call made him leave the place. She would say that she was confused and cried. She thought of escaping from the place and went to the door and found it bolted from outside. On that day, after about 6.30 p.m., P.W.1 would say that the appellant is alleged to have reached the place. P.W.1 was asked to lay on bed and he undressed her. So did the appellant. P.W.1 would say that she was brutally ravished. Though she cried in pain, the accused pacified her by saying that these are normal things and there is nothing wrong in the act. He also cautioned her that if she disclosed the incident to anybody, her future will be in jeopardy and he had nothing to lose. The next day morning, the second accused came and picked her up and took her to the tuition centre. At the tuition centre, she was introduced as an inmate of Santhitheeram and one Shalini teacher took her tuition classes. She would say that food was provided from the tuition centre. At about 3 p.m. on that day, i.e. on 6.6.2006, she was picked up from the tuition centre and taken to the flat. When she reached the flat, the accused was not there. She was left alone in the flat. She did not know what to do. The appellant came in the night and repeated the act. On the next day, she was given a sum of Rs.100/- and she was asked to phone him frequently. P.W.1 would say that she went to the school from the flat and then she went to her house. The further evidence of P.W.1 is to the effect that during the study holidays, the accused came to her house and asked her to return to Santhitheeram. When she refused, she was threatened that he had her nude photographs which he would circulate and that would humiliate the victim. Though he went away on that day, he returned on another day and on that day P.W.1 was alone at home. She was taken by the accused to the flat. The act was repeated. P.W.1 would say that she felt helpless and hopeless and she did not resist.

66. In the end of April, 2006, P.W.6 informed P.W.1 about the prayer meeting and convention that was being held at Don Bosco and asked her to attend the same. The function was captioned as 'Arise 2006', which was a five day camp. P.W.1 would say that she stayed there for all the five days. While attending the function she says that she had occasion to meet P.W.7 Rexy who was working as Counsellor, and she narrated the traumatic experience to him. P.W.1 would say that P.W.7 advised her not to agitate the issue in court and God will take care of the sinners. P.W.1 would say that she came to know that P.W.7 conveyed the information to P.W.6. P.W.1 then would say that she disclosed the entire incidents to her father, P.W.5. After completing the 10th standard, she procured admission in a College at Aluva at the behest of P.W.6. P.W.1 would say that she happened to come across news item regarding the exploits of the appellant and then she felt that she too should complain about the experience she had. She says that she along with her father went to the police station on 18.5.2006 and gave first information statement. She would say that she was taken for medical examination.

67. In cross-examination, she deposed that all the details were not given at the time of furnishing FIS. Two or three weeks thereafter the C.I. took the statement and she gave more details. On the second occasion she mentions about the incident in the flat. The next day further statement was taken. The victim would say that she had narrated the incidents to the police officer. At the relevant time her father was injured and was remaining at home. She would also say that though her sister was very affectionate to her, she did not disclose the incidents to her. P.W.1 would say that she used to be threatened and harassed over phone. Then ultimately she disclosed the incident to her sister also. She would say that three others also used to threaten her and one of them is Abhilash, the cousin of the accused and he offered her money.

68. It was pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that even going by the evidence of P.W.1, P.W.6 was her class teacher and it was at her behest she was taken to Santhitheeram. In cross-examination, P.W.1 did say that P.W.6 liked her very much, but not vice versa. In cross-examination, she corrected herself that she had gone to the flat of the appellant on the last occasion in April and not in May. In cross-examination, she also stated that after the results of SSLC examination was announced, she had gone to the flat of the accused. She denied the suggestion in cross-examination that she had infact stated that the last incident occurred in May and finding it incompatible, at the time of evidence, she switched the last incident to April to suit the convenience of the prosecution. Her statement is to the effect that she had disclosed to the doctor that she was assaulted two years before, but that was not seen recorded. Her statement in cross-examination was that she had complained to the doctor that she had been repeatedly harassed by the appellant. Her attention was drawn to the fact that on 16.1.2008 and the subsequent working day she had not informed the police that she had taken leave and gone to tuition. Her attention was drawn regarding the absence of mention of the name of the tuition teacher. In cross-examination she stated that tuition centre was not at Panampally Nagar, but actually situate in Ernakulam North. In cross-examination, she also stated that the first incident was not on 15.1.2006, but on 16.1.2006 and this according to the learned Senior Counsel is deliberate because 15.1.2006 is a Sunday and if that be so, it will not be in consonance with the statement given by P.W.1 in chief-examination. According to the learned Senior Counsel, very cleverly she therefore switched the first incident to 16.1.2006. It was suggested to P.W.1 that she had signed in a blank paper on which a statement was later drawn up. She also denies the suggestion that she was thrown out of Santhitheeram due to her indiscipline.

