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Challenge against the Abkari Policy 2014- 2015, by the hotels classified as two star, three star and by hotels having no classification fails.

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 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM 

PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.SURENDRA MOHAN 

THURSDAY, THE 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014/8TH KARTHIKA, 1936 

WP(C).No. 22195 of 2014 (Y)

PETITIONER(S):

XAVIER'S RESIDENCY REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER, D.RAJKUMAR THEVALLY, KOLLAM. 

SRI.A.SUDHI VASUDEVAN SMT.K.PUSHPAVATHI 

RESPONDENTS:

1. THE STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT TAXES (G) DEPARTMENT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM. 6950 001 

2. EXCISE COMMISSIONER COMMISSIONERATE OF EXCISE, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM. 695 001 3. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF EXCISE KOLLAM. 695 001 

SR. COUNSEL SRI KAPIL SIBAL SRI K P DANDAPANI, ADVOCATE GENERAL R1 to R3 BY SPL GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI.TOM K.THOMAS

J U D G M E N T 

On 22.08.2014, as per GOMS.No.139/2014/TD dated 22.08.2014, the Government of Kerala notified its Abkari Policy for the year 2014-15. As per the new Abkari Policy, only hotels having Five Star classification and above granted by the Ministry of Tourism, Government of India are entitled to be granted Bar licences. Thereafter, the Foreign Liquor Rules under the Abkari Act of 1077 has also been amended, to give effect to the Abkari Policy. Since as per the new Abkari Policy, only hotels classified as Five Star and above are entitled to be granted bar licences, all existing bar attached hotels have been issued with notices by the Excise Commissioner informing them that, their bar licences would stand cancelled on the expiry of 15days of the date of such notices. The hotels that face cancellation of their Bar licences (FL-3 licences) have filed these writ petitions challenging the Abkari Policy, the consequential amendments to the Foreign Liquor Rules and the notices issued to them, terminating their bar licences.

2. The petitioners in these writ petitions are mostly hotels having three star classification. Three writ petitions, W.P.(C) Nos.23391 of 2014, 23528 of 2014 and 22460 of 2014 relate to two star hotels. The hotel in W.P. (C) No.22785 of 2014 has no star classification. The petitioners in W.P.(C).No.22203 of 2014, 22993 of 2014, 23081 of 2014, 23179 of 2014, 23262 of 2014, 23317 of 2014, 23446 of 2014, 23569 of 2014, 22219 of 2014, 23896 of 2014, 22776 of 2014, 24048 of 2014, 23167 of 2014, 22410 of 2014, 23399, and 24926 of 2014 are filed by hotels having either Four Star or heritage category certification. W.P.(C) No.24128 of 2014 is filed by the Kerala Bar Hotels Association and two others. The remaining writ petitions are filed by persons conducting three star hotels. Irrespective of their categorization into Three Star or Four Star, Heritage etc., all the petitioners challenge the Abkari Policy of the State and the consequential amendments. A wide spectrum of arguments have been put forward, attacking the constitutionality of the Abkari Policy, alleging violation of the fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, besides violation of the parent enactment, the Rule Making power conferred on the State by the Abkari Act and even violation of the Rules of Business of the Government. Before addressing the contentions advanced before me, it is necessary to have an overview of the scenario prevalent in the State of Kerala in relation to the trade of liquor. The Enactments applicable and control measures adopted.

3. The Abkari Act, 1077 is a pre-constitutional enactment, initially passed by His Highness the Maharaja of the erstwhile State of Cochin on the 5th of August 1902 as Act 1 of 1077 (Malayalam Era). The Act was later on extended to the entire State of Kerala by Act 10 of 1967. The Foreign Liquor Rules enacted in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 10, 24 and 29 of the Abkari Act deal exclusively with the grant of licences to vend, what is described as the Indian Made Foreign Liquour (IMFL). Apart from the Abkari Act of 1077, there is another enactment by name, the Prohibition Act, 1950, which prohibits import, export, transport or possession of any liquor or intoxicating drug, its manufacture and dealing, including tapping of toddy from any trees, in short, imposing total prohibition in the State of Kerala. However, Section 2 of the said enactment has conferred power on the Government to suspend the operation thereof by issuing a notification. Though the Abkari Act,1077 is stated to have been repealed with effect from the date of coming into force of the said enactment, in view of the specific provision made in Section 3 thereof, the said enactment would revive on the issue of a notification under Section 2 of the said Act. The State Government has accordingly issued a notification dated 28.04.1967 (S.R.O.No.104/67) under Section 2 of the Prohibition Act suspending the operation of the provisions of the said Act except Sections 1,7 and 11 thereof. Consequently, the Abkari Act and the Rules thereunder have revived and are continuing to be in operation ever since. The provisions that are not suspended, deal with punishments for offences. Licences for possession, use or sale of liquor are issued under Rule 13 of the Foreign Liqour Rules.

4. Earlier licences to conduct retail sale in liquor (sale in bottles) were being auctioned by the State to private parties on payment of a fee. The system was subsequently changed and the privilege of conducting retail sale in liquor was granted exclusively to the Kerala State Beverages (Manufacturing and Marketing) Corporation Limited (hereinafter referred to as 'the Beverages Corporation' for short), the Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited and the Kerala State Co- operative Consumers Federation Limited. The Corporations referred to above sell the liquor in bottles through a wide network of retail shops located along the length and breadth of Kerala. The Beverages Corporation also enjoys monopoly in the wholesale business of liquor. This is for the reason that, an FL-9 licence that entitles the licensee to possess and sell foreign liquor in wholesale is granted only to the said Corporation. The persons who have been issued with a Foreign Liquor licence under any of the categories made mention of in Rule 13 of the Foreign Liquor Rules, can purchase the stock of Foreign Liquor required by them, only from the Beverages Corporation. Thus, apart from the holders of FL-3 licences or Bars, there are various other establishments conducting liquor business like the Beer and Wine Parlours that are operated only by the Kerala Tourism Development Corporation (a Government Company), recognized Clubs with licences to serve liqour to their members, Airport Transit Lounges licensees, Canteens and Messes attached to Military Units, Seamen and Marine Officers Clubs etc.

