(2012) 246 KLR 297 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN & THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.T.RAVIKUMAR FRIDAY, THE 23RD DAY OF MARCH 2012/3RD CHAITHRA 1934 WP(C).No. 11777 of 2011 (V) ---------------------------------------- PETITIONER: ------------------- ANIL KUMAR.A., S/O. ALEXANDER, AGED 26 YEARS, RESIDING AT ABHILASH SADANAM, SOUTH ARYAD, AVALUKUNNU.P.O., ALAPPUZHA-688 006. BY ADV. SRI.R.AZAD BABU. RESPONDENTS: ------------------------ 1. STATE OF KERALA, REPRESENTED BY HOME SECRETARY, SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001. 2. THE COMMANDANT, KAP 3 BN. OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT, KAP 3 BN., ADOOR, PATHANAMTHITTA DISTRICT - 689 711. 3. KERALA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM - 695 001. W.P.(C).NO.11777/2011-V: *ADDL. R4 IMPLEADED: 4. SHOUKATH ALI.P, P.C. 6765, C COMPANY, KAP II BATALLION, MUTTIKULANGARA, PALAKKAD. *ADDL. R4 IMPLEADED VIDE ORDER IN I.A. NO.15104/2011 DT. 27/09/2011. R1 & R2 BY SR. GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI. T. RAMPRASAD UNNI, GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI. R. PADMARAJ, R3 BY SRI.P.C.SASIDHARAN, S.C, ADDL. R4 BY ADVS. SRI.ELVIN PETER P.J, SRI.T.G.SUNIL (PRANAVAM). THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 11/01/2012, ALONG WITH W.P.(C). NO. 14328/2011 AND CONNECTED CASES, THE COURT ON 23/03/2012 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.P.(C).NO.11777/2011-V: APPENDIX PETITIONERS' EXHIBITS:
RESPONDENTS' EXHIBITS:
//TRUE COPY// P.A. TO JUDGE. Prv. Thottathil B.Radhakrishnan & C.T.Ravikumar, JJ. = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = WP(C).No.11777 of 2011, WP(C).No.35577 of 2004, WP(C).Nos.5310, 7352 & 25789 of 2005, WP(C).Nos.32559, 33387, 34002, 34084 & 34102 of 2009, WP(C).Nos.9310, 29353 & 35397 of 2010, WP(C).Nos.12188, 12324, 13009, 13372, 13399, 13771, 14328, 14907, 15985, 16142, 16798, 18690, 25357 & 25817 of 2011 = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = Dated this the 23rd day of March, 2012. Head Note:- Kerala State & Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 - Rule 10(b)(iii) of Part II - Criminals in Police Service - Held, If on subsequent verification, the Government are not satisfied of the character and antecedents of that person, the appointment shall be terminated without notice. The authority of the Government to terminate without notice cannot be watered down by judicial decision except by holding that provision as ultra vires. Held Not Good Law: Suresh v. Public Service Commission, 2008 (2) KLT 441 Kerala State & Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 - Rule 10(b)(iii) of Part II - Criminals in Police Service - Held, It is not advisable in law, including as to practice and procedure, to issue interlocutory orders in writ jurisdiction, commanding appointment or admission to the police force. It shall be left to those in the hierarchy of the police department under the control of the Director General of Police to come to appropriate conclusions on a case to case basis, wherever a criminal antecedent is seen about a person, leading to the question as to whether such person should be admitted to the force, or not, to enable appropriate information regarding the person concerned being conveyed to the appropriate appointing authority so that the appointing authority will be notified of the situation which may call for exercise under proviso to Rule 10(b) (iii). Kerala State & Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 - Rule 10(b)(iii) of Part II - Criminals in Police Service - Held, the Director General of Police and the officers under his command shall, without fail, guard zealously tracking the individual cases, leaving no stone unturned and keeping their eyes wide awake, with no fail. Any failure on this issue could visit the Director General of Police and the officers under his command with personal liability as the responsibility they have in this regard is attendant to National and State security. The Nation, including the State, needs a disciplined uniformed force of Police. Kerala State & Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 - Rule 10(b)(iii) of Part II - Criminals in Police Service - Held, if a person is to be refused appointment on the State Government being satisfied that his character and antecedents are such as not to qualify him for such service, the mere fact that such a person had been temporarily appointed awaiting verification of character and antecedents does not give him the eligibility for a pre-decisional hearing. It is not a case of removal from service. It is only a case of recalling an appointment made temporarily. Judgment "CR" Thottathil B.Radhakrishnan, J. I.These matters are before the Division Bench on different reference orders by a learned single Judge. The first among them was issued on 11th April, 2011 in WP(C).No.11777 of 2011 noticing that different interlocutory orders were issued in writ jurisdiction permitting persons who were involved in criminal cases to undergo training on being selected as Police Constables. The reference is on the ground that such practice of issuing interim orders needs reconsideration on issues of law; the learned Judge who made the reference, having, apparently, disagreed with such practice and procedure. II.Different interlocutory orders, including as directions, were issued pending the proceedings before the Division Bench, also focussing on the legal issue referred to the Division Bench. III.On 21st June, 2011, it was directed that except in cases