"6. From time to time question arose whether the existing operators have any legal right to raise such objections. The question which actually fell for consideration of the Full Bench in Binu Chacho v. R.T.A., Pathanamthitta [2006(2) KLT 172] was whether an oder granting permit is a revisable order under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 at the instance of a business rival, i.e., an existing permit holder. In view of apparently inconsistent views taken by two Division Benches of this Court, the matter came to be referred to Full Bench and by the abovementioned judgment, the Full Bench held at paragraph 28 as follows: 

"We are of the view that the existing operator cannot invoke the revisional jurisdiction on the sole ground that the grant of permit to the opposite party prejudicially affects his rights. It is not as though he can impeach each and every order of the RTA or STA alleging illegality or impropriety. He can challenge only those orders against which he can have a legal grievance. He cannot be a person aggrieved in respect of every action or decision of RTA or STA. There are grievances which would give rise to a cause of action exclusively for the passengers only or sometimes to a local authority and the like. If the existing operator is given the right to challenge the very grant of permit or renewal of permit on the ground that he is aggrieved by such grant, it will amount to resurrecting a right which he was entitled to avail only under the old Act. It will be illogical and irrational to interpret the expression "person aggrieved" in Section 90 of the Act in such a manner as to take away the right given to a new entrant at the pre-permit stage to have a permit under the Act without obstruction from those already in the business, the very moment he is granted or issued a permit. Under normal circumstances, grievance of the existing operator shall be confined to disputes relating to settlement of timings and cannot be entertained against the grant of permit or renewal of permit as such." 

7. The Full Bench reached on such a conclusion on the basis of an earlier Division Bench judgment reported in Girija Devi v. K.T. Mathew [1991(1) KLT 353]. We may mention here that neither in the Full Bench decision nor in the abovementioned Division Bench decision, there is discussion either on the language of Rule 212 or interpretation of the said rule in the context of the scheme of the new Motor Vehicle Act, 1988. The Full Bench took note of the fact that in view of the decision in Mithilesh Garg v. Union of India [AIR 1992 SCC 443] there is a change of the legislative policy under the 1988 Act compared to its predecessor Act of 1939 and therefore came to the conclusion that the existing operator cannot object to the grant of the permit, but the existing operator can raise objection regarding settlement of timings. With utmost respect to the Full Bench, we are of the opinion that such a conclusion, to our mind, appears to be inconsistent with the other principle laid down by the Full Bench that the existing operator has no right to object to the grant of new permits.

8. The learned counsel for the appellants however, referred to proviso to Rule 212 (3) which reads as follows: 

"Provided that the State or Regional Transport Authority shall not however vary the timings of a service without giving to the interested permit holders an opportunity to represent their case." 9. As already noticed by us earlier, neither the language of the said proviso nor the scheme of the rule was the subject matter of discussion either by the Full Bench or by the earlier Division Bench relied upon by the Full Bench.

10. Prima facie we are of the opinion that the language of the abovementioned proviso confers a right on an existing operator of a stage carriage for an opportunity to represent his case only when the timings fixed for operating his permit are sought to be varied but not otherwise." 

"90. Revision. 

The State Transport Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made to ti, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport authority against which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal that the order made by the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit and every such order shall be final: 

Provided that the State Transport appellate Tribunal shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty days from date of the order: 

Provided further that the State Transport Appellate Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by good and sufficient cause from making the application in time: Provided also that the State Transport appellate Tribunal shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard." 

"212. Schedule of timings:- 

(1) The State or Regional Transport Authority may from time to time- 

(a) by a general order prescribe a schedule of timings for stage carriages other than those belonging to State Transport Undertakings running on specified routes, or 

(b) by a special order prescribe a schedule of timings for each stage carriage other than that belonging to state Transport Undertaking. 

(2) The changes ordered by the Transport Authority in the timings of a service shall not be considered as variation of permit under sub- section (3) of section 80 of the Act. 

(3) The State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority may, by resolution, delegate to its Secretary the powers conferred on it under this rule subject to any conditions that it may prescribe: 

Provided that the State or Regional Transport Authority shall not however vary the timings of a service without giving to the interested permit holders an opportunity to represent their case." 

"47. Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit. 