5. The consumption of liquor within the state has been on a phenomenal increase, over the past many years. The volume of liquor consumed became a cause for concern and have been engaging the attention of the State Government during the past few decades. The Government have been initiating measures for regulating the consumption of intoxicating liquor, for a number of years now. Initially, a Distance Rule was introduced prohibiting the location of Foreign Liquor retail shops as well as Bar attached Hotels, in the close proximity of Educational Institutions, Temple, Church or burial grounds. Since people belonging to the lower strata of the society including the labour class were found to be the persons frequenting the Arrack shops, arrack was banned in the state. The duty of excise on IMFL was steeply hiked. However, the following years showed only a tremendous spurt in the sale of liquor. The situation has been continuing without any change, showing a steady increase in the sale and consumption of liquor every year. The efforts undertaken by the State to reduce the consumption has failed to achieve any significant results. There has been a public outcry with the Prohibitionists, Women's Organisations, other Non- Governmental organizations and voluntary bodies joining in to blame the State Government, for not initiating effective measures to deal with the problem. However, the fact remains that the demand for intoxicating liquor within the State of Kerala is phenomenal and displays an increase with every passing year. Any attempt at curbing consumption would have to begin with a search for the reason for the increase in consumption. Unless the reason is identified and measures to remedy the same, put in place, it would not be possible to reduce the consumption in an effective manner. A sudden non availability of any article in demand would only induce people to search for other alternatives or avenues to satisfy the demand. Bootlegging, production of spurious liquor, alternative drugs or other substances that would satisfy the demand would appear in the market, taking the place of liquor. Statistics show that the measures already adopted, like the ban of Arrack and the enhancement of Excise Duty on liquor have not had any effect in stemming the demand.

6. The State of Kerala attracts a large number of tourists every year. The State Government has been taking efforts to develop tourism as an industry. Various measures have been adopted, with the object of attracting tourists, not only foreign but also domestic. It has been recognized by the State that, good and clean places for them to stay as well as healthy and tasty food are necessary to attract tourists. The consumption of alcoholic beverages with their food is a way of life in many foreign societies. Therefore, the State recognizes that serving of alcohol with food is necessary to promote tourism in the state. The above objective is discernible from the wordings of Rule 13(3) of the Foreign Liquor Rules also.

7. Initially, bar licences used to be issued to hotels having two star facilities. However, in the year 2007, Rule 13(3) was amended to provide that, Bar licences shall be granted to only hotels having a classification of three star and above. At the same time, by adding a proviso to the Rule, it was provided that all existing licensees not having the requisite three star or above classification, but who had been functioning as on 31.03.2007 were entitled to the renewal of their licences. Later on, in 2011, Rule 13(3) was again amended, disentitling three star hotels from seeking the issue of a bar licence by providing that such licences would be issued only to hotels classified as four star and above. At the same time, the existing licensees were again saved by incorporating a fresh proviso to the Rule permitting the licences of the existing hotels to be regularised. The policy of the Government in permitting the existing hotels to continue though they were not maintaining the standards of classification prescribed by the Rule and at the same time denying fresh licences to new three star hotels and two star hotels with proper facilities was the subject matter of challenge before this Court. In 

Surendra Das B. v. State of Kerala [2012(3) KHC 653] (DB)

a Division Bench of this Court held that the action of the State in discriminating between hotels having the same star classification (namely three star), by granting bar licences to the existing ones and denying the same to new hotels was discriminatory. However, on appeal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reversed the said decision on the above aspect and held that, deletion of three star hotels falls within the same genre as Two Star Hotels that were excluded earlier. However, the action of the State in stipulating that no new FL-3 licences shall be granted to hotels located within a stipulated distance from an existing hotel having FL-3 licence, that was also struck down by this Court, was held to be bad. The Supreme Court was informed by the State that, it had appointed a One Man Commission for reviewing the Abkari Policy as per a notification dated 23.01.2014. The Supreme Court made it clear that the State Government would not deny FL-3 licence to hotels with a classification of Four Star and above, until the report of the one man Commission was received. The One man Commission submitted its report on 06.03.2014. The Government thereupon called for a report from the Government Secretary, Taxation. The said report is dated 02.04.2014. However, by that time, the code of conduct declared by the Election Commission on 05.03.2014, in view of the Lok Sabha Elections that were notified, had come into force. Therefore, the existing hotels that did not conform to the specifications stipulated by Rule 13(3) were also renewed, provisionally. Thereafter, the new Abkari Policy has been formulated and on the basis thereof, the present notices have been issued by the Excise Commissioner proposing to cancel the licences provisionally issued to the bar hotels, as stated above. 

Contentions on behalf of the petitioners 

8. According to Sri Aryama Sundaram, the learned Senior Counsel, this is a case of deprivation of a right that has already accrued to a citizen for the only reason that there is a change in the Government Policy. It is pointed out that, the nature of the right of a citizen with respect to a business permitted by the State and the nature of a right with respect to a business not permitted by the State is different. If a particular trade or business is completely prohibited, there cannot be any doubt that the citizen would have no right to carry on the said business. However, if a business is not prohibited, but permitted either with or without regulations, every citizen has a right to engage in such business, under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Thus, in cases where a business is permitted either partially or subject to regulations, every citizen has a right to participate in the business activity. This is for the reason that, the State has no intention to prohibit the trade altogether. In the present case, as far as the State of Kerala is concerned, the Preamble of the Abkari Act shows that the enactment is intended to consolidate and amend the law regulating import, export, transport, manufacture, sale and possession of intoxicating liquor and intoxicating drugs in the State of Kerala and not prohibition. Since the object of the enactment is only to consolidate and amend the law relating to the trade in liquor, the petitioners in these writ petitions have in addition to their fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g), a statutory right under the Abkari Act to conduct trade or business in liquor, subject of course to the restrictions contained in the Act. It is the said right that has been taken away by the present Abkari Policy as well as the amendment that has been effected.