69. P.W.5 is the father of P.W.1. He stays with his wife Tessy, P.W.1 himself and Albil. The elder daughter had been given in marriage. He speaks about the circumstances under which P.W.1 happened to be put in Santhitheeram and the association with P.W.6. He deposed that P.W.6 had high opinion about the institution. According to him, P.W.1 joined Santhitheeram in 2005. In December, 2005, a meeting of the parents was convened and he had attended the same. P.W.5 would say that then the appellant told him that his daughter is weak in mathematics and he has arranged tuition for her. According to him, for 3-4 days she had gone for tuition and he asked her where she had stayed in the night. P.W.1 is alleged to have told him that she had stayed in the flat of the accused. That was not to the liking of P.W.5 who claims that he scolded her. He says that on one occasion he was called urgently to Santhitheeram and P.Ws.10 and 11 told him about the disobedience displayed by P.W.1 and sent her away with him. He says that thereafter on two or three occasions, the appellant had taken his daughter to his flat.

70. P.W.6 was once the class teacher of P.W.1. She would say that she was a teacher in LMCC School. In 2005 she was the class teacher of X-C standard. Preethy, a student of her class came from Santhitheeram and she found a person outside the class room on various occasions. When enquired about it, the person introduced himself as Purushothaman and told her about Santhitheeram and the facilities offered to the students from Santhitheeram. P.W.6 would say that Sister Jannet and she had visited Santhitheeram, P.W.6 would say that when she visited Santhitheeram she had not met the appellant. She in her evidence says that after the students joined Santhitheeram, they were found to be less talkative and were seen moody. She then says about the five day programme at Don Bosco School which was attended by P.W.1. She stated that on the last day of the convention, P.W.7 had told her that the appellant could not be trusted.

71. P.W.7 claims to have taken classes in the five day convention at Don Bosco School and also acted as a Counsellor. He was a member of a social organization and he had taken courses in Counselling. During his class, he indicated to the children that if any one of them needed his advise, they could approach him. He would say that P.W.1 later came crying to him and narrated to him what had transpired at Santhitheeram. He would say that he had conveyed the information to P.W.6.

72. P.W.1's evidence is sufficiently corroborated by the medical evidence furnished by P.W.35 which would indicate that P.W.1 suffered vaginal penetration.

73. The main criticism levelled against the evidence of P.W.1 is that she is a witness unworthy of credit. Her evidence is full of inconsistencies and contradictions and she keeps on developing her case from stage to stage. The last of the incidents occurred in 2006 and she did nothing till 2008. Attention was drawn to the fact that finding that her claim that the first incident was on 15.1.2006 would not stand scrutiny, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, she conveniently changed it to 16.1.2006 and if that be so, the second incident would have taken place on 17.1.2006. Her versions in chief-examination are proved to be false in cross-examination. It was pointed out that the evidence shows that she was expelled from Santhitheeram in December, 2005 and there is nothing to show that she had rejoined the institution. Drawing attention to the evidence of P.W.6, it was pointed out by the learned counsel that the claim of P.W.1 that P.W.6 was in the know of things of what had transpired in Santhitheeram is not correct because P.W.6 would deny such information. It was further pointed out that P.W.1 has also shifted the tuition centre from Panampally Nagar to another place. It is significant to notice, according to the learned Senior Counsel that the tuition centre has not been located and there is nothing to show that P.W.1 had gone for tuition as claimed by her. If the tuition theory fails, then the entire prosecution case falls to the ground. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant also pointed out that if the two days on which tuition was arranged were 16th and 17th of January, 2006, those was working days. The prosecution deliberately did not produce the attendance register of the school to show whether P.W.1 had actually attended the school on those days. It is significant to notice, according to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that there was no attempt to locate the tuition centre even after P.W.1 mentions about the name of the teacher and also that lunch was provided from the tuition centre. These facts would make the evidence of P.W.1 open to serious doubt and it will be imprudent on the part of the court, according to the learned Senior Counsel, to simply accept the evidence of P.W.1 to find the accused guilty.

74. One fact may be noticed. There is clear evidence to show that P.W.1 was subjected to sexual intercourse. She was examined by the doctor on 18.5.2008 and Ext.P1 is the certificate.

75. True, there are contradictions both intrinsic and in other ways regarding the evidence furnished by P.W.1. P.W.1 had initially stated that the first of the incidents had taken place on 15.1.2006 and the second incident on 16.1.2006 and the last of them in April, 2006. There is also some controversy and contradiction with regard to the last of the incidents. In one of the statements she had started that it was in May, 2006, while in court she had stated that it was in April, 2006. The evidence of P.W.1 will be dealt with little later.

76. P.W.5's knowledge regarding the incident is what is told to him by his daughter. However, he admitted that his daughter was sent out of the institution complaining of disobedience. There was no attempt from the side of the prosecution to elicit from him that at the relevant time, P.W.1 was staying in Santhitheeram. How far that failure on the part of prosecution to do so will affect the evidence of P.W.1 is a different question. It has come out from the evidence of P.W.5 that the victim had gone for tuition from the house of P.W.5. He says that 3 - 4 days she went for tuition and on one day she is stated to have stayed in the flat of the accused, to which objection was taken by him. He also says that 2 - 3 times later P.W.1 was taken to the flat by the accused. A reading of his evidence would indicate that the expulsion of his daughter was after all the incidents were over cannot obviously be true. But as already noticed, his evidence needs to be considered only in the context of what was told to him by his daughter. However, the statement made by P.W.5 that the narration of the incident by P.W.1 to him was soon after the convention held in April, 2006 is not seen challenged in cross-examination. He has also offered explanation for the delay in lodging the FIS.