where any candidate has completed the period of training and has been permitted to discharge duties and responsibilities in the service, awaiting verification report as regards character and antecedents, all other candidates, in relation to whom there are indicators of criminal cases, including those who had been allowed to join training on the basis of the interim orders or otherwise, shall be discontinued and forthwith kept out of training for a period of six weeks. It was further directed that the State Government shall immediately ensure that verification of antecedents and character of all such candidates, including those who have already completed the training, is carried out without fail within a period of five weeks and action taken on the basis of such reports. It was further ordered that in the case of any candidate who may be found fit to continue after such verification, the training will stand extended by six weeks, however, without prejudice to his eligibility on the basis of the present entry for the purpose of regularisation. In issuing those directions, the Bench had deliberated, dealt with and held specifically on certain issues that arise for decision on the basis of the reference orders. It is, therefore, profitable to quote the following from that order dated 21st June, 2011: "2. These cases relate to the recruitment of police constables. In almost all the cases, the respective candidate was not permitted to join duty or was not issued with appointment order on the premise that he was involved in criminal cases and that his antecedents were not above board going by the materials available with the competent authority. Indisputably, no order has been issued by the competent authority under Rule 10(b)(iii) of Part II of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958, holding that the Government is satisfied that his character and antecedents are such as to qualify him for such service. A proviso to that clause enjoins that the appointing authority may, in anticipation of such decision, appoint the person temporarily on condition that the appointment shall be terminated without notice, if the Government are satisfied that his character and antecedents on subsequent verification are found not satisfactory. Note 2 under that clause provides that the appointing authorities shall get the necessary details for verification of character and antecedents of the candidates advised by the Commission from the candidates themselves before they are allowed to join duty and the appointing authorities shall obtain the reports on the verification of character and antecedents so advised, within a period not exceeding six months from the date of joining duty of the candidates. This, obviously, enjoins a duty on the appointing authority to ensure that report regarding the verification of character and antecedents cannot be indefinitely dragged on. We say this in the context of cases where admittedly no report has been obtained in the case of any of these writ petitioners. 3. On the strength of the advise by the Public Service Commission and in one case, on the strength of an appointment order issued by the appointing authority, under the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii), the writ petitioners moved this Court for interim orders. Going by the reference order, the learned single Judge indicates that there would have been at least more than 50 cases where orders have been issued by this Court as interlocutory orders, pending writ petitions, directing admission of the respective candidate to training as police constables, in spite of the availability of materials to show that such candidate was a person in relation to whom a criminal case was pending, be it at the stage of merely registering a First Information Report or against whom investigation is on or where a final report has been laid following which the court has taken cognizance of the case or has even framed charge in terms of the Cr.PC. We are clear in our mind that the gravity of the offences, in relation to which the criminal cases exist, is not a matter for objective consideration by the writ court while exercising jurisdiction on an allegation that appointment is not being made. We stand cautioned by the well settled principle governed by at least half a dozen precedents of the Apex Court that no one gets an indefeasible right to be appointed merely because he is included in a select list or his candidature has been advised by the PSC. 4. Be that as it may, Rule 10(b)(iii) states about the State Government being satisfied of the candidate's character and antecedents to be such as to qualify him for such service. This is a matter for the Government to consider. "Such service" in the case in hand is the service in the police constabulary. The quality, discipline, ability etc. in relation to such service is not a matter for the judiciary to lay down. While the mere existence of a criminal case carries with it the indefeasible presumption as to the innocence of the accused until tried and found guilty, such proposition of law cannot tie down the State Government in the formulation of its opinion as to whether any particular conduct attributed to a person and found reflected in the proceedings pending before the police or the criminal court dis- entitles him to enter such service. The uniformed disciplined force of the police can ill-afford the presence of a criminal or a probable criminal in its cadre. In this context, we record the submission of the learned Advocate General that the policy of the Government is to de-criminalise the police force. If it is found that there are persons in the police service with criminal antecedent, that will disable them to continue in service in terms of the provisions of law, including Rule 10(b)(iii). With this, we are clear in our mind that while the courts may consider issuing directions to the Government in any given case, on the facts of that case, to expedite the issuance of the verification reports as to antecedents, within such time frame as is provided by Note 2 to Rule 10(b) (iii), there would be no ground to issue an order to make an appointment or order admission or entry of candidates or cadets to the force or for training as part of induction thereto. 