9. According to the learned Senior Counsel, a Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has in 

Narula v. State of Jammu & Kashmir [AIR 1967 SC 1368] 

held that every citizen has a right under Article 19 (1)(g) to conduct trade or business, even in intoxicating liquor, subject of course to the reasonable restrictions that the State is empowered to place on the said right under Article 19(6) of the Constitution. It is therefore contended that, the petitioners in these cases are also entitled to put forward a claim to carry on business in intoxicating liquor, subject to the restrictions contained in the Abkari Act. The Act being one intended to regulate such trade in liquor cannot proceed to the extent of altogether prohibiting the trade. Any such attempt would amount to an unreasonable restriction under Article 19(6). It is therefore contended that, the present Abkari Policy as well as the amendment now introduced constitute unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right of the petitioners under Article 19(1)(g).

10. It is further contended that, the State in the present case has not introduced a total prohibition. Nor has it excluded private participation in the business entirely. No monopoly in favour of the State has also been created. Therefore, the exclusion of a section of the members of the public from conducting trade in liquor is discriminatory, under Article 14 of the Constitution. Conferring the eligibility to apply for bar licences only on hotels having classification of 5 star and above, actually identifies the said category of hotels for conferring a benefit, to their advantage over the others doing business in the field. The said classification bears no nexus to the proclaimed object of achieving prohibition, for the reason that, liquor is available freely in the FL-1 shops and other establishments owned by the State.

11. The petitioners are all existing licensees. They were being granted renewal of their licences over the past many years. There are no complaints or allegations against them as licensees. They have a right of renewal granted by the Statute, provided the conditions necessary for the purpose are satisfied. A non licence holder has a right to apply for licence and not to be discriminated in the matter of grant. In the present case, the existing licensees are being discriminated in the matter of granting renewal, by providing that, only the licensees of hotels classified as 5 star and above would be granted renewal. The said classification is, according to the counsel, violative of the guarantee of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. The State has over the years followed a consistent policy of renewing the licences of the all existing licensees. Fresh applicants as well as the existing licensees were therefore being treated as two separate classes. By the present policy, the existing licensees are again classified into hotels having a classification of 5 star and above and those who do not have the said classification. The said classification, according to the learned Senior Counsel, is unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

12. The sequence of events leading up to the formulation of the present Abkari Policy shows that, the State was awaiting the report of the One Man Commission that was appointed to go into the question of making a Comprehensive revision of the Abkari Policy and the issue of renewals to the Bar licences already granted. The One Man Commission has submitted its report containing various recommendations The Government had thereafter sought for the report of the Government Secretary for Taxation on the question of implementing the recommendations of the One Man Commission. However, while formulating the Abkari Policy 2014-15, the Government has discarded all the recommendations of the One Man Commission as well as the Taxation Secretary. Absolutely no reasons are stated for not accepting the recommendations of the One Man Commission. In fact, the recommendations have not even been referred to or considered. The One Man Commission had recommended an evaluation of the facilities available in the hotels that were not maintaining required standards and permitting them to upgrade their facilities within a specified time. Having informed the Hon'ble Supreme Court that action would be taken against the non Standard bar hotels on the basis of the report of the One Man Commission, the present turn around without any reason whatsoever is, according to the counsel, nothing but malafides in law. The present policy, according to the learned Senior Counsel, is also bad, not only for the reason that it is discriminatory but for the further reason that it has not considered the relevant materials. In fact, the policy has omitted to consider such materials without any reason. It is contended that this is a clear case of imposing unreasonable restrictions under Article 19(6) on the right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, besides being discriminatory. The object sought to be achieved being prohibition, the classification of hotels into those having certification of five star and above and those not having such certification, has no nexus to the object sought to be achieved.

13. Apart from the above, it is contended that, even assuming the policy to be valid, the action now initiated ought to have been taken by a Plenary Legislation and not by a Subordinate Legislation, as done in the present case. Section 29 of the Abkari Act confers on the State, the power to make Rules but only for the purposes of the Act. Since prohibition is not one of the purposes of the Act, the power under Section 29 is not available for making a Rule to achieve prohibition. Section 69 of the Act provides that the Rule made in accordance with the power conferred by Section 29 of the Act shall, on publication in the Gazette have the force of law and shall be read as part of the Act itself. Therefore, it is contended that, the Rule making power conferred by Section 29 of the Act has to be strictly construed so as to limit it to the making of Rules for carrying into effect the objects of the Act alone. It is also contended by the learned Senior Counsel that, any restriction under Article 19(6) of the Constitution can be made only by a Legislation and not by Subordinate Legislation.

14. It is further contended that, the right to renewal of the licence is a statutory right that is conferred on the petitioners by Sub Rule 3 of Rule 13B of the Foreign Liquor Rules, provided the conditions therein are satisfied. Therefore, the petitioners have a subsisting right to claim renewal of their licence, since the said Rule has not been amended pursuant to the Abkari Policy 2014-15. In other words, in spite of the present Abkari Policy, the right to claim renewal under Rule 13B continues unscathed. The above is a right that is available to licence holders alone in contradistinction to the applicants for fresh licence. The above right is capable of being enforced at law.