(1) A Regional Transport Authority shall, in considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the following matters, namely:- 

(a) the interest of the public generally; 

(b) the advantages to the public of the service to be provided, including the saving of time likely to be effected thereby and any convenience arising from journeys not being broken; 

(c) the adequacy of other passenger transport services operating or likely to operate in the near future, whether by road or other means, between the places to be served; 

(d) the benefit to any particular locality or localities likely to be afforded by the service; 

(e) the operation by the applicant of other transport services, including those in respect of which applications from him for permits are pending; 

(f) the condition of the roads included in the proposed route or area; and shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the proposed route or area, or by any association representing persons interested in the provision of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by the State Government, or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies: 

Provided that other conditions being equal, an application for a stage carriage permit from a co-operative society registered or deemed to have been registered under any enactment in force for the time being and application for a stage carriage permit from a person who has a valid licence for driving transport vehicles shall, as far as may be, be given preference over applications from individual owners." 

"4. If the said decision of the Division Bench in C.T.R.B.T. Co-op. Society's case (supra) is to be followed, the writ petitioner has to be non-suited, by holding that he is not entitled to challenge Exhibit P1 grant and thereby does not have the locus to file either a statutory revision under S.90 of the Act, or to file this writ petition. I say so because, the Division Bench in C.T.R.B.T Co-op. Society's case (supra) had categorically found that the existing operators have no right to object to the grant of permit to other stage carriage operators. Thereby it followed an earlier Division Bench decision in Girija Devi v. K.T.Mathew (1991(1) KLT 353). 

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9. Learned counsel for the petitioners raised following issues for our consideration: 

(1) Whether absence of a statutory right to file objection/representation before the Regional Transport Authority, and absence of a statutory right to be heard in the matter of grant of permit to a rival operator would disentitle an existing operator to invoke the supervisory discretionary jurisdiction of the STAT under S.90 of the Act to impugn an order of the R.T.A granting permit on the ground that the order of the R.T.A is illegal and rendered overlooking relevant provisions of the regulatory statute; 

(2) Whether a competitor/rival in trade can be said to be a person aggrieved by an illegal and improper grant of permit/licence to another person in contravention of the provisions of the statute? And 

(3) Whether the question of locus standi be considered in the abstract or as a preliminary issue without considering the merits of the contentions touching the legality and propriety of the order, in a given fact situation?" 

"7. As against the above provisions in the old Act, Ss.57, 64, 71, 80 and 90 of the Act have been designed in such a manner that the power of the authority to refuse permit to the applicant has been substantially curtailed. And to effectuate the above purpose the right of the rival operator to raise objections against the application for the grant of permit has been taken away. S.80 of the Act which deals with the procedure for making applications for the grant of permits mandates that the STA/RTA shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under the Act. S.71 of the act makes it clear that the Legislature wanted to exclude the existing or rival operators from participating in the decision making process. One of the objects of the Act is simplification of procedure and liberalisation in the matter of grant of permits. Sub-clause(1) of S.71 of the act mandates that the R.T.A shall, while considering an application for a stage carriage permit, have regard to the objects of the act. Another important change brought about by the Act is exclusion of a provision similar to the one contained in sub-s.(5) of S.57 of the old Act. The absence of a provision similar to sub- s.(5) of S.57 of the old Act makes the intention of the Legislature clear. A similar intention can be spelt from the absence of provisions similar to those in clause (f) of sub-s.(1) of S.64 of the old Act." 

"6. The Parliament in its wisdom has completely effaced the above features. The scheme envisaged under Sections 47 and 57 of the old Act has been completely done away with by the Act. The right of existing operators to file objections and the provision to impose limit on the number of permits have been taken away. There is no similar provision to that of Section 47 and Section 57 under the Act. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act shows that the purpose of bringing, in the Act was to liberalise the grant of permits. Section71(1) of the Act provides that while considering an application for a stage carriage permit the Regional Transport Authority shall have regard to the objects of the Act. Section80(2), which is the harbinger of Liberalisation, provides that a Regional 'Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under the Act. There is no provision under the Act like that of Section 47(3) of the old Act and as such no limit for the grant of permits can be fixed under the Act. There is, however, a provision under Section 71(3) (a) of the Act under which a limit can be fixed for the grant of permits in respect of the routes which are within a town having population of more than five lakhs." 

