“3(e) 'Insecticide' means- (i) any substance specified in the Schedule; or ii) such other substances (including fungicides and weedicides) as the Central Government may, after consultation with the Board, by notification in the Official Gazette, include in the Schdule from time to time; or (iii) any preparation containing any one or more of such substances;” 

“5. Registration Committee.- 

(1) The Central Government shall constitute a Registration committee consisting of a Chairman, and not more than five persons who shall be members of the Board (including the Drugs Controller, India and the Plant Protection Adviser to the Government of India)- 

(i) to register insecticides after scrutinising their formulae and verifying claims made by the importer or the manufacturer, as the case may be, as regards their efficacy and safety to human beings and animals, and 

(ii) to perform such other functions as are assigned to it by or under this Act. 

(2) Where the Chairman is not a member of the Board, his term of office and other conditions of service shall be such as may be determined by the Central Government. 

(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), a member of the Registration Committee shall hold office for so long as he is a member of the Board. 

(4) The Committee may also co-opt such number of experts and for such purpose or period as it may deem fit, but any expert so co-opted shall have no right to vote. 

(5) The Registration Committee shall regulate its own procedure and the conduct of business to be transacted by it.” 

“9. Registration of insecticides.- 

(1) Any person desiring to import or manufacture any insecticide may apply to the Registration Committee for the registration of such insecticide and there shall be separate application for each such insecticide. Provided that any person engaged in the business of import or manufacture of any insecticide immediately before the commencement of this section shall make an application to the Registration Committee within a period of seventeen months from the date of such commencement for the registration of any insecticide which he has been importing or manufacturing before that date: 

Provided further that where any person referred to in the preceding proviso fails to make an application under the proviso within the period specified therein, he may make such application at any time thereafter on payment of a penalty of one hundred rupees for every month or part thereof after the expiry of such period for the registration of each such insecticide. 

(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed. 

(3) On receipt of any such application for the registration of an insecticide, the Committee may, after such enquiry as it deems fit and after satisfying itself that the insecticide to which the application relates conforms to the claims made by the importer or by the manufacturer, as the casemay be, as regards the efficacy of the inseceticide and its safety to human beings and animals, register, on such conditions s may be specified by it and on payment of such fee as may be prescribed, the insecticide, allot a registration number thereto and issue a certificate of registration in token thereof within a period of twelve months from the date of receipt of the application: 

Provided that the Committee may, if it is unable within the said period to arrive at a decision on the basis of the materials placed before it, extend the period by a further period not exceeding six months: 

Provided further that if the Committee is of opinion that the precautions claimed by the applicant as being sufficient to ensure safety to human eings or anials are not such as can be easily observed or that notwithstanding the observance of such precautions the use of the insecticide involves serious risk to human beings or animals, it may refuse to register the insecticide.” 

“11. Power of revision of Central Government.- 

The Central Government may, at any time, call for the record relating to any case in which the Registration Committee has given a decision under section 9 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any such decision and may pass any such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit: 

Provided that no such order shall be passed after the expiry of one year from the date of the decision: 

Provided further that the Central Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any person unless that person has had a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed order.” 

“Administrative law needs consistent working definitions of the three primary constitutional functions, legislative administrative and judicial; and also of the hybrid 'quasi-judicial' function which has a part of its own to play. But the reader must be warned that the courts themselves are addicted to distinctions which are more superficial and more confusing than those discussed here, and which by no means always help to clarity. Nor is it very profitable to take concepts out of their particular contexts and analyse them in the abstract.” 