15. The report of the One Man Commission shows that, after an elaborate overview of the situation in the State as far as liquor trade is concerned, a retired Judge of this Court, Justice M.Ramachandran, has recommended measures to bring down consumption of intoxicating liquor and to impose regulations on the manner in which the trade is being conducted. What has been recommended is to retain the policy of issuing bar licences to hotels with a classification of three star and above. With respect to the hotels that do not have the requisite standards, they have been recommended to be given time to upgrade their facilities and to attain the standards of three star hotels. In the event of such opportunity not being utilized, it has been recommended that, their licences be revoked. In the case of existing licencees, the recommendation is to permit them to continue operations for the current financial year and to refuse renewal from the coming year onwards. The report of the Taxation Secretary has also recommended the grant of sufficient time to a licensee to upgrade their facilities. However, without even considering the said recommendations, the present Abkari Policy has ignored the recommendations. It is pointed out that, the One Man Commission being not one appointed under the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952, the principle that the recommendations are not binding on the Government cannot apply in the present case. The present One Man Commission had been appointed in the wake of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Surendra Das B. v. State of Kerala (Supra). It was also undertaken by the State Government before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that no fresh licence would be issued until the report of the One Man Commission was received. The above submission has been noticed and recorded in 

State of Kerala v. Surendra Das [2014(1) KLT 948 (SC)]. 

The State having undertaken before the Hon'ble Supreme Court to abide by the recommendations of the One Man Commission, it cannot be permitted to ignore the said report altogether. Even if the recommendations were not acceptable, the policy should have contained reasons for the rejection thereof.

16. On the basis of the above contentions it is pointed out that, the policy is bad not only for not having considered relevant materials that were available to the Government but also for not disclosing proper or cogent reasons. The same is therefore alleged to be arbitrary, and discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, apart from being an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners to carry on trade or business.

17. The counsel appearing for other petitioners, apart from endorsing the above contentions of the learned Senior Counsel have put forward a slew of other contentions which are also required to be noticed.

18. According to Senior Counsel Sri.C.C.Thomas, the present policy in so far as it has decided not to renew the licences of existing licence holders is arbitrary and liable to be set aside. In 

Secretary to Government, T.N. v. K. Vinayaga Murthy [2002 (7) SCC 104]

the Government order by which a provision providing for renewal of liquor vending licences was repealed, was set aside and the Government directed the question of renewal of licence to be considered. The existing licences were being treated separately, as a distinct class by the previous Abkari Policies. Therefore, it is contended that the present attempt to deny renewal of their licences is arbitrary and liable to be set aside. The respective licences of the petitioners having been renewed for the current Abkari year and licence fee having been paid in full, in advance, it is contended that there is no justification for terminating the privilege during the term of the licence.

19. Learned Senior Counsel Sri.K.Ramkumar contends that, even a policy can be interfered with, where it is arbitrary or discriminatory. Reliance is placed on various decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in support of the above contention. Drawing analogy from the case in which prohibition of dancing in bars in Bombay was found to be unsustainable, it is contended that the liquor sold in five star hotels as well as the hotels with lesser classification is the same. Therefore, the classification made in the present cases for the purpose of grant of bar licences is unreasonable. 

20. The learned Senior Counsel also contends that a perusal of the impugned order shows that the cancellation of the licences of the petitioners have been made on the orders of the Government. The Excise Commissioner being the authority empowered to cancel the licence, the present action is a clear case of the authority acting under dictation.

21. With reference to the provision under which the impugned orders have been issued, cancelling the licences already granted, it is contended that Section 26 (e) is not attracted to the fact situation in the present case. The conditions subject to which licences had been granted are part of the Rules. A perusal of the conditions would show that, there is no condition permitting cancellation of any licence, 'at will'. It is further contended that, since Section 26 has not been amended, no fresh ground could be granted by an executive action. In the absence of a condition in the licence permitting cancellation thereof, 'at will' no such condition could also be incorporated by an executive action. It is further pointed out that the licences in these cases have been renewed subject to the liquor policy to be formulated. However, the said condition does not authorize cancellation of the licence that has been granted for the entire financial year. The petitioners are entitled to continue their businesses till the expiry of the terms of their licences. Relying on the licence that has already been issued, the petitioners have upgraded the facilities in their hotels expending crores of rupees. They have also acquired stocks of imported foreign liquor anticipating the sale in their hotels. The expectations of the petitioners that they would be permitted to continue their activity for the entire period of their licence was legitimate. Therefore, the impugned action is also hit by the principle of legitimate expectation. Apart from the above, it is pointed out that, Article 163 of the Constitution has been violated, inasmuch as, the present Abkari Policy was not recommended by the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers only ratified the policy ex post facto. 

22. According to Senior Counsel Sri. O.V.Radhakrishnan, the preamble of the Abkari Act,1077 clearly states that, the Act is intended only to regulate trade in liquor. There is no provision in the Act permitting or authorising imposition of total prohibition. Therefore, the proclaimed object of the present Abkari Policy as well as the measures adopted for attainment thereof are unsustainable, being not supported by any of the provisions of law. A perusal of Section 29 of the Abkari Act that confers power on the Government to frame rules shows that, all the purposes mentioned therein relate to regulation. There is no provision that empowers the Government to frame rules for the purpose of imposing total prohibition. In the absence of a specific power, the present amendment to Rule 13(3) is unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

23. The learned Senior Counsel further points out that, amended rules were published in the Government Gazette on 27.08.2014. As on the said date, the State had no Governor for the reason that, the Governor had resigned and had ceased to hold office. The resignation takes effect instantaneously. The notification in the gazette is purported to be issued in the name of the Governor. Therefore, the said notification is invalid. No ex post facto ratification is permissible in such matters. Nor is any such ratification constitutionally recognized. Therefore, it is contended that the explanation of the State that the policy has been ratified, cannot be sustained. Since Article 163 mandates that the Governor should act only on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, the present policy that was not supported by a decision of the Council of Ministers suffers from a constitutional illegality that is not capable of being rectified. Apart from the above, it is contended that, the manner in which the decision was taken, in post haste manner justifies a presumption of malafides against the State.