"13. This takes us to the further question: Who is an "aggrieved person" and what are the qualifications requisite for such a status? The expression "aggrieved person" denotes an elastic, and to an extent, an elusive concept. It cannot be confined within the bounds of a rigid, exact and comprehensive definition. At best, its features can be described in a broad tentative manner. Its scope and meaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the content and intent of the statute of which contravention is alleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature and extent of the petitioner's interest, and the nature and extent of the prejudice or injury suffered by him. English courts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide construction on the expression "aggrieved person". However, some general tests have been devised to ascertain whether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to have the necessary locus standi or "standing" to invoke certiorari jurisdiction." 

"17. The ratio of the decision in Queen v. Justices of Surrey was followed in King v. Groom ex parte. There, the parties were rivals in the liquor trade. The applicants (brewers) had persistently objected to the jurisdiction of the justices to grant the license to one J.K. White in a particular month. It was held that the applicants had a sufficient interest in the matter to enable them to invoke certiorari jurisdiction.

18. A distinguishing feature of this case was that unlike the appellants in the present case who did not, despite public notice, raise any objection before the District Magistrate to the grant of the no-objection certificate, the brewers were persistently raising objections in proceedings before the justices at every stage. The law gave them a right to object and to see that the licensing was done in accordance with law. They were seriously prejudiced in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the justices.

19. The rule in Grooms case was followed in King v. Richmond Confirming Authority, ex parte Howitt. There also, the applicant for a certiorari was a rival in the liquor trade. It is significant that in coming to the conclusion that the applicant was a "person aggrieved", Earl of Reading, C.J., laid stress on the fact that he had appeared andobjected before the justices and joined issue with them, though unsuccessfully, "in the sense that they said they had jurisdiction when he said they had not".

20. In R. v. Thames Magistrate's Court ex parte Greenbaum, there were two traders in Goulston St., Stepney. One of them was Gritzman who held a license to trade on pitch No. 4 for 5 days in the week and pitch No. 8 for the other two days. The other was Greenbaum, who held a licence to sell on pitch No. 8 for two days of the week and pitch No. 10 for the other days of the week. A much better pitch, pitch No. 2, in Goulston St. became vacant. Thereupon, both Gritzman and Greenbaum applied for the grant of a licence, each wanted to give up his own existing licence and get a new licence for pitch No. 2. The Borough Council considered and decided in favour of Greenbaum and refused Gritzman who was left with his pitches Nos. 4 and 8.

21. Gritzman appealed to the Magistrate. He could not appeal against the grant of a licence to Greenbaum, but only against the refusal to grant a licence to himself. Before the Magistrate, the Borough Council opposed him. The Magistrate held that the Council were wrong to refuse the licence of pitch No. 2 to Gritzman. The Council thereupon made out a licence for Gritzman for pitch No. 2 and wrote to Greenbaum saying that his licence had been wrongly issued. Greenbaum made an application for certiorari to court. The court held that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. An objection was taken that Greenbaum had no locus standi. Rejecting the contention, Lord Denning observed: 

"I should have thought that in this case Greenbaum was certainly a person aggrieved, and not a stranger. He was affected by the Magistrate's orders because the Magistrate ordered another person to be put on his pitch. It is a proper case for the intervention of the court by means of certiorari." 

xx xx xx 

24. In Regina v. Liverpool Corporation ex parte Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association the City Council in exercise of its powers under the town Police Clauses Act, 1847, limited the number of licensesto be issued for hackney carriages to 300. The Council gave an undertaking to the associations representing the 300 existing licence holders not to increase the number of such license holders above 300 for a certain period. The Council, disregarding this undertaking, resolved to increase the number. An association representing the existing license holders moved the Queens' Bench for leave to apply for orders of prohibition, mandamus and certiorari. The Division Bench refused. In the Court of Appeal, allowing the association's appeal, Lord Denning, M.R. observed at pp. 308, 309: 

"The taxicab owners' association come to this Court for relief and I think we should give it to them. The writs of prohibition and certiorari lie on behalf of any person who is a `person aggrieved' and that includes any person whose interests may be prejudicially affected by what is taking place. It does not include a mere busybody who is interfering in things which do not concern him; but it includes any person who has a genuine grievance because something has been done or may be done which affects him: See Attorney General of the Gambia v. N'Jie and Maurice v. London County Council. The taxicab owners' association here have certainly a locus standi to apply for relief." 