5. Police training indisputably involves training in arms and ammunitions. What if at the closure of the training it is ultimately found that a particular candidate is unfit to join service? He gets well trained in arms and ammunitions and would then be told to leave the cadre, which will obviously make him available to other pastures which may be more lucrative to his economic growth in the present scenario, world over. It may also be a case where there would be conscious infiltration into the training camps of the police by persons with criminal antecedents using the lethargy of the State Government to issue verification reports in time. If the judiciary were to pass interlocutory orders compelling the establishment to train such person also, in the training centres, in all the different battalions, police camps etc, that will only provide room for growth of unlawful elements, including assemblies, which may ultimately result in hatching of unnecessary groups within the disciplined force. Once a drop of poison destroys the milk, it could never be filtered off to cleanse the milk for consumption. A drop of poison is sufficient. Similar is the case of the uniformed forces also. 6. We are, therefore, in agreement with the suggestion in the reference order that it may not be advisable to issue interlocutory orders in writ jurisdiction commanding appointment or admission to the police force. We are clear in our mind that the prerogative of the executive in terms of the statutory rules should get priority. Secondly and more importantly, as regards uniformed force, it shall be left to those in the hierarchy of the police department under the control of the Director General of Police to come to appropriate conclusions on a case to case basis, wherever a criminal antecedent is seen about a person, as to such person should be admitted or not. We are also of the view that verification of character and antecedents in terms of Note 2 under the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii) is not one which provides any room for pre-decisional hearing." IV.Holding as aforesaid, the Bench noted that the concept of pre-decisional hearing before terminating the continuance of a particular person who has been taken in on the basis of the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii) requires further consideration since prima facie, the Bench was of the view that the precedent Suresh v. Public Service Commission [2008(2) KLT 441] needs reconsideration. V.On 8th August, 2011, the learned Government Pleader placed before the Bench a communication given by the State Police Chief to the learned Advocate General enclosing therewith details which the Police Headquarters is stated to have considered in relation to candidates under training who are kept out of training. Adverting to some of the relevant issues arising for decision and in furtherance of the afore-quoted order dated 21st June, 2011, the Bench issued an order on 8th August, 2011. Having regard to the issues dealt with in that order and the directions issued thereby, it is apposite to quote paragraphs 1 to 10.iii. They read as follows: "1. The learned Government Pleader has placed before us, for our perusal, a communication given by the State Police Chief to the learned Advocate General enclosing therewith details which the Police Headquarters is stated to have considered in relation to candidates under training who are kept out of training. It is stated that a Committee consisting of ADGP(Admn.), ADGP (INT) and DIG(APBN) as Members, is constituted to carry out the exercise of weeding out persons who are unsuitable and undesirable in the Police Department from among those who are undergoing or have by now undergone training in the Police Academies in the State of Kerala. We desist from going into the details of individual cases, though the learned Government Pleader has placed before us for perusal some materials in the form of recommendations taken at a particular meeting to review the progress of the compliance of the earlier directions of this Court with reference to criminal cases pending against police personnel whose verification reports are pending. 2. We direct that the entire materials as now placed before us which would now be returned to the learned Government Pleader be placed before this Court in a sealed cover. We require this sealed cover procedure because the materials now available should not be treated as reflecting the views of the State or the prosecuting agency, in relation to criminal cases which are pending trial. We further direct that no criminal court would take cognizance of any material contained in this report or statements furnished by the police personnel while considering the antecedents of the police personnel for the purpose of considering whether they deserve to be detained in service. 