77. It is painful to note that P.W.6 was very keen to withhold the real facts and there was no serious attempt from the side of the prosecution to elicit from this witness the truth. She disowned that it was at her behest that P.W.1 was shifted to Santhitheeram. She also feigned ignorance about the sexual assault on P.W.1. A reading of her evidence along with the evidence of P.Ws.1, 5 and 7 would clearly reveal that she is speaking utter falsehood before court. There is ample evidence or other evidence which will clearly expose her attempt to conceal many crucial aspects.

78. P.W.7 claims to have acted as a Counsellor. He has no qualification justifying his act of counsellng. But however he says that he has undergone a training in that regard. His evidence falsifies the evidence of P.W.6 regarding other aspects.

79. Ultimately, the issue revolves around the credibility, worthiness, weight and acceptance of the evidence of P.W.1. Even if there are infirmities and inconsistencies in her evidence, and even if there is a deviation and departure by her at the time of giving evidence in court compared to her earlier statements, if the residue of her evidence inspires confidence in the mind of court and there is nothing to show that she had any reason to speak falsehood or that her evidence is completely tainted and the available evidence is sufficient to establish the prosecution case, that will satisfy the requirements of law.

80. There may be inconsistencies with regard to the actual date of assault also. But one should remember that the victim is speaking about an incident which is horrifying and shattering and which has affected her both mentally and physically.

81. It is true that the burden is on the prosecution to establish all the ingredients to attract the offences. The presumption of innocence in favour of the accused increases the burden on the prosecution.

82. What constitutes sufficient evidence to establish a fact is a difficult question to answer. There is no universal formula or rule or law regarding that aspect. One could say that it is that evidence which has the power to satisfy the conscience of the court about the existence of a fact and that produce belief. One cannot say what exactly is the quantum or kind of evidence that needs to be adduced in this regard.

83. The weight to be given to the testimony of a witness depends to a large measure upon the credibility of the witness. The evidence adduced may be in the form of oral or documentary evidence.

84. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 5th Edition, Vol.11 at page 568 Note 766, it was held as follows: 

"766. Weight of evidence; in general. The weight to be given to a particular item of evidence is a matter of fact which will be decided, largely on the basis of common sense, in the light of the circumstances of the case and of the views formed by the jury (or judge where there is no jury) on the reliability and credibility of the witnesses and exhibits. Frequently, a conclusion on the facts will decide a case one way or another, and the burden of proof has not part to play in the resolution of evidential conflict, although it may be the determining factor if evidence is non-existent or evenly balanced." 

85. It is definitely impossible to get absolute certainty. Pragmatic approach and degree of probability are the criterion. The evidence may often fall short of absolute certainty. The law does not insist upon absolute certainty as could be seen going by the definition of 'proved' in the Indian Evidence Act, which reads as follows: 

" "Proved". - A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists." 

No precedents can help in appreciation of evidence. There is no rule that a minimum number of witnesses are necessary to prove a fact and the evidence may consists of the solitary testimony of a prosecutrix. 

86. While suspicion cannot take the place of truth, insistence of absolute certainty will be impracticable as well as imprudent. A fact may be proved by any means known to law. Proof is in fact the effect of evidence. In a case built on circumstantial evidence, there is a probability of conjunctures and surmises creeping in though it is said "men may lie, but circumstances do not".

87. One fact is very clear and that is one does not begins to appreciate the evidence with a suspicion or doubt in mind. Sufficiency of material is a question not to be decided on whether more evidence could have been adduced. It is said that in criminal cases, a higher standard of proof is insisted upon, to be more precise, proof beyond reasonable doubt.

88. In Halsbury's Laws of India, Vol.15 at page 169 Note 145.025 it was held as follows: 

"The doubt must be that of a reasonable mind. Where the evidence raises a reasonable doubt in the ming of the court regarding the participation in the crime by the accused that doubt must be resolved in his favour, but the benefit of doubt to which the accused is entitled is reasonable doubt, the doubt which rational thinking men will reasonably, honestly and conscientiously entertain." 

89. In the decision reported in 

Ramesh Harijan v. State of U.P. (AIR 2012 SC 1979) 

it was held as follows: 

"26. Therefore, in such a case the paramount importance of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. The benefit of doubt particularly in every case may not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense." 

90. It is well settled that the evidence has to be read as a whole. By reading the evidence of a witness, his credibility will have to be determined. Creditworthiness means whether the witness is capable of being believed, is he/she is worthy of belief or confidence and of trustworthy. 

91. There is no settled pattern or rule to ascertain the truth. Some of the tests are; 

(i) Consistency of the witness's evidence vice versa other evidence. 

(ii) The internal consistency of the witness's evidence. 

(iii) Consistency with respect to what the witnesses had said on other occasions. 