"37. It will be seen that in the context of locus standi to apply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily fall in any of these categories: (i) "person aggrieved"; (ii) "stranger"; (iii) busybody or meddlesome interloper. Persons in the last category are easily distinguishable from those coming under the first two categories. Such persons interfere in things which do not concern them. They masquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in the name of pro bono publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in the pastime of meddling with the judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity; while the ulterior intent of some applicants in this category, may be no more than spoking the wheels of administration. The High Court should do well to reject the applications of such busybodies at the threshold.

38. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of "persons aggrieved". In the grey outer circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer zone may not be "persons aggrieved".

39. To distinguish such applicants from "strangers", among them, some broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made above. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their efficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case, including the statutory context in which the matter falls to be considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person whose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal wrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised by law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the act or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a person who has suffered a legal grievance, a person "against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something?" Has he a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some grievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the rest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by the authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was he prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by the act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the authority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope of the words "person aggrieved" is being considered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down ethical or professional standards of conduct for the community? Or is it a statute dealing with private rights of particular individuals?" 

"47. Thus, in substance, the appellant's stand is that the setting up of a rival cinema house in the town will adversely affect his monopolistic commercial interest, causing pecuniary harm and loss of business from competition. Such harm or loss is not wrongful in the eye of law, because it does not result in injury to a legal right or a legally protected interest, the business competition causing it being a lawful activity. Juridically, harm of this description is called damnum sine injuria, the term injuria being here used in its true sense of an act contrary to law. The reason why the law suffers a person knowingly to inflict harm of this description on another, without holding him accountable for it, is that such harm done to an individual is a gain to society at large.

48. In the light of the above discussion, it is demonstrably clear that the appellant has not been denied or deprived of a legal right. He has not sustained injury to any legally protected interest. In fact, the impugned order does not operate as a decision against him, much less does it wrongfully affect his title to something. He has not been subjected to a legal wrong. He has suffered no legal grievance. He has no legal peg for a justiciable claim to hang on. Therefore he is not a "person aggrieved" and has no locus standi to challenge the grant of the no-objection certificate." 

"28. We are of the view that the existing operator cannot invoke the revisional jurisdiction on the sole ground that the grant of permit to the opposite party prejudicially affects his rights. It is not as though he can impeach each and every order of the RTA or STA alleging illegality or impropriety. He can challenge only those orders against which he can have a legal grievance. He cannot be a person aggrieved in respect of every action or decision of RTA or STA. There are grievances which would give rise to a cause of action exclusively for the passengers only or sometimes to a local authority and the like if the existing operator is given the right to challenge the very grant of permit or renewal of permit on the ground that he is aggrieved by such grant, it will amount to resurrecting a right which he was entitled to avail only under the old Act. It will be illogical and irrational to interpret the expression "person aggrieved" in S.90 of the Act in such a manner as to take away the right given to a new entrant at the pre-permit stage to have a permit under the act without obstruction from those already in the business, the very moment he is granted or issued a permit. Under normal circumstances, grievance of the existing operator shall be confined to disputes relating to settlement of timings and cannot be entertained against the grant of permit or renewal of permit as such. We are unable to concur with the reasoning and the final conclusion arrived at by the learned Judges in D.L.Sadashiva Reddy v. P.Lala Sheriff (AIR 1999 Karnataka 5). We agree with the views expressed by the Division Bench in Girija Devi v. K.T.Mathew (1991(1) KLT 353) and in C.T.R.B.T. Cop-op. Society's case that an existing operator will be a person aggrieved as far as settlement of timings is concerned. However, it may not be proper or expedient to restrict the scope of the words "person aggrieved" to settlement of timings only, though under the scheme of the act, existing operators may have in the normal course, legal grievance against settlement of timings only. We, therefore, do not rule out any other grievance of a similar nature which would tilt the balance in favour of one operator and against another as a consequence of orders issued by R.T.A or S.T.A. The applicant is required not only to establish that the order impugned suffers from illegality or impropriety of a substantial nature but also has to discharge the burden to satisfy the tribunal that he has a legal grievance against that order, and therefore, is a person aggrieved. This exercise the STAT has to do by applying its mind to the facts and circumstances of each case and this implies that the tribunal may not throw a revision petition overboard at the threshold." 