24. It is further contended that, the Rules of Business of Government of Kerala issued under Article 166 of the Constitution have been violated. Rule 58 stipulates that the draft should be referred to the Law Department, for opinion, which was not done. Rule 59(1) has also been violated. In the absence of a valid policy decision, the impugned action of cancelling the licence of the petitioners cannot be sustained and is therefore liable to be struck down.

25. The learned Senior Counsel also contends that, the restriction contemplated by Article 19(6) could be imposed only by means of legislation. In the present case, the restriction is imposed by an executive action which is not permissible. The impugned action is vitiated by violation of the principles of Natural Justice, it is contended. No notice was issued to the petitioners before the licences were cancelled. The petitioners have invested substantial sums of money acting on the strength of the licence issued. Consequently, the principle of promissory estoppel applies against the action of the State in revoking the licence.

26. According to Senior Counsel Smt Indira Jaisingh, Kerala is a state where there is already a Prohibition Act in force. The State has enacted the Prohibition Act, 1950. Section 8 of the said enactment prohibits the manufacture, traffic in and consumption of liquors and intoxicating drugs. The punishment for violation of the said provision has also been provided. Section 9 makes even being found in a state of intoxication, punishable. With the coming into force of the said Act, the Abkari Act 1077 stood repealed. However, Section 2 confers power on the Government to suspend the operation of the Act, by a notification in the Kerala Government Gazette, with effect from a date to be specified therein, with respect to all or any of the local areas to which the same should supply. In exercise of the power under Section 2 of the said Act, the Government has issued a notification dated 28.04.1967 (SRO 104/67) suspending the operation of the provisions of the Prohibition Act, except Sections 1,7 and 11 in all areas to which the said provisions were to apply. As per Section 3 of the Prohibition Act, upon issue of a notification under Section 2, the enactments mentioned in the first schedule to the said Act, along with the Rules and notifications made thereunder would become operative and would be in force. The Abkari Act, 1077 is one of the enactments made mention of in the first schedule to the Prohibition Act. Therefore, it is pursuant to the notification issued under Section 2 of the Prohibition Act, that the Abkari Act, 1077 has revived and is continuing to be in force. In the above scheme of things, therefore, the field of prohibition is occupied by the Prohibition Act, 1950 whereas, the field of regulation of trade in liquor is occupied by the Abkari Act, 1077. If the State wanted to bring in prohibition, it could have done so, by simply cancelling the notification under Section 2 of the Prohibition Act. That has not been done. Therefore, the intention of the State is not to impose prohibition, but to permit trade in liquor in a regulated manner. The power to impose regulations is contained in Abkari Act, 1077. The provisions of the said Act therefore cannot be employed to impose prohibition. The power to frame Rules under the Act is conferred, for the purpose of giving effect to the objects of the enactment. Any Rule made for the purpose of imposing prohibition would be ultra vires the rule making power as well as the scope of the Act itself for the reason that, the object of the Act is only to regulate and not to prohibit. The present Abkari Policy that proclaims the object of imposing prohibition cannot therefore be introduced in exercise of the Rule making power under the Abkari Act, 1077.

27. In view of the fact that, there is no prohibition in the State or a monopoly in favour of the Sate, the citizen also has a right to carry on trade in liquor. The said right has been recognized by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It is further contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the right of a citizen under Article 19(1)(g) has to be understood as being subject to the reasonable restrictions that the State has been permitted to impose under Article 19(6), in the context of the duty cast on it by Article 47, to bring about the prohibition of consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs which are injurious to health. Since the State has not imposed prohibition nor created a monopoly in the trade for itself, the policy of selective permission to private individuals, presupposes a corresponding right in the citizen to claim opportunity to carry on the trade. The said right has been denied by the present Abkari Policy. In the present case, the restrictions imposed have no nexus to the object that is sought to be achieved, namely to raise the health of the people. The policy classifies the citizens on the basis of their paying capacity. A person who has the financial capacity to pay is permitted to consume intoxicating liquor which is available only in 5 star hotels, there is no justification for the said classification. The One Man Commission report has recommended grant of FL-3 licence to hotels with a classification of 3 star and above. The object of the Abkari Act being only to permit and regulate the trade, cannot justify the imposition of total prohibition.

28. With respect to the power under Section 26(e) of the Abkari Act, the provision has to be read down by construing the same ejusdem generis. Reliance is placed on the Constitutional Bench decision of the Supreme Court in 

Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation [AIR 1986 SC 180] 

to contend that, the restriction imposed, to be sustainable should satisfy the test of being, just, fair and reasonable, the soul of natural justice being fair play in action. The present policy does not satisfy the above vital requirement. It is further contended that, the Abkari Policy is arbitrary though it proclaims that it is to promote tourism, the policy is in fact against tourism. The rule proclaims tourism as its objective, but restricts the facility of bar only to five star hotels. The statistics show that, the bulk of the tourists frequenting the State do not belong to the five star category. There is a total lack of application of mind to any of the above aspects, by the framers of the policy, rendering the same arbitrary and liable to be set aside.