(iv) The demeanour of witnesses.

92. Sarkar on Law of Evidence, 6th Edn. Vol. 2, at page 2396 would observe as follows: 

"Credit.- The credibility of a witness depends upon 

(1) his knowledge of the facts he testifies; 

(2) his disinterestedness; 

(3) his integrity; 

(4) his veracity; and 

(5) his being bound to speak the truth by oath or affirmation. 

Proportioned to these is the degree of credit his testimony deserves from the court and jury. A witness is not discredited merely because the cross-examiner asked some questions impeaching his character, when the answers are satisfactory." 

93. Credibility is something instinctive and personal to a Judge and not amenable to precedents. Credibility in short involves the issue whether the witness appears to be telling the truth as he believes it to be. Slight discrepancies and inconsistencies are not to be given undue importance. One should remember that the capacity of perception, retention and reproduction varies from person to person. Variation may occur due to several other factors and due to passage of time. Those minor inconsistencies and contradictions are not to be taken as indicative of the fact that the witness is not telling the truth. Witnesses are prone to exaggerations, embellishments and developments. The test is to see whether the so-called variations are of material nature affecting the prosecution case. It is infact an objective assessment, but a certain degree of subjective satisfaction is bound to creep in. 

94. In the decision reported in 

Thoti Manohar v. State of Andhra Pradesh ((2012) 7 SCC 723) 

it was held as follows: 

"38. .......... Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the matter cannot bring discredit to the story of the prosecution. Giving undue importance to them would amount to adopting a hypertechnical approach. The Court, while appreciating the evidence, should not attach much significance to minor discrepancies, for the discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case re to be ignored. This has been so held in State of U.P,. v. M.K. Anthony, Appabhai v. State of Gujarat, Rammi v. State of M.P., State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj, Laxman Singh v. Poonam Singh and Dashrath Singh v. State of U.P.

39. No evidence can ever be perfect fro man is not perfect and man lives in an imperfect world. Thus, the duty of the court is to see with the vision of prudence and acceptability of the deposition regard being had to the substratum of the prosecution story. In this context, we may reproduce a passage from the decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh wherein H.R.Khanna, L., speaking for the Court, observed thus: 

"23. A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one's imagination and phantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the court should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures."" 

95. In the decision reported in 

Alagupandi v. State of T.N. ((2012) 10 SCC 451) 

it was held as follows: 

"22. In the case of Govindaraju alias Govinda v. State of Sriramapuram P.S. and Anr.,[Crl. Appeal No. 984 of 2007 decided on March 15, 2012] ,this Court held as under: 

"23. Now, we come to the second submission raised on behalf of the appellant that the material witness has not been examined and the reliance cannot be placed upon the sole testimony of the police witness (eye-witness).

24. It is a settled proposition of law of evidence that it is not the number of witnesses that matters but it is the substance. It is also not necessary to examine a large number of witnesses if the prosecution can bring home the guilt of the accused even with a limited number of witnesses. In the case of 

Lallu Manjhi and Anr. v. State of Jharkhand (2003) 2 SCC 401 : (AIR 2003 SC 854 : 2003 AIR SCW 308)

this Court had classified the oral testimony of the witnesses into three categories:- 

a. Wholly reliable; 

b. Wholly unreliable; and 

c. Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. 

In the third category of witnesses, the Court has to be cautious and see if the statement of such witness is corroborated, either by the other witnesses or by other documentary or expert evidence.

25. Equally well settled is the proposition of law that where there is a sole witness to the incident, his evidence has to be accepted with caution and after testing it on the touchstone of evidence tendered by other witnesses or evidence otherwise recorded. The evidence of a sole witness should be cogent, reliable and must essentially fit into the chain of events that have been stated by the prosecution. When the prosecution relies upon the testimony of a sole eye-witness, then such evidence has to be wholly reliable and trustworthy. Presence of such witness at the occurrence should not be doubtful. If the evidence of the sole witness is in conflict with the other witnesses, it may not be safe to make such a statement as a foundation of the conviction of the accused. These are the few principles which the Court has stated consistently and with certainty.

26. Reference in this regard can be made to the cases of 

Joseph v. State of Kerala (AIR 2003 SC 507) 

and 

Tika Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2007) 15 SCC 760. 

Even in the case of 

Jhapsa Kabari and others v. State of Bihar (AIR 2002 SC 312) 

this Court took the view that if the presence of a witness is doubtful, it becomes a case of conviction based on the testimony of a solitary witness. There is, however, no bar in basing the conviction on the testimony of a solitary witness so long as the said witness is reliable and trustworthy.

27. In the case of Jhapsa Kabari (supra), this Court noted the fact that simply because one of the witnesses (a 14 years old boy) did not name the wife of the deceased in the fardbayan, it would not in any way affect the testimony of the eye-witness i.e. the wife of the deceased, who had given graphic account of the attack on her husband and her brother-in-law by the accused persons. Where the statement of an eye-witness is found to be reliable, trustworthy and consistent with the course of events, the conviction can be based on her sole testimony. There is no bar in basing the conviction of an accused on the testimony of a solitary witness as long as the said witness is reliable and trustworthy." ............. ...............