"71. Procedure of Regional Transport Authority in considering application for stage carriage permit.- 

xx xx xx 

(3)(a) The State Government shall, if so directed by the Central Government having regard to the number of vehicles, road conditions and other relevant matters, by notification in the Official Gazette, direct a State Transport Authority and a Regional Transport Authority to limit the number of stage carriages generally or of any specified type, as may be fixed and specified in the notification, operating on city routes in towns with a population of not less than five lakhks." 

Section 80(2) of the Act, 1988 provides that Regional Transport Authority or State Transport Authority shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit. Sub- section (2) of Section 80 of the Act, 1988, however, contains a proviso, which is to the following effect: "80.Procedure in applying for and granting permits.-

(1) xx xx xx 

(2) A Regional Transport Authority, State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority referred to in sub-section (1) of section 66 shall not ordinarily refuse to grant an application for permit of any kind made at any time under this Act: Provided that the Regional Transport Authority, State Transport Authority or any prescribed authiority referred to in sub-section (1) of section 66 may summarily refuse the application if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application would have the effect of increasing the number of stage carriages as fixed and specified in a notification in the Official Gazette under clause (a) of sub-section (3) of section 71 or of contract carriages as fixed and speecified in a notification in the Official Gazette under clause (a) of siub-section (3) of section 74: Provided further that where a Regional Transport Authority, Stage Transport Authority or any prescribed authority referred to in sub-section (1) of Section 66 refuses an application for the grant of a permit of any kind under this Act, it shall give to the applicant in writing its reasons for the refusal of the same and an opportunity of being heard in the matter." 

".....The statutory authorities under the Act are bound to keep a watch on the erroneous and illegal exercise of power in granting permits under the liberalised policy." 

"12. In this context we noticed that this Court has changed from the earlier strict interpretation regarding locus standi as adopted in Nagar Rice & Flour Mills v. N. Teekappa Gowda & Bros. and Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar and a much wider canvass has been adopted in later years regarding a person's entitlement to move the High Court involving writ jurisdiction. A four-Judge Bench in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai pointed out three categories of persons vis-`-vis the locus standi: 

(1) a person aggrieved; 

(2) a stranger; and 

(3) a busybody or a meddlesome interloper. 

Learned Judges in that decision pointed out that anyone belonging to the third category is easily distinguishable and such person interferes in things which do not concern him as he masquerades to be a crusader of justice. The judgment has cautioned that the High Court should do well to reject the petitions of such busybody at the threshold itself. Then their Lordships observed the following: (SCC p. 683, para 38) 

"38. The distinction between the first and second categories of applicants, though real, is not always well demarcated. The first category has, as it were, two concentric zones; a solid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of lessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an outermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling within the central zone are those whose legal rights have been infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the category of `persons aggrieved'. In the grey outer circle the bounds which separate the first category from the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly in a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outer zone may not be `persons aggrieved'." 

xx xx xx 

14. In the light of the expanded concept of the locus standi and also in view of the finding of the Division Bench of the High Court that the order of the Excise Commissioner was passed in violation of law, we do not wish to nip the motion out solely on the ground of locus standi. If the Excise Commissioner has no authority to permit a liquor shop owner to move out of the range (for which auction was held) and have his business in another range it would be improper to allow such an order to remain alive and operative on the sole ground that the person who filed the writ petition has strictly no locus standi. So we proceed to consider the contentions on merits." 

"2. The main grievance of the appellant before the High Court was that Prakash Palance Video Parlour, Respondent 3 was situated within 350 metres from Sai Chalchitra and hence no licence could be granted to Respondent 3 to run a video parlour under the U.P. Cinema (Regulation of Exhibition by Means of Video) Rules, 1988. It was also asserted that the exhibition of video films by Respondent 3 had badly affected the cinema business of the appellant as the video parlour was situated very close to the cinema hall of the appellant. It was also submitted that the grant of licence in favour of Respondent 3 was in violation of the provisions contained in Sections 7(1-A)(a), (b) and (c) of the U.P. Regulation of Cinema Act, 1955. Under Section 7(1-A), licence could be cancelled or revoked on the following grounds: 