3. We, however, note that the State Police Chief reports that after verification, the cases have been categorized into four: (1) those who are to be retrenched, (2) those who are to be retained, (3) those who are fit to be retained, if acquitted, (4) those acquitted who are to be retained but who could be retrenched if suitability is adversely reported by ADGP(INT). 4. As regards the first two categories, i.e., those who have been identified to be retrenched and those who have been identified to be retained, there could not be any controversy because those liable to be retrenched have necessarily to go and those who have been identified as fit to be retained are those who have cleared themselves of blemish in relation to any criminal case. 5. But, in relation to those who are categorized as fit to be retained if acquitted, we do not now feel that it would be in the interest of the Police Force of the State to take any such lenient stand since the primary duty of the State in relation to law and order, investigation and other relevant police duties requires discipline of the highest order to permit entry into the cadre and also to be continued in the Force. 6. Also, as regards those who are acquitted but in relation to whom reports by ADGP(INT) are yet to come, it would only be in the best interest of the State to keep them away from the Force in terms of the earlier orders and ADGP(INT) can be required to expedite the question of reporting on the suitability of those candidates. It would not be in public interest to permit entry without the final word of clearance by the ADGP(INT). What if a person who is acquitted and permitted to join is found later, as unfit to continue, and the ADGP(INT) were to come out with a report recommending against the continuation of such person in the Service? This can never be, in public interest. 7. We have looked into the list that is now before us. Those cases which have been identified as fit to be retained, if acquitted by Court, are cases where the concerned personnel are seen to have been charge sheeted for offences punishable under different provisions of the Indian Penal Code and also under different special laws. We see that persons, who are allegedly involved in offences of kidnapping, cause of loss to private property and in offences under the Explosives Act, Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act etc., are also included in the list of persons as fit to be retained if they would be acquitted by Court. We also see a case where the charge is of having outraged the modesty of a woman. Without going further into the different types of offences, we emphasise that it would not be in consonance with the duties, responsibilities and discipline of Police Force to permit any person to be admitted to duty or to training on a provisional basis subject to be cleared of the criminal charge not only by acquittal by Court but also by a later clearance by the Department. Even if one is acquitted, the question whether he is suitable to be in the Force is a matter that would again have to be considered notwithstanding the acquittal. This is why even the report goes to show that even as regards those who have been acquitted already, their continuance or retrenchment would depend on the suitability report by the ADGP(INT). This means that if there is adverse report by ADGP(INT), that would be against the admission of such a candidate to the Force. We are of the firm view that it would not be in the interest of the State and the public interest, as also that of the Police Force to permit any person to join the Force or to discharge duties and responsibilities unless he is acquitted of the criminal charge and also is cleared as suitable for the purpose of entry into service and continuity in service even if acquitted by the criminal court. 8. With this, we note that submissions are made on behalf of some of the petitioners that the criminal cases against one or two would have, by this time, ended or even been terminated by proceedings of superior courts, including under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 CrlPC. We leave open it to those persons to move the competent authority in the Police Department for consideration of such material if available in their favour. If any such request comes, the concerned authority will expeditiously consider such matter. 9. What surprises us more is the fact that the exercise carried out following the earlier interim orders in relation to one recruitment shows that the Police Department has come to the conclusion at its highest level, by now, that 38 personnel have to be retrenched from service. This means that but for the aforesaid exercise in terms of the earlier interim order, 38 persons would have continued in the police service, a uniformed and armed service, as if they do not have the blemish of being involved in offences. We wonder for ourselves as to what would be the situation or what would have been the situation as regards the previous recruitments? If tainted hands had already entered the service, when are they gong to be sieved off? How are they going to be identified? Criminalization of the Police Force is, necessarily, beyond dispute, suicidal for law and order and also for other needs of a civilized society which depends on Police Force and Rule of Law when it comes to protecting the needs and rights of citizens and also of the society collectively. This would also have a bearing on public wealth. We need, therefore, to know as to whether there is any input available as to the antecedents of the police personnel of the State of Kerala, including those in the higher-up ranks, may be even belonging to the Indian Police Service or the Kerala Police Service. Such antecedents may be those which would have accrued even before their entry into service or would have got added on with the passage of time even while wearing the uniform under the State or National emblem. It would be a great threat if any such person continues in service, unnoticed by the State Government, because the very protectors of law would be the assailants of that primordial principle which is the succor of every citizen and also the society in the collective interest. 