29. Senior Counsel Sri.P. Ravindran referred to the provisions of the Abkari Act to contend that Section 15A, 15B and 15C only seeks to impose restrictions on the manner in which the trade in liquor is to be carried on. Section 24 mandates that every licence or permit granted under Act shall be in the prescribed forms. The form of FL-3 licence incorporates the conditions subject to which the licence is granted. Clause 1 specifically provides that sale of foreign liquor is permissible only to the residents of the hotels, for the use of such residents or their guests or casual visitors partaking in meals. The conditions stipulate the quality of liquor to be sold, prohibits drunkardness, rioting or gambling within the premises and provides that no liquor shall be sold for removal outside the hotel. The liquor is permitted to be sold only along with meals. Restrictions are imposed with respect to the timings during which the Bar could be kept open. Section 18A empowers the State to grant exclusive privilege for the manufacture of liquor. No restriction has been imposed on any of the above powers. The manufacture, wholesale trade as well as retail sale through Beverages Corporation are permitted to be continued without any restriction.

30. It is further contended that, the power to grant a licence to an applicant stands exhausted on the grant of the licence. The power to cancel a licence is contained in Section 26 of the Act. The said power can be exercised only on one of the grounds specified therein. All the grounds mentioned in Section 26 refer to violation of one or the other conditions of the licence. Only sub clause 'e' provides for cancellation or suspension of the licence 'at will'. The above provision has to be read down, in the context of the other grounds that are mentioned. In the present case, the notice of termination has been issued, acting under dictation. It is pointed out that, Rule 13(3) even after the present amendment proclaims that bar licences are issued, for the promotion of tourism. The said object would not be served by limiting the grant of bar licences to five star hotels alone.

31. Senior Counsel Sri Ramesh Babu concedes that no citizen has a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to trade in liquor. The right is only a qualified right subject to Article 19(6). However, according to the counsel, the present policy is violative of Article 14 of the constitution not only because the classification made is unreasonable, bearing no nexus to the object sought to be achieved, but for the further reason that the policy is arbitrary. Though the State has proclaimed its intention to impose prohibition, while proposing to cut down the number of outlets of the Beverages Corporation at the rate of 10% every year, there is no proposal to reduce the number of five star hotels. Apart from five star hotels, there are other categories of Foreign liquor licencees, like Beer and Wine Parlour licencees, club licenees etc. There is no proposal to restrict the grant of licences to any of the said categories. Therefore, the effect of the policy is only to create a monopoly in liquor trade in favour of five star hotels. Creation of such a monopoly, in favour of private parties is neither permissible nor sustainable in law. The policy has not been fully carried over to the amended Rule 13(3) of the Foreign liquor Rules for the reason that, there is no provision even in the amended Rule to phase out the outlets of the Beverages Corporation. According to the counsel, the object sought to be achieved being safeguarding of the health of the persons who frequent the bars, confining the same to five star hotels alone would not achieve the said objective. The decision of the Supreme court in the case of Bombay Dancing Bars is relied upon to contend that there is no difference in the nature of activity carried on in five star hotels and in hotels having lesser star classifications.

32. Senior Counsel Sri. K.P.Satheesan points out that, the Kerala Consumer Federation ('Consumerfed' for short) to which FL-I retail licences are granted is a co- operative society. Therefore, there is no justification for not granting such licences to other private parties. According to the Senior Counsel, sale and consumption of foreign liquor within the precincts of a bar hotel are subjected to closer regulation than a similar sale from a retail shop conducted by the Beverages Corporation. In a bar hotel, liquor is permitted to be sold only along with the food. It is stipulated that the cost of liquor be billed along with the food. Closure of such establishments would leave the consumers free to purchase liquor in bottles and to consume it indiscriminately and without any control, wherever they may choose to consume the same. The said course would only lead to more law and order problems. It would not in any case result in a reduction in the consumption of liquor, since the same is freely available for purchase from the FL-1 shops. The restriction now imposed would therefore be only counter productive.

33. Senior Counsel Sri T.A. Shaji contends that, no action under article 47 has been initiated by the State in the present Abkari Policy. This is for the reason that, the consumption of liquor has in no way been restricted. A restriction has been placed only on the trade in liquor through bar hotels. The said restriction does not and cannot achieve the object of reducing consumption, in any manner.

34. Senior Counsel Sri. S.Sreekumar representing the four star hotels points out that there are only 33 four star hotels in the state, whereas five hotels number only 20. The four star hotels are frequented only by the financially well to do sections of the society. Four star and five star hotels are grouped together for the purposes of classification by the Ministry of Tourism, Government of India. The only difference between a five star hotel and a four star hotel is the existence of a swimming pool, with marginal variations in the dimensions of the rooms. The sale of liquor through four star and five star hotels within the state accounts only for a small, miniscule percentage of the total liquor sold in the state. There has never been any complaint against the functioning of four star hotels or with respect to the manner in which liquor was sold or consumed in the premises of such hotels at any time. Nor was the category of four star hotels targeted for any type of restriction, at any time by the State. At no time was there any proposal to impose restrictions on the four star hotels. Therefore, the present policy of not granting bar licences to four star hotels is without any justification whatsoever.

35. According to the counsel, four star, five star and heritage hotels form a class by themselves. Therefore, the present policy that singles out five star hotels alone for the purposes of conferring a benefit is arbitrary and discriminatory. The decision in State of Kerala v. Surendra Das (supra) is relied upon to contend that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has proceeded on the basis that two star and three star hotels stand on a different footing in comparison to the four star and other higher classification hotels under the Tourism Policy of the Government of India. All the restrictions that were sought to be imposed at that time concerned two star and three star hotels. Therefore, the petitioners as well as other four star hotels expected that their licences would be renewed. The terms of reference made to the One Man Commission by G.O.(MS) 12/13/T.D. dated 23.01.2013 also related only to the manner of functioning of two star hotels, with no reference to the higher category hotels like four star and five star. The report of the One Man Commission, particularly paragraph 44 is relied upon to contend that there is no justification whatsoever for denying bar licences to hotels with four star classification. It is contended that, the classification on the basis of which bar licences have been denied to four star hotels is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

36. Advocate N.N.Madhu takes strong exemption to the action of the Government in not accepting and not even referring to the opinions of the Taxation Secretary as well as the report of the One Man Commission. The Taxation Secretary has recommended that hotels having three and four star classifications could be granted renewal of licence. With respect to the bars that do not conformed to the standards, the recommendation was that, they should be given time to upgrade their facilities. The recommendations of the Excise Commissioner are also on similar terms. The recommendation regarding refusal to grant licence was limited to those hotels that do not have two star classification. According to the counsel, as stated in the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner represented by him, the total sales have only increased after the closure of the bars. Apart from bar hotels there are about five thousand toddy shops vending toddy in the State. There are other categories of establishments to which licences for sale of liquor are granted. Therefore, the policy cannot achieve the desired objective. It is further contended that, no mass cancellation of licences, as done in the present case, is envisaged under Section 26(e) of the Abkari Act.