(underlined by us) 

“The one distinction which would seem to be workable is that between judicial and administrative functions. A judicial decision is made according to rules. An administrative decision is made according to administrative policy. A judge attempts to find what is the correct solution according to legal rules and principles. An administrator attempts to find what is the most expedient and desirable solution in the public interest. It is true, of course, that many decisions of the courts can be said to be made on grounds of legal policy and that the courts sometimes have to choose between alternative solutions with little else than the public interest to guide them. There will always be grey areas. Nevertheless the mental exercises of judge and administrator are fundamentally different. The judge's approach is objective, guided by his idea of the law. The administrator's approach is empirical, guided by expediency. Under this analysis, based on the nature of the functions, many so-called administrative tribunals, such as social security and employment tribunals, have judicial rather than administrative functions, since their sole task is to find facts and apply law objectively. Yet in the case of a local valuation court, whose task is similar, the House of Lords has held exactly the opposite. A quasi-judicial function is an administrative function which the law requires to be exercised in some respects as if it were judicial. A typical example is a minister deciding whether or not to confirm a compulsory purchase order or to allow a planning appeal after a public inquiry. The decision itself is administrative, dictated by policy and expediency. But the procedure is subject to the principles of natural justice, which required the minister to act fairly towards the objectors and not (for example) to take fresh evidence without disclosing it to them. A quasi-judicial decision is therefore an administrative decision which is subject to some measure of judicial procedure. since nowadays the great majority of administrative decisions which affect the rights or legal position of individuals are subject to the principles of natural justice in any case, the term quasi-judicial is now little used.” 

“'Quasi-judicial' B-014 In administrative law this term may have any one of three meanings. It may describe a function that is partly judicial and partly administrative, e.g. the making of a compulsory purchase order (a discretionary or administrative act) preceded by the holding of a judicial-type local inquiry and the consideration of objections. It may, alternatively, describe the “judicial” element in a composite function; holding an inquiry and considering objections in respect of a compulsory purchase order are thus “quasi-judicial” acts. Or it may describe the nature of a discretionary act itlself where the actor's discretion is not unfettered Seldom is it essential to use this ambiguous term, and it will be avoided here as far as possible.” 

“Judicial B-015 A judicial decision made within jurisdiction is binding and conclusive in so far as it cannot be impeached in collateral proceedings; and it cannot, in general, be rescinded by the tribunal itself.....” 

“5. Some examples of administrative powers 

There exist numerous administrative powers of various types. The range and scope of such powers is vast. These powers range from such simple matters as registration of births and deaths to regulation of a business activity, acquiring property for a public purpose, and detaining a person on the subjective satisfaction of the executive. There exist a miscellany of administrative powers e.g., grant of licences, grant of permissions, registration, inspection, investigation, ordering inquiries, undertaking searches, seeking information, seizing property, even destroying property of an individual without hearing him in the interest of public health, safety and morality. Some idea of the vastness of the range and scope of administrative powers is given below, but this is only illustrative, by no means exhaustive. The catena of administrative powers is too numerous to be fully mentioned here. In broad terms, administrative powers of the Administration fall into the following categories: (1) Non-statutory powers e.g., evolving and implementing of policies; 

(2) Statutory powers, e.g., execution of laws; applying vague standards laid down in statutes or delegated legislation from case to case.” 

“139. It is well established that if the Legislature simply confides the power of doing an act to a particular body if in the opinion of that body it is necessary or expedient to do it, then the act is purely an administrative, i. e., an executive act as opposed to a judicial or quasi-judicial act, and, in the absence of proof of bad faith, the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with it and certainly not by the high prerogative writ of certiorari. Usually this discretion is confided by the use of expressions like "if it appears to," "if in the opinion of" or "if so and so is satisfied." 

In Mayor etc. of Westminster v. London and North-Western Railway Co., (1905) A. C. 426: (74 L.J. Ch. 629), Lord Halsbury L.C. observed : 

"Assuming the thing done to be within the discretion of the local authority, no Court has power to interfere, with the mode in which it has exercised it. Where the Legislature has confided the power to a particular body, with a discretion how it is to be used, it is beyond the power of any Court to contest that discretion. Of Course, this assumes that the thing done is the thing which the Legislature has authorised." 