10. In the aforesaid circumstances, we issue the following directions: i.The State of Kerala and other official respondents will be at liberty to retrench persons who have been identified for retrenchment. We issue this order without prejudice to the individual right of those persons to challenge any such decision before the competent authority or forum. ii.Those who are to be retained could be so done subject to continued surveillance for all times in service since that can never be ignored. iii.As regards those persons who have been identified as fit to be retained if acquitted and those who have been identified as could be retained subject to the liability to be retrenched, if adverse reports come from ADGP(INT), we find no ground for retaining any such person unless the order of acquittal is also coupled with clearance from the competent authority, particularly the ADGP(INT) as to the suitability of such person being permitted to join or to be retained in service. We may indicate at once that all orders of acquittals are not acquittals free of blemish. Acquittals may come on different grounds, including on being rendered on the evidence of hostile witnesses, on lack of evidence or on benefit of doubt or on some technical flaw in the prosecution. These are matters to be deeply looked into at the competent level preferably not below the rank of ADGP. This has to be part of the exercise that would be carried out to ascertain the suitability of such person being permitted to enter the service or to be retained in service." VI.In answering the reference, we reiterate the principles stated in the order dated 21st June, 2011 to affirm that it is not advisable in law, including as to practice and procedure, to issue interlocutory orders in writ jurisdiction, commanding appointment or admission to the police force. The prerogative of the executive in terms of the statutory rules should be the priority. This is all the more important as regards the uniformed forces. It shall be left to those in the hierarchy of the police department under the control of the Director General of Police to come to appropriate conclusions on a case to case basis, wherever a criminal antecedent is seen about a person, leading to the question as to whether such person should be admitted to the force, or not, to enable appropriate information regarding the person concerned being conveyed to the appropriate appointing authority so that the appointing authority will be notified of the situation which may call for exercise under proviso to Rule 10(b) (iii). Of course, if the Director General of Police or any officer under his command is himself the appointing authority, necessary action shall immediately follow since it does not have to be reported to anybody else. Equally, the Director General of Police and the officers under his command would have to keep necessary and prompt vigil in terms of the directions contained in this judgment to ensure that the person concerned, who has joined service on the basis of an order under the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii), does not enjoy what is not due to him. This is a matter on which the judiciary would keep its hands off fervently hoping that the Director General of Police and the officers under his command shall, without fail, guard zealously tracking the individual cases, leaving no stone unturned and keeping their eyes wide awake, with no fail. Any failure on this issue could visit the Director General of Police and the officers under his command with personal liability as the responsibility they have in this regard is attendant to National and State security. The Nation, including the State, needs a disciplined uniformed force of Police. VII.Suresh(supra) was decided holding, among other things, that an order under Rule 10(b)(iii) of Part II of K.S. & S.S.R. can be passed only after the candidate concerned is put on notice and after giving him an opportunity of being heard. That rule provides that no person shall be eligible for appointment to any service by direct recruitment, unless the State Government are satisfied that his character and antecedents are such as to qualify him for such service. The proviso to that rule enables the Government to appoint a person temporarily if the appointing authority is satisfied that the incumbent is of sound health, active habits and free from any bodily defect or infirmity rendering him unfit for such service, subject to the condition that his appointment shall be terminated without notice if the Government are not satisfied of his/her character and antecedents on subsequent verification and as to his eligibility for appointment in regular service upon re-verification of character and antecedents. That proviso only authorizes the Government to appoint a person temporarily without awaiting for verification of character and antecedents. Mere appointment of a person temporarily under that proviso, does not give him any indefeasible priority over those who have not been appointed by