24. Furthermore, it is contended that the statement of PW-1 cannot be relied upon by the Court also for the ground that he is an interested witness. This argument is equally without merit. The presence of PW1 at the house of his sister is natural. He was working as a cleaner and was staying with his sister in the same village. He was sleeping outside the house of the deceased and went towards the house upon hearing her screams. Every witness, who is related to the deceased cannot be said to be an interested witness who will depose falsely to implicate the accused. In the present case, the accused is also related to PW1 and there could be no reason for PW1 to falsely implicate the accused. 

25. We have already discussed that the statement of PW1 is worthy of credence. In the case of Mano Dutt and Anr. v. State of U.P. [Crl. Appeal No. 77 of 2007 decided on 29th February, 2012],a Bench of this Court held that it is not the quantity but the quality of the evidence which would bring success to the case of the prosecution or give benefit of doubt to the accused. Statement of every related witness cannot, as a matter of rule, be rejected by the Courts.

26. This court, in the aforesaid case, held as under: 

"24. Another contention raised on behalf of the accused/appellants is that only family members of the deceased were examined as witnesses and they being interested witnesses cannot be relied upon. Furthermore, the prosecution did not examine any independent witnesses and, therefore, the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. This argument is again without much substance. Firstly, there is no bar in law in examining family members, or any other person, as witnesses. More often than not, in such cases involving family members of both sides, it is a member of the family or a friend who comes to rescue the injured. Those alone are the people who take the risk of sustaining injuries by jumping into such a quarrel and trying to defuse the crisis. Besides, when the statement of witnesses, who are relatives, or are parties known to the affected party, is credible, reliable, trustworthy, admissible in accordance with the law and corroborated by other witnesses or documentary evidence of the prosecution, there would hardly be any reason for the Court to reject such evidence merely on the ground that the witness was family member or interested witness or person known to the affected party.

25. There can be cases where it would be but inevitable to examine such witnesses, because, as the events occurred, they were the natural or the only eye witness available to give the complete version of the incident. In this regard, we may refer to the judgments of this Court, in the case of 

Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, [(2007) 14 SCC 150]. 

This Court drew a clear distinction between a chance witness and a natural witness. Both these witnesses have to be relied upon subject to their evidence being trustworthy and admissible in accordance with the law.

26. This Court, in the said judgment, held as under: 

"28. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that Indian legal system does not insist on plurality of witnesses. Neither the legislature (Section 134 of the Evidence Act, 1872) nor the judiciary mandates that there must be particular number of witnesses to record an order of conviction against the accused. Our legal system has always laid emphasis on value, weight and quality of evidence rather than on quantity, multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is, therefore, open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction. Conversely, it may acquit the accused in spite of testimony of several witnesses if it is not satisfied about the quality of evidence. The bald contention that no conviction can be recorded in case of a solitary eye-witness, therefore, has no force and must be negatived.

29. It was then contended that the only eye-witness, PW 6 Sopan was none other than the son of the deceased. He was, therefore, "highly interested" witness and his deposition should, therefore, be discarded as it has not been corroborated in material particulars by other witnesses. We are unable to uphold the contention. In our judgment, a witness who is a relative of the deceased or victim of a crime cannot be characterised as "interested". The term "interested" postulates that the witness has some direct or indirect "interest" in having the accused somehow or the other convicted due to animus or for some other oblique motive." 

27. It will be useful to make a reference of another judgment of this Court, in the case of 

Satbir Singh and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (AIR 2009 SC 2163)

where this Court held as under: 

"26. It is now a well-settled principle of law that only because the witnesses are not independent ones may not by itself be a ground to discard the prosecution case. If the prosecution case has been supported by the witnesses and no cogent reason has been shown to discredit their statements, a judgment of conviction can certainly be based thereupon. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, at least Dhum Singh (PW 7) is an independent witness. He had no animus against the accused. False implication of the accused at his hand had not been suggested, far less established." 

28. Again in a very recent judgment in the case of 

Balraje alias Trimbak v. State of Maharashtra [(2010) 6 SCC 673] : (2010 AIR SCW 3707)

this Court stated that 

".......when the eye-witnesses are stated to be interested and inimically disposed towards the accused, it has to be noted that it would not be proper to conclude that they would shield the real culprit and rope in innocent persons. The truth or otherwise of the evidence has to be weighed pragmatically. The Court would be required to analyse the evidence of related witnesses and those witnesses who are inimically disposed towards the accused. But if after careful analysis and scrutiny of their evidence, the version given by the witnesses appears to be clear, cogent and credible, there is no reason to discard the same." 

96. As regards reliability of witness, in the decision reported in 

Kuria v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 2013 SC 1085) 

it was held as follows: 

" 'Sterling worth' is not an expression of absolute rigidity. The use of such an expression in the context of criminal jurisprudence would mean a witness worthy of credence, one who is reliable and truthful. This has to be gathered from the entire statement of the witnesses and the demeanour of the witnesses, if any, noticed by the Court. Linguistically, 'sterling worth' means 'thoroughly excellent' or 'of great value'. This term, in the context of criminal jurisprudence cannot be of any rigid meaning. It must be understood as a generic term. It is only an expression that is used for judging the worth of the statement of a witness." 