140. To the like effect are the following observations of Batty J. in Balvant Ramchandra Natu v. Secretary of State, 29 Bom. 480 at p. 503 : (7 Bom L.R. 497) : 

"No doubt when a power has been conferred in unambiguous language by Statute, the Courts cannot interfere with its exercise and substitute their own discretion for that of persons or bodies selected by the Legislature for the purpose." 

141. Sometimes the Legislature may entrust a power to a specified authority to do an act for a certain purpose. Even in such a case, the Legislature may, nevertheless, by appropriate language, leave not only the determination of the necessity or expediency for doing the act but also the determination of the necessity or expediency for doing the act for that purpose as a composite matter to the opinion, satisfaction or discretion of that authority. In such a case what is a condition precedent for the doing of the act is not the actual existence of the particular purpose but the opinion of the specified authority that the purpose exists. In other words the authority is also made the sole judge of the existence of the purpose, for otherwise it cannot form its opinion as to the necessity or expediency of doing the act for that purpose.” 

161. As to what is a quasi-judicial act there have been many judicial pronouncements. May C.J. inQueen v. Dublin Corporation, (1878) 2 L.R. Ir. 371 described a quasi-judicial act as follows : 

"In this connection the term judicial does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for purpose of this question, a judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority upon consideration of facts and circumstances and imposing liability or affecting the rights. And it there be a body empowered by law to enquire into facts, make estimates to impose a rate on a district, it would seem to me that the acts of such a body involving such consequence would be judicial acts." 

162. Lord Atkinson inFrome United Brsweries v. Bath Justices, (1926) A.C., 566, approved of this definition as one of the best definitions. The definition that now holds the field is that of Atkin L. J, as he then was, in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners, (1924) 1 K.B. 171 :(93 L. J. K. B. 390). It runs as follows : 

"Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine question affecting the right, of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs." 

163. This definition was accepted as correct inRex v. London County Council, (1931) 2 K. B. 215 : (100 L.J. K. B. 760) and by many learned Judges in subsequent cases including the latest decision of the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali v. M. F. De S. Jayaratne, 54 C. W. N. 883 (P.C.). In Banwarilai's case:, 48 C. W. N. 766 at pp. 779, 801, I had occasion to analyse the essential characteristics of a quasi-judicial act as opposed to an administrative act. I stand by what I said on this point on that occasion. As I pointed out there, the two kinds of acts have many common features. Thus a person entrusted to do an administrative act has often to determine questions of fact to enable him to exercise his power. He has to consider facts and circumstances and to weigh pros and cons in his mind before he makes up his mind to exercise his power just as a person exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function has to do. Both have to act in good faith. A good and valid administrative or executive act binds the subject and affects his rights or imposes liability on him just as effectively as a quasi-judicial act does. The exercise of an administrative or executive act may well be and is frequently made dependent by the Legislature upon a condition or contingency which may involve a question of fact, but the question of fulfilment, of which may, nevertheless, be left to the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority as was done in the several ordinances regulation and enactment considered and construed in the several cases referred to above. The first two items of the definition given by Atkin L.J. may be equally applicable to an administrative act. The real test which distinguishes a quasi-judicial act from an administrative act is the third item in Atkin L.J's definition, namely, the duty to act judicially. As was said by Lord Howart C.J. inR.v. Legislative Committee of the Church Assembly, (1928) 1 K.B. 411 at p. 415: (97 L.J.K.B. 222) : 

"In order that a body may satisfy the required test it is not enough that it should have legal authority to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects; there must be superadded to that characteristic the further characteristic that the body has the duty to act judicially." 164. The above passage was quoted with approval by Lord Radclifie in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali's case, 54 C. W.N. 883 (P.C.) (supra). Therefore, in considering whether a particular statutory authority is a quasi-judicial body or a mere administrative body it has to be ascertained whether the statutory authority has the duty to act judicially. When and under what circumstances then can a statutory body be said to be under a duty to act judicially?” 