37. Sri. George Poonthottam, Advocate, points out on behalf of a four star hotel that, closure of bars has not resulted in any reduction in the consumption of liquor, as the statistics show. The bars constitute only 33% of the outlets vending liquor within the state. By closure of the bars, what has happened is that the sale has shifted to FL-1 retail outlets. According to the counsel, there are 17 manufacturing units producing liquor within the state. One unit is owned by the state. No attempt has been made to reduce production. The entire sale of liquor both wholesale and retail is conducted through outlets run by the Beverages Corporation. There is no restriction on the production or sale of liquor. Therefore, the availability of liquor within the state is in no way affected by the present policy. Consequently, the consumers are left free to satisfy their requirements by taking recourse to the other outlets. A further contention raised is that, even as per the amended provision, the FL-3 licences are issued with the object of promoting tourism. The said object has been lost sight of while formulating the present policy. The middle class tourists who patronize the State and form the bulk of the tourist inflow, cannot afford bars that are available in five star hotels. It is therefore pointed out that, there is no nexus between the present policy and the object, being promotion of tourism, that is sought to be achieved.

38. Yet another contention raised is that, the policy has not been framed after proper consideration of the relevant issues or after due deliberations. It is contended that a decision had been taken initially to renew all the licences but, the same was subsequently given the go by. The above aspect would be revealed by the Government files. The Rules of business made under Article 166 of the Constitution has not been complied with. As per Rule 44 of the Rules, a proposal has to originate from the Department concerned and the Finance Ministry has to consent. In the present case the procedure has not been complied with.

39. It is further contended that the Tourism sector accounts for a total inflow of Rupees four thousand crores annually, to the State. Considering the potential for the growth of tourism in the State, investments of crores of Rupees have been made by various persons. Financing Agencies have also funded many of the projects. The State Bank of India has disbursed a whopping Rupees Nine hundred crores to various establishments while the Kerala Financial Corporation has advanced Rs.570 crores. The establishments that received the funds would run into problems and would have to be eventually closed down. Corporate meetings and conferences both national and international that were expected to be conducted at various scenic locations within the State have started getting cancelled. They are shifted to other places like Goa and Sree Lanka. The above vital aspect has not engaged the attention of the policy makers. The policy to confine bar licences to only five star hotels has come as a bolt out of the blue to the entire tourism industry, wreaking havoc and losses.

40. Advocate P. Chandrasekhar places reliance on the Prohibition Act, 1950 and the Notification of 1967 suspending the provisions thereof, to point out that the situation that was recognized, taken note of and accepted by the State Government continues to exist till this date. The situation has not changed in any manner. Prohibition can be imposed only under the said Act, after withdrawing the notification of 1967.

41. The trade in liquor is subject to two types of controls in the State namely, regulation of the provisions of the Abkari Act, 1077 and prohibition by the Prohibition Act, 1950. Though the Prohibition Act has repealed the regulatory enactment, the provisions thereof have been revived by the notification of 1967 that has suspended the Prohibition Act. The present attempt to introduce prohibition through regulation, is according to the counsel, unsustainable. The further contention of the counsel is that, the licencee had a legitimate expectation that the privilege granted to him by the licence would continue at least till the expiry of the term thereof. Therefore, the present cancellation of the licence before the expiry of the term is absolutely unwarranted. The legitimate expectation of the petitioner should have been taken into account as a relevant factor by the authority while arriving at the decision. Only where there is an overriding public interest can the legitimate expectation be superseded. In the present case, there is no overriding public interest. Nor, is there any urgency in the present case, since the professed object of the State is only to impose prohibition over a period of ten years.

42. It is the case of the counsel that, the present policy is unsustainable applying proportionality principle also. The Court is the primary reviewing authority as regards proportionality. The Courts in India have been employing both the Proportionality Test as well as the Wednesbury Principle in judicial review. In the light of the above principles, what has to be proved is whether the measure imposed was really necessary, whether it has a legitimate nexus to the object and whether there was a lesser measure that could have been adopted to achieve the same result. A process of balancing would have to be undertaken where the hardship as well as the benefits are balanced to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the impugned action could be sustained.

43. It is contended by the counsel that, the legitimate expectation is only one facet of unfairness. In the present case, the report of the One Man Commission has arrived at its conclusions after a study in depth of the situation prevailing in the State. The State Government was waiting for the report of the One Man Commission as well as the recommendations of the Taxation Secretary, to formulate its Abkari Policy. The Abkari Policy does not evidence a consideration of the said documents. There is no evidence that prohibition is necessary. The report of the One Man Commission has been simply ignored. None of the stake holders have been consulted or taken into confidence. Therefore, it is contended that the policy document is a total contradiction in terms.

44. Advocate Saiby Jose Kidangoor has put forward a further contention that, production of wine in the State has been treated separately and is permitted by a separate set of rules that govern such activity. With the existence of toddy shops and various other establishments not only producing but also selling liquor, the proclaimed object of prohibition cannot be achieved by the measures now adopted.