97. In appreciating the evidence of witnesses, the court has to make an over all assessment and the function of the court is to sift the chaff from the grain. 

98. In Halsbury's Laws of India, Vol.15 at page 180 it was observed as follows: 

"It is the function of the court to separate the grain from the chaff and accept what appears to be true and reject the rest. It is only where the testimony of a witness is tainted to the core, the falsehood and the truth being inextricably intertwined, that the court must discard the evidence in toto. The mere fact, that some witnesses did not admit or had expressed ignorance about certain collateral facts may not be a ground for rejecting their oral account when there is general agreement among them with regard to the substratum of the prosecution case. The court must consider the worth of evidence of each witness and must give reasons for disbelieving the same on merits. Unless the exaggeration and falsehood in the evidence are on points destructive of the substance of the prosecution story, it is the court's duty to sift the evidence separating truth from falsehood, and come to its conclusion about the guilt or innocence of the persons accused of the offence. Exaggeration or falsehood on points which do not touch the core of the prosecution story are not to be given undue importance, provided there is trustworthy evidence supporting the real substance and core of the prosecution case. Unless the facts on which an allegation rests are integrally related, so that if part of the case is not proved the rest will fail, then even if some of the facts which are the basis of the allegation are not proved the case may be made out." 

99. The duty of the court in this regard is well settled. In the decision reported in 

State of Maharashtra v. Siraj Ahmed Nisar Ahmed ((2007) 5 SCC 161)

wherein it was held as follows: 

"33. ......... While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinize the evidence, more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence, as a whole, and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witnesses and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matter not touching the core of matter in issue, hyper-technical approach by taking sentence out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter, would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole." 

Guidance is available from the decision reported in 

Subal Ghorai v. State of West Bengal ((2013) 4 SCC 607) 

regarding the manner in which evidence is to be appreciated.

100. Next is the need for corroboration. It is not a rule of law but a rule of prudence. Corroboration becomes necessary when the court is not satisfied with the evidence of a particular witness. If the evidence of the witness is clear, cogent and convincing, then the court need not go in search of corroborative items. It is well settled that absence of corroborative evidence does not affect the available evidence. Wigmore on Evidence, Vol.VII at page 342 it was observed as follows: 

"The common law, then, in repudiating the numerical system, lays down four general principles: 

(1) Credibility does not depend on numbers of witnesses. 

Therefore: 

(2) In general, the testimony of a single witness, no matter what the issue or who the person, may legally suffice as evidence upon which the jury my found a verdict. 

(3) Conversely, the mere assertion of any witness need not be believed, even though he is unimpeached in any manner, because to require such belief would be to give a quantitative and impersonal measure to testimony. 

(4) As a corollary of the first proposition, all rules requiring two witnesses, or a corroboration of one witness, are exceptions to the general principle." 

101. The next question that arises for consideration is if the prosecution is left with the solitary evidence of P.W.1, will that be sufficient? 

102. Wigmore on Evidence, Vol.VII at page 451, it was observed as follows: 

"Uncorroborated complaint in rape, sodomy, adultery, seduction, enticement, bastardy, breach of marriage promise, and the like. At common law, the testimony of the prosecutrix or injured person, in the trial of all offenses against the chastity of women, was alone sufficient evidence to support a conviction; neither a second witness nor corroborating circumstances were necessary." 

103. In the decision reported in 

Narender Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) ((2012) 7 SCC 171) 

it was held as follows: 

"20. It is a settled legal proposition that once the statement of prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the court as such, conviction can be based only on the solitary evidence of the prosecutrix and no corroboration would be required unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies should not be a ground for throwing out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.

21. A prosecutrix complaining of having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice after the crime. Her testimony has to be appreciated on the principle of probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree of probability having been shown to exist in view of the subject matter being a criminal charge. However, if the court finds it difficult to accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may search for evidence, direct or substantial, which may lend assurance to her testimony. (Vide: 

Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal S.P. and Anr., AIR 2003 SC 818 : (2003 AIR SCW 253)

and 

Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2006 SC 508 : 2005 AIR SCW 6149)).

22. Where evidence of the prosecutrix is found suffering from serious infirmities and inconsistencies with other material, prosecutrix making deliberate improvements on material point with a view to rule out consent on her part and there being no injury on her person even though her version may be otherwise, no reliance can be placed upon her evidence. (Vide: 

Suresh N. Bhusare and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 1 SCC 220 : (AIR 1998 SC 3131 : 1998 AIR SCW 3045)

............... ................

28. The courts while trying an accused on the charge of rape, must deal with the case with utmost sensitivity, examining the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses which are not of a substantial character." 