“5. The distinction between purely administrative or executive acts and judicial or quasi-judicial acts has been considered by this Court on several occasions. In the case of Province of Bombay v. Khushaldas S. Advani, 1950 SCR 621: (AIR 1950 SC 222), Mahajan J. observed that the question whether an act is a judicial or a quasi-judicial one or a purely executive act depends on the terms of the particular rules and the nature, scope and effect of the particular powers in exercise of which the act may be done and would, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Courts of law established by the State decide cases brought before them judiciary and the decisions thus recorded by them fall obviously under the category of judicial decisions. Administrative or executive bodies, on the other hand, are often called upon to reach decisions in several matters in a purely administrative or executive manner and these decisions fall clearly under the category of administrative or executive orders. Even judges have, in certain matters, to act administratively, while administrative or executive authorities may have to act quasi-judicially in dealing with some matters entrusted to their jurisdiction. Where an authority is required to act judicially either by an express provision of the statute under which it acts or by necessary implication of the said statute the decisions of such an authority generally amount to quasi-judicial decisions. Where, however, the executive or administrative bodies are not required to act judicially and are competent to deal with issues referred to them administratively, their conclusions cannot be treated as quasi-judicial conclusions. No doubt, even while acting administratively, the authorities must act bona fide; but that is different from saying that they must act judicially....” 

“9. In the State of Madras v. C. P. Sarathy, 1953 SCR 334 at p. 346 = (AIR 1953 SC 53 at p. 57) this Court held on construction of Section 10(1) of the Central Act that the function of the appropriate Government thereunder is an administrative function. It was so held presumably because the Government cannot go into the merits of the dispute, its function being only to refer such a dispute for adjudication so that the industrial relations between the employer and his employees may not continue to remain disturbed and the dispute may be resolved through a judicial process as speedily as possible. In the light of the nature of the function of the Government and the object for which the power is conferred on it, it would be difficult to hold that once the Government has refused to refer, it cannot change its mind on a reconsideration of the matter either because new facts have come to light or because it had misunderstood the existing facts or for any other relevant consideration and decide to make the reference. But where it reconsiders its earlier decision it can make the reference only if the dispute is an industrial one and either exists at that stage or is apprehended and the reference it makes must be with regard to that and no other industrial dispute....” 

“9. It follows, therefore, that an authority is described as quasi-judicial when it has some of the attributes or trappings of judicial functions, but not all. This Court in Province of Bombay v. Khusaldas S. Advani, 1950 SCR 621 : (AIR 1950 SC 222) dealt with the actions of the statutory body and laid down tests for ascertaining whether the action taken by such body was a quasi-judicial act or an administrative act. The Court approved the celebrated definition of the quasi-judicial body given by Atkin L. J. as he then was in Rex v. Electricity Commissioner, (1924) 1 KB 171 in which it was held : 

"Whenever any body of persons having legal authority to determine questions affecting rights of subjects, and having the duty to act judicially act in excess of their legal authority they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs." 

The aforesaid definition was accepted as correct in Rex v. London County Council (1931) 2-KB 215 and many subsequent cases both in England and in India. Again this Court in Radheshyam v. State of M. P., AIR 1959 SC 107 relying upon its earlier decision held (At P. 116 of AIR) :- 