invoking such proviso. This essentially means that if a person is to be refused appointment on the State Government being satisfied that his character and antecedents are such as not to qualify him for such service, the mere fact that such a person had been temporarily appointed awaiting verification of character and antecedents does not give him the eligibility for a pre-decisional hearing. It is not a case of removal from service. It is only a case of recalling an appointment made temporarily. VIII.The proviso occurring after Rule 10(b)(iii) is a statutory provision. It is that proviso which enables appointment of a person temporarily before the Government are satisfied as to his character and antecedents. That proviso itself contains the statutory command that, if on subsequent verification, the Government are not satisfied of the character and antecedents of that person, the appointment shall be terminated without notice. When the statutory rule provides for such termination and expressly excludes any pre- decisional notice in that regard, the interpretation given in Suresh(supra) would amount to imposing a condition which is, not only not there in the proviso, but also one that is expressly excluded by the clear terms of that proviso. The authority of the Government to terminate without notice in terms of the second limb of the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii) cannot be watered down by judicial decision except by holding that provision as ultra vires. Notwithstanding the fact that there was no challenge to the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii) in Suresh(supra), we do not find any ground of invalidity to apply the ultra vires doctrine and read down the said proviso. The view in Suresh(supra) that a person appointed invoking the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii) is entitled to notice and opportunity of hearing before being removed as enjoined by that proviso, amounts to re- writing that statutory provision. That is impermissible. The said decision does not lay down the law correctly, in that regard. IX.Not only that, the last limb of the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii) itself specifically states that a person appointed in terms of that proviso shall be eligible for appointment in regular service in accordance with the Rules only if his character and antecedents are found satisfactory on subsequent verification. Note (1) under that Rule clarifies that a person appointed under that proviso shall not be treated as a member of the service to which he has been so appointed, unless he is appointed in regular service in accordance with the Rules. If his character and antecedents are verified and found to be satisfactory, his temporary appointment shall be treated as appointment in regular service from the date of the temporary appointment. This means that a person appointed temporarily under the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii) cannot be treated as a member of the service until his character and antecedents, on subsequent verification, are found satisfactory and, following such finding, he is appointed in regular service. Otherwise, the second limb of the proviso would operate and it would oblige the Government or the appointing authority, as the case may be, to terminate the said person's temporary appointment without notice. X.Logically, an appointee under the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii) does not stand to loose anything if, ultimately, his character and antecedents are found to be satisfactory. On the converse, if the finding as to character and antecedents is not satisfactory, it would be perilous in public interest, public service and for the Government to continue such a person in service till he is heard on that issue by giving him a pre-decisional notice. Balancing the scales in that regard also, we do not find the reasoning of Suresh(supra) as acceptable. XI.We may also indicate that Rule 3 of the Kerala Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1960 would show that persons subject to discharge from service without notice and persons whose appointment and other matters are governed by special provisions, would not fall within those Rules. The proviso occurring after Rule 10(b)(iii) of Part II K.S. & S.S.R. stands as a separate law and would be governed only by the provisions in that proviso, unless and until the competent authority is satisfied of the character and antecedents, on verification of the person concerned, and thereafter, inducts him into regular service by appropriate action in accordance with law. XII.At any rate, one who is temporarily appointed cannot expect that he is entitled to be heard before being removed from service on a ground that the Government are not satisfied as to his character and antecedents, which is essentially a condition to enable a person for appointment into service in terms of Rule 10(b)(iii). The verification of the character and antecedents in terms of the proviso to Rule 10(b)(iii) of Part II of K.S. & S.S.R. is not one that provides any room for pre-decisional hearing and the view to the contrary laid down in Suresh(supra) does not lay down the law correctly. In the result, the orders dated 21st June, 2011 and 8th August, 2011, as noted above, are made absolute and it is directed that action shall proceed in strict conformity with the directions contained in those orders. Writ petitions ordered accordingly. No costs. Sd/- Thottathil B.Radhakrishnan, Judge. Sd/- C.T.Ravikumar, Judge. Sha/130112 -true copy- P.S.to Judge. |