"(a) that the licence was obtained through fraud or misrepresentation; or 

(b) that the licensing authority or the State Government while considering the application or appeal, as the case may be, under Section 5 was under a mistake as to a matter essential to the question of grant or refusal of licence; or 

(c) that the licensee has been guilty of breach of the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder or of any conditions or restrictions contained in the licence, or of any direction issued under sub-section (4) of Section 5; or" 

3. The writ petition was contested by the State of U.P. as well as Respondent 3.

4. Learned Single Judge, before whom the writ petition came up for hearing, dismissed the writ petition on the locus standi of the appellant to file the writ petition without going into the other questions of law. It was observed that the appellant could not raise a grievance against his rival in the trade particularly when the rival in trade, as in the instant case, was exhibiting cinematograph films much before the appellant was granted the licence. It was held that the appellant had not been denied or deprived of its legal right to exhibit the films and, therefore, he had not sustained any legally protected interest. It was also observed that the order of the Commissioner did not operate as a decision against the appellant as the appellant had not suffered any legal wrong. The writ petition filed by the appellant was held not to be maintainable.

5. After hearing the counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the High Court clearly erred in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant on the ground of locus standi. The appellant being in the same trade as Respondent 3 has a right to seek the cancellation of the licence granted to Respondent 3 being in violation of the Act and the Rules." 

"under normal circumstances, grievance of the existing operator shall be confined to disputes relating to settlement of timings and cannot be entertained against the grant of permit or renewal of permit as such". 

"we, therefore, do not rule out any other grievance of a similar nature which would tilt the balance in favour of one operator and against another as a consequence of orders issued by R.T.A or S.T.A. ...". 

(1) The existing permit holder has no right to challenge grant of permit under the Act, 1988 on the sole ground that such grant shall adversely affect their commercial interest. For the above purpose, he cannot be treated to be "a person aggrieved" within the meaning of Section 90 of the Act, 1988. 

(2) The existing permit holder can be treated to be "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Section 90 of the Act, 1988 in the event his challenge to the grant of permit is on the ground of any violation of the provisions of the Act or Rules. 

(3) The proviso to Rule 212 gives a statutory right to the existing permit holder to be heard in the event timings of his service is sought to be changed. However, his right under the proviso to Rule 212 confines to challenge the variation of timings and the said right cannot be read as a right to challenge the very grant of permit. 

(4). The Full Bench judgment in Binu Chacko's case (supra) is explained and clarified in the above manner.

(i) Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the 2nd respondent to forthwith issue the regular permit granted under Exhibit P3 order of the Regional Transport Authority, Thrissur with Exhibit P2 timings proposed by the petitoiner, reserving the right of the respondent to settle/revise the timings after the issue of the permit, on receipt of genuine objections. 

(ii) Issue such other appropriate writ, order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case." 

"The respondent shall within one week from the date on which the petitioner produces a copy of this judgment before him, issue a set of timings to the petitioner on a provisional basis and shall immediately thereafter issue the permit to the petitioner. The respondent shall thereafter invite objections from other stage carriage operators and settle the timings within a period of three months thereafter. If any existing stage carriage operator is aggrieved by the time schedule issued to the petitioner pursuant to the directions in this judgment, it will be open to him or her to object to the timings and to request the respondent to convene a timing conference to settle the timings expeditiously." 

"Issue a writ of mandamus commanding the 2nd respondent to forthwith issue the regular permit granted under Exhibit P3 order of the Regional Transport Authority, Ernakulam with Exhibit P2 timings proposed by the petitioner, reserving the right of the respondent to settle/revise the things after the issue of the permit, on receipt of genuine objections." 

"I accordingly dispose of the writ petition with a direction to the respondent to issue the permit in implementation of Ext.P3 order with a set of provisional timings. Needful in the matter shall be done expeditiously and in any event within one week from the date on which the petitioner produces a certified copy of the judgment before the respondent. If, after the permit is issued and the petitioner commences service, any other person(s) objects to the timings presently fixed, it will be open to the respondent to convene a timing conference and settle the timings with notice to the petitioner and the other operators operating on the route or sectors thereof. In that event, the time schedule shall be settled expeditiously and in any event within two months from the date on which any objection is received from the existing operators to the time schedule presently fixed."