"It will be noticed that this definition insists on three requisites each of which must be fulfilled in order that the act of the body may be quasi judicial act, namely, that the body of persons (1) must have legal authority, (2) to determine questions affecting the rights of parties, and (3) must have the duty to act judicially. Since a writ of certiorari can be issued only to correct the errors of a court or a quasi judicial body, it would follow that the real and determining test for ascertaining whether an act authorised by a statute is a quasi judicial act or an administrative act is whether the statute has expressly or impliedly imposed upon the statutory body the duty to act judicially as required by the third condition in the definition given by Atkin L. J. . . . . . . Relying on paragraphs 114 and 115 of Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Volume 11 at pages 55-58 and citing the case of R. v. Manchester Legal Aid Committee (1952) 2 QB 413 learned counsel for the appellants contends that where a statute requires decision to be arrived at purely from the point of view of policy or expediency the authority is under no duty to act judicially. He urges that where on the other hand, the order has to be passed on evidence either under an express provision of the statute or by implication and determination of particular facts on which its jurisdiction to exercise its power depends or if there is a proposal and an opposition the authority is under a duty to act judicially. As stated in paragraph 115 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 11, page 57, the duty to act judicially may arise in widely differing circumstances which it would be impossible to attempt to define exhaustively. The question whether or not there is a duty to act judicially must be decided in each case in the light of the circumstances of the particular case and the construction of the particular statute with the assistance of the general principles laid down in the judicial decisions. The principles deducible from the various judicial decisions considered by this Court in 1950 SCR 621 : AIR 1950 SC 222 at page 725 (of SCR) : (at p. 260 of AIR) were thus formulated namely :- 

"(i) that if a statute empowers an authority not being a Court in the ordinary sense, to decide disputes arising out of a claim made by one party under the statute which claim is opposed by another party and to determine the respective rights of the contesting parties who are opposed to each other there is a lis and prima facie and in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary it is the duty of the authority to act judicially and the decision of the authority is a quasi judicial act; and 

(ii) that if a statutory authority has power to do any act, which will prejudicially affect the subject, then, although there are not two parties apart from the authority and the contest is between the authority proposing to do the act and the subject opposing it, the final determination of the authority will yet be a quasi judicial act provided the authority is required by the statute to act judicially." 

In the instant case the order appointing the Pricing Committee which was amended on 26-11-86 specifically provided : 

"The aforesaid Pricing Committee was established to determine (not merely to advise on) the price and terms and conditions for the supply of resin, resin blazes, standing trees and other foreign produce to be handed over by the HP Forest Department to the HP State Forest Corporation Ltd. from time to time." Applying the tests noticed hereinabove, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the said committee was or intended to be a quasi-judicial Tribunal as argued on behalf of the respondent No.

1. This Committee can also not be stated to have been constituted in exercise of the plenary administrative power of the appellant-State. It has been conceded before us that the said Committee was not constituted in terms of Section 6 of the Himachal Pradesh Forest Produce (Regulation of Trade) Act, 1982. No other statutory provision has been relied either. The Committee appears to have been constituted for settlement of the claims and disputes between the appellant-State and the respondent-corporation. The decisions of the Committee were applicable to the parties to the said Committee and not to any third person. The said Committee had no source of its constitution in any statutes nor was it intended to determine or adjudicate the claims of parties with respect to the matters referred to it for opinion and suggestion or even for settlement between the parties concerned. The decision of the Committee, not being statutory, thus could not be given effect to by the High Court.” 

“5. The last point raised by Shri Garg was that the Central Government had no power to review its earlier orders as the rules do not vest the Government with any such power. Shri Garg relied on certain decisions of this Court in support of his submission : Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyamunsinghji Arjunsinghji AIR 1970 SC 1273, D. N. Roy v. State of Bihar (1971) 2 SCR 522 : (AIR 1971 SC 1045) and State of Assam v. J. N. Roy Biswas (1976) 2 SCR 128 : (AIR 1975 SC 2277). All the cases cited by Shri Garg are cases where the Government was exercising quasi-judicial powers vested in them by statute. We do not think that the principle that the power to review must be conferred by statute either specifically or by necessary implication is applicable to decisions purely of an administrative nature. To extend the principle to pure administrative decisions would indeed lead to untoward and startling results. Surely, any Government must be free to alter its policy or its decision in administrative matters. If they are to carry on their daily administration they cannot be hidebound by the rules and restrictions of judicial procedure though of course they are bound to obey all statutory requirements and also observe the principles of natural justice where rights of parties may be affected. Here again, we emphasise that if administrative decisions are reviewed, the decisions taken after review are subject to judicial review on all grounds on which an administrative decision may be questioned in a Court. We see no force in this submission of the learned counsel. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.” 