104. In the decision reported in 

Rai Sandeep v. State (NCT) of Delhi (AIR 2012 SC 3157)

it was held as follows: 

"To test the quality of such a witness, the status of the witness would be immaterial and what would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement made by such a witness. What would be more relevant would be the consistency of the statement right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the time when the witness makes the initial statement and ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the accused. There should not be any prevarication in the version of such a witness. The witness should be in a position to withstand the cross- examination of any length and strenuous it may be and under no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved, as well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should have co-relation with each and everyone of other supporting material such as the recoveries made, the weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said version should consistently match with the version of every other witness. It can even be stated that it should be akin to the test applied in the case of circumstantial evidence where there should not be any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him. Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the above test as well as all other similar such tests to be applied, it can be held that such a witness can be called as a 'sterling witness' whose version can be accepted by the Court without any corroboration and based on which the guilty can be punished. To be more precise, the version of the said witness on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the Court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged." 

105. In the decision reported in 

State of Haryana v. Basti Ram (AIR 2013 SC 1307)

it was held as follows: 

"29. The law on the issue whether a conviction can be based entirely on the statement of a rape victim has been settled by this Court in several decisions. A detailed discussion on this subject is to be found in 

Vijay alias Chinee v. State of Madhya Pradesh ((2010) 8 SCC 191). 

After discussing the entire case law, this Court concluded in paragraph 14 of the Report as follows: 

"Thus, the law that emerges on the issue is to the effect that the statement of the prosecutrix if found to be worthy of credence and reliable, requires no corroboration. The Court may convict the accused on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix." 

106. Bearing the above principles in mind, an evaluation of the evidence of P.W.1 would be made to ascertain whether it is sufficient to reach a conclusion regarding the offences attributed to the accused. But before going into that aspect, one fact needs to be noticed. The investigation in this case is found to be wanting in many aspects. Many of the crucial aspects have been left untouched by the investigating agency. Quite a few material documents have not been produced and several aspects which needed to be looked into were not probed into also. But the flaws in investigation may not be a ground to throw out the prosecution case.

107. In the decision reported in 

Zindar Ali Sheikh v. State of West Bengal ((2009) 3 SCC 761)

it was held as follows: 

"The shabby quality of investigation was severely criticised by the learned counsel. There can be no dispute that the investigation in this case is not at all satisfactory. There are discrepancies galore. However, in this case, the truthful version of the prosecutrix cannot be ignored. It is trite law that the defence cannot take advantage of such bad investigation where there is clinching evidence available to the prosecution as in this case. We, therefore, confirm the finding of the High court that the accused is guilty of the offence under Section 376 IPC." 

108. In the decision reported in 

Karan Singh v. State of Haryana (AIR 2013 SC 2348)

it was held as follows: 

"14. Omissions made on the part of the Investigating Officer, where the prosecution succeeds in proving its case beyond any reasonable doubt by way of adducing evidence, particularly that of eye-witnesses and other witnesses, would not be fatal to the case of the prosecution, for the reason that every discrepancy present in the investigation does not weight upon the court to the extent that it necessarily results in the acquittal of accused, unless it is proved that the investigation was held in such manner that it is dubbed as "a dishonest or guided investigation" , which will exonerate the accused. ...... Thus, unless lapses on the part of the Investigating authorities are such, so as to cast a reasonable doubt on the case of the prosecution, or serious prejudice the defence of the accused, the court would not set aside the conviction of the accused merely on the ground of tainted investigation." 

109. In the decision reported in 

Dayal Singh v. State of Uttaranchal (AIR 2012 SC 3046)

it was held as follows: 

"28. Where our criminal justice system provides safeguards of fair trial and innocent till proven guilty to an accused, there it also contemplates that a criminal trial is meant for doing justice to all, the accused, the society and a fair chance to prove to the prosecution. Then alone can law and order be maintained. The Courts do not merely discharge the function to ensure that no innocent man is punished, but also that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties of the judge. During the course of the trial, the learned Presiding Judge is expected to work objectively and in a correct perspective. Where the prosecution attempts to misdirect the trial on the basis of a perfunctory or designedly defective investigation, there the Court is to be deeply cautious and ensure that despite such an attempt, the determinative process is not sub-served. For truly attaining this object of a 'fair trial', the Court should leave no stone unturned to do justice and protect the interest of the society as well." 

110. Coming back to the evidence in this case, the prosecution has to succeed or to fail depending upon the acceptability or non-acceptability of the evidence of P.W.1. She is a rustic witness though she is a brilliant student. It is quite unfortunate that misfortune of the present nature has fallen on her. 

111. As already noticed, there are certain inconsistencies, developments and contradictions in the evidence of P.W.1. It consists of self contradictions also. But while evaluating the evidence of the victim of rape, one fact will have to be borne in mind. It is an abhorrent crime, something which is unacceptable to both the victim and to the society. The victim of offence is certain to have moral indignation and absolute hate for the accused who has robbed her of a very precious asset. Therefore, there will be a tendency to exaggerate and develop at the stage of giving evidence in court.