“19. We find it difficult to accept the reasoning underlying the aforesaid view. Before we consider the correctness of the proposition laid down by the High Court we must, at the expense of some space, analyse the distinctions between quasi-judicial and administrative functions. An administrative function is called quasijudicial when there is an obligation to adopt the judicial approach and to comply with the basic requirements of justice. Where there is no such obligation, the decision is called 'purely administrative' and there is no third category. This is what was meant by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963) 2 All ER 66, 75-76: 

"In cases of the kind with which I have been dealing the Board of Works was dealing with a single isolated case. It was not deciding, like a judge in a law suit, what were the rights of the persons before it. But it was deciding how he should be treated - something analogous to a judge's duty in imposing a penalty ...... So it was easy to say that such a body is performing a quasi-judicial task in considering and deciding such a matter and to require it to observe the essentials of all proceedings of a judicial character the principles of natural justice. Sometimes the functions of a minister of department may also be of that character and then the rules of natural justice can apply in much the same way....." 

20. Subba Rao, J, as he then was, speaking for this Court in G. Nageshwara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Transport Corporation, (1959) 1 SCR 319 : (AIR 1959 SC 308) put it on a different emphasis (at p. 353) (of SCR): (at p. 326 of AIR) : 

"The concept of a quasi-judicial act implies that the act is not wholly judicial, it describes only a duty cast on the executive body or authority to conform to norms of judicial procedure in performing some acts in exercise of its executive power ......" 

xx xx xx 

27. It has been argued that the order of the Chancellor becomes final and binding which is one of the features of judicial power. It is true that the conclusiveness of the decision without the need for confirmation or adoption by any other authority is generally regarded as one of the features of judicial power. But it must be added that the order made by a statutory authority even if it is given finality does not thereby acquire judicial quality if no other characteristic of judicial power is present. Power to make orders that are binding and conclusive is not, by itself a decisive factor to hold that the power is judicial. Prof. DeSmith makes a similar point in his book 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action' (4th Edition p. 82).

28.Taking all these factors into consideration, we would sum up our opinion in this way. The power of the Chancellor under S. 31(8)(a) is purely of administrative character and is not in the nature of judicial or quasijudicial power. No judicial or quasi judicial duty is imposed on the Chancellor and any reference to judicial duty, seems to be irrelevant in the exercise of his function. The function of the Chancellor is to consider and direct appointment of a candidate on the basis of the relative performance assessed by the Expert Selection Committee and in the light of the opinion, if any, expressed by the Executive Council. His decision nonetheless is a decision on the recommendation of the Selection Committee. Such a power cannot be considered as a quasi judicial power. And we see nothing in that to justify our thinking that it must conform to the principles of natural justice. The contention urged to the contrary is, therefore, unacceptable to us. We also do not agree with the contrary view taken by the High Court in the Full Bench decision in L. N. Mathur case (AIR 1986 All 273) (supra).

“19. True, the distinction between administrative and quasi judicial function is very thin. In quasi judicial function the adjudication of civil rights of a person is involved. The legal rights of persons are decided according to legal rules and prudence. But an administrative authority does not do so. It is true that a balance has to be struck between executive function and legal protection of right of the citizen. Abuse of discretionary power should be checked.” 

“20. On the argument of parties, the question that arises for our consideration is, whether the Election Commission, in exercise of its powers under S. 29-A of the Act, acts administratively or quasi-judicially. We shall first advert to the argument raised by learned counsel for the respondent to the effect that in the absence of any lis or contest between the two contending parties before the Election Commission under S. 29-A of the Act, the function discharged by it is administrative in nature and not a quasi-judicial one. The dictionary meaning of the word quasi is 'not exactly' and it is just in between a judicial and administrative function. It is true, in many cases, the statutory authorities were held to be quasijudicial authorities and decisions rendered by them were regarded as quasi judicial, where there were contest between the two contending parties and the statutory authority was required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties. In Cooper v. Wilson (1937) 2 KB 309, it is stated that "the definition of a quasi-judicial decision clearly suggests that there must be two or more contending parties and an outside authority to decide those disputes". In view of the aforesaid statement of law, where there are two or more parties contesting each other's claim and the statutory authority is required to adjudicate the rival claims between the parties, such a statutory authority was held to be quasi-judicial and decision rendered by it as a quasi-judicial order. Thus, where there is a lis or two contesting parties making rival claims and the statutory authority under the statutory provision is required to decide such a dispute, in the absence of any other attributes of a quasi-judicial authority, such a statutory authority is quasi-judicial authority.” 

“21. But there are cases where there is no lis or two contending parties before a statutory authority yet such a statutory authority has been held to be quasi-judicial and decision rendered by it as quasi judicial decision when such a statutory authority is required to act judicially.... “ 

When an act of statutory authority will be quasi judicial and what distinguishes an administrative act of quasijudicial were laid down in paragraphs, 24, 27, 29 and 31, which are to the following effect: 

“24. The legal principles laying down when an act of a statutory authority would be a quasi-judicial act, which emerge from the aforestated decisions are these : Where (a) a statutory authority empowered under a statute to do any act (b) which would prejudicially affect the subject (c) although there is no lis or two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and the subject and (d) the statutory authority is required to act judicially under the statute, the decision of the said authority is quasi-judicial.

25. Applying the aforesaid principle, we are of the view that the presence of a lis or contest between the contending parties before a statutory authority, in the absence of any other attributes of a quasi-judicial authority is sufficient to hold that such a statutory authority is quasi-judicial authority. However, in the absence of a lis before a statutory authority, the authority would be quasi-judicial authority if it is required to act judicially. 

Xx xx xx 

27. What distinguishes an administrative act from quasi-judicial act is, in the case of quasi judicial functions under the relevant law the statutory authority is required to act judicially. In other words, these law requires that an authority before arriving at decision must make an enquiry, such a requirement of law makes the authority a quasi-judicial authority. 

xx xx xx 

29. We do not find any merit in the submission. At the outset, it must be borne in mind that another test which distinguishes administrative function from quasi-judicial function is, the authority, who acts quasi-judicially is required to act according to the rules, whereas the authority which acts administratively is dictated by the policy and expediency. In the present case, the Election Commission is not required to register a political party in accordance with any policy or expediency but strictly in accordance with the statutory provisions. The afore-quoted passage from Administrative Law by Wade and Forsyth is wholly inapplicable to the present case. Rather, it goes against the argument of learned counsel for the respondent. The afore-quoted passage shows that where an authority whose decision is dictated by policy and expediency exercises administratively although it may be exercising functions in some respects as if it were judicial, which is not the case here. 

xx xx xx 

31. From the aforesaid provisions, it is manifest that the Commission is required to consider the matter, to give opportunity to the representative of political party and after making enquiry and further enquiry arrive at the decision whether to register a political party or not. In view of the requirement of law that the Commission is to give decision only after making an enquiry, wherein an opportunity of hearing is to be given to the representatives of the political party, wer are of the view that the Election Commission under Section 29A is required to act judicially and in that view of the matter the act of the Commission is quasi-judicial.” 

“1(b) Category of the industry - SSI/DGTD/MRTP/FERA/others. Xx xx xx Note.- The application form including the verification portion must be signed in case of an individual, by the individual himself or a person duly authorised by him; in case of Hindu undivided family, by the Karta; in case of a partnership firm, by the managing partner; in case of a company, by a person duly authorised in the behalf by the Board of Directors, and in any other case, by a person in charge of or responsible for the conduct of the business.” 

“10. (i) Ten copies of specifications for product, quality and methods of analysis for Technical/formulated compound (as applicable) and its residues. (ii) Analytical test report for the product quality.- As may be specified by the Registration Committee.”