112. Even if one concedes that there has been a conscious attempt to shift the incident from 15.1.2006 to 16.1.2006 probably realizing that 15.1.2006 was a Sunday, is it sufficient to disbelieve her whole evidence? Whether the first incident is on 15.1.2006 or 16.1.2006, is not of much significance. At any rate, P.W.1 is consistent that on 16.1.2006 she was raped by the accused. The fact that the investigating agency has not bothered to seize the records of the school or Santhitheeram cannot affect the veracity of the testimony of P.W.1.

113. It is true that there seems to be a lot of confusion regarding the number of times she was subjected to sexual assault. It seems to be on three occasions going by the evidence of P.W.1. Relying on the fact that going by the evidence of P.W.1, on the second day when she was taken from the tuition class to the flat, for a long time she was alone in the flat and she could have sought for help, and the inaction on the part of P.W.1 to draw the attention of people belies her version.

114. Here one has to appreciate the predicament in which P.W.1 was placed. On the previous day she was a prey to the lust of the accused who raped the victim. Considering the age of the victim, the circumstances in which she was placed, the fact that she did not rebel or muster courage to seek help or she did not raise a hue and cry cannot go against her. The agony of a poor girl who felt lost and who was apprehensive about her future could be well understood. She might have not been fully aware of the consequences of what had happened to her. A girl of tender age, who suffered a most inhuman act at the hands of the accused, if was unable to respond considering the influence and cult wielded by the accused, she could not be found fault with.

115. It is here one has to notice that there was no attempt from the side of the defence to show that the victim was not an inmate of Santhitheeram nor was there any attempt to show that the victim was not a resident of Santhitheeram at the relevant time. It is also significant to notice that there is no reason suggested to P.W.1 as to why she should falsely implicate the accused. It is difficult to believe that a girl of her age would have masterminded such a humiliating move especially against the accused who at the relevant time had lot of wealth with him and actually enjoyed patronage from several quarters. One has to be sensitive, considerate and sympathetic to the plight of the victim. One should remember that by deposing before court about the incident, she is made to recollect the harrowing incident. One aspect needs to be noticed here. In cross-examination, to a question she replies as follows: " ." Such spontaneous natural reaction of P.W.1 shows that there is a ring of truth in her evidence.

116. The age of the victim, the position in which she was placed and the impact of disclosing the agonizing incident will have to be taken note of while appreciating her evidence. By disclosing the incident, it is not as if P.W.1 stand to gain anything, but she becomes an object to ridicule before the society. The society will thereafter look upon her with suspicion even though she is an innocent victim. One should remember that the stigma remains forever. Under these circumstances, it is extremely difficult to believe that P.W.1 would come forward with a false story.

117. It is in this context one will have to appreciate the failure of the investigating officer to locate the tuition centre, to seize the records relating to the school and Santhitheeram etc. Of course, as already noticed, there have been some significant departures made by P.W.1 in her evidence. True, there are inconsistencies between her statement in chief-examination as well as in cross-examination. But they are not so material so as to affect the core of the prosecution case. Even assuming that the contradictions, inconsistencies and developments are all eschewed for consideration, there remains the residua evidence furnished by P.W.1 which would show that she had been a prey to sexual assault by the accused. It is not the rule that if a portion of the evidence of a witness is found to be untrue, the entire evidence has to be eschewed from consideration. The court will well within its powers to accept that portion of the evidence which is found reliable and base its conclusion thereon.

118. The non-location of tuition centre and failure to seize attendance register of the school where P.W.1 at the relevant time was studying cannot be grounds to suspect the testimony of P.W.1.

119. One has to remember that in a case of rape, it is extremely difficult to get corroborative items of evidence for, the act is done in secrecy. One should remember in this case, the appellant stood in a fiduciary capacity and he exploited the victim to his advantage. The victim was at his mercy. She had no choice.

120. It will be imprudent on the part of the court to insist for mathematical precision regarding the narration of incident by P.W.1. She was giving evidence after a long time and her statements were taken on several occasions by the police. Merely because there is some deviation from her previous statements, what is obvious, that is not sufficient to impeach her evidence. It is sad to note that the prosecution was betrayed by P.W.6. Such conduct was not expected from P.W.6 who has entered the holy order. Therefore, one is left with the solitary evidence of P.W.1 regarding the incident and medical evidence.

121. It is significant to notice that the evidence of P.W.1 is to a great extent in consonance with the first information statement given by her. The fact that there is no serious contradiction between the evidence in court and the statements contained in the FIS to a great extent guarantees the version given by P.W.1 in court.

122. There is no justifiable reason as to why one should doubt the version given by P.W.1. 

123. The court below was therefore perfectly justified in acting on the testimony of P.W.1 and finding the accused guilty. No grounds are made out to interfere with the conviction and sentence passed by the court below in this regard. The appeal is only to be dismissed. 

In the result, Crl.Appeal No. 1599 of 2009 is allowed setting aside the conviction and sentence passed in S.C. 369 and 429 of 2008 and the appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him. Crl.Appeal No. 1630 of 2009 is dismissed confirming the conviction and sentence passed by the court below in S.C. 368 of 2008. 

P. BHAVADASAN, JUDGE 

sb.