45. Advocate Roy Chacko contends that Rule 36 of the Foreign Liquor Rules confers unguided and unchannelised powers on the authorities. As per the said rule, the Excise Commissioner has been empowered to revoke any licence after giving 15 days notice. The said provision according to the counsel is arbitrary. While formulating the present Abkari Policy, no provision has been made for rehabilitation of the section of workers who would be rendered jobless, consequent upon the implementation thereof. It is further contended that, the present amendment made pursuant to the Abkari Policy is ultra vires the Rule making power of the State under Section 29 of the Abkari Act. According to the Counsel, there is no justification for permitting a bar in a five star hotel, when it is permissible for five star classification to be granted to a hotel even if it does not have a bar.

46. According to Sri. R.Harikrishnan, there is no substantial difference between the facilities offered by four star and five star hotels. The rates at which liquor is sold in both the categories of hotels also vary only marginally. Both the categories of hotels have all along been grouped together as homogenous class. There is no justification for treating them separately for the purpose of denying to four star hotels the facility of a bar licence. It is also pointed out that, the report of the One Man Commission has taken note of the problem of migrant workers and referred to the orderly behavior of people within the premises of bar hotels. However, the report has not been considered while formulating the policy.

47. According to Senior Counsel Sri. C.Ramesh Chander, the present policy is arbitrary and liable to be set aside. It is pointed out that five star hotels are available only in a few districts of the State of Kerala. At the same time, tourist destinations of importance are spread all over the state. Confining bar facility only to five star hotels would adversely affect the future prospects of development of tourism in the State. The consequence would be to render jobless not only the persons working in the liquor trade but also people working in the tourism sector. Substantial loss of Revenue to the State Exchequer is also a certain consequence.

48. Advocate Sivan Madathil points out that the present Abkari policy is in direct conflict with Section 13A of the Abkari Act. Section 24 describes the forms and conditions of licence. Section 29 confers power on the State to frame rules. Section 69 according to the counsel is unconstitutional. Rule 36 confers unguided power on the Excise Commissioner to revoke a licence and is unconstitutional, according to the counsel. The present cancellation of licence is violative of Article 14. It is contended that, the present Abkari Policy has been framed without any consultation with the stake holders. Strong exception is taken by the counsel to the manner in which the policy has been formulated, without the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. There is no provision to ratify a decision as purportedly done in the present case. Ratification of a policy issued by the Government, ex post facto, is unsustainable. 

Contentions on behalf of the State 

49. The contentions made on behalf of the petitioners are refuted on behalf of the State by pointing out in the first place that, the question as to whether bar licences should be issued to the petitioners or to any other persons is a matter of policy of the Government. Judicial interference with matters of policy is limited and confined to situations where there are compelling circumstances justifying such intervention. In the present case, there are no such compelling circumstances. According to Senior Counsel Sri.Kapil Sibal who represents the State, the State has a duty, which is a fundamental duty under Article 47 of the Constitution, to bring about prohibition of the consumption of intoxicating drinks and drugs which are injurious to health. In the face of the constitutional duty cast on the state, the present State action cannot be characterized as unjustified or uncalled for. The State is only striving to discharge its fundamental duty. According to the learned Senior Counsel, no citizen has a fundamental right to trade in liquor. Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6) and Article 47 of the Constitution obligates the State to initiate action with a view of reduce consumption of liquor.

50. The present policy is one intended to reduce consumption of liquor in public places. It is for the said reason that, the consumption of liquor in bar hotels have been banned. The policy would put pressure on the persons who frequent the bars to restrict their consumption to the confines of their homes, thereby subjecting their activity to the influence of their family members. The said restriction is absolutely in tune with the object of prohibition which the State wants to ultimately achieve.

51. Reliance is placed on the Constitutional Bench decision of the Supreme Court 

Khoday Distilleries Ltd v. State of Karnataka [(1995) 1 SCC 574] 

to contend that trade in liquor is objectionable and no citizen has a fundamental right to trade in liquor. The power of control of the State is intended to protect the society. Any State law made with the object of imposing prohibition has to be viewed as a legislation made in discharge of the fundamental duty of the Sate under Article 47 of the constitution. The right to conduct trade or business varies in scope and content depending on the substance in which such trade is proposed to be undertaken. In the case of a substance that is res commercium, the citizen would have greater freedom. Whereas his right would be considerably restricted, if the substance in which the trade is proposed, is res extra commercium. The State has a duty to protect the public from deleterious substances. Intoxicating liquor being a substance that is res extra commercium, it is contended that, any restriction on a trade in the said substance would have to be viewed as a restriction made in discharge of the Constitutional duty under Article 47.

52. With respect to the contentions put forward alleging discrimination against the petitioners, it is pointed out by Senior Counsel Sri. Kapil Sibal that, the Abkari Act does not classify hotels into two star, three star or four star. The classification is made by the Ministry of Tourism, Government of India. The said classification was only adopted as a method of differentiation among the various categories of hotels by the State. Initially, the two star hotels were excluded. The action was challenged before the Courts, but was found to be in order. Thereafter, three star hotels were excluded, the said action was also sustained. By confining bars to only hotels having five star classification, the opportunities to consume intoxicating liquor available to youngsters and students are reduced substantially. The major consumption of liquor takes place in hotels classified as two, three and four stars. As a consequence of the present policy, the consumption of liquor in public places would be limited to five star hotels alone. The people who frequent five star hotels form a very limited category and the consumption of such establishments also is not substantial.

53. The fact that the liquor is available freely in the retail outlets does not militate against the policy for the reason that, no measure to curtail the sale of liquor in bottles has been adopted. The restriction is limited to consumption of intoxicating liquor in public places. For the only reason that, liquor is being sold in bottles from retail shops, the validity of the present policy is not affected in any way.

54. The refusal of the State to renew licenses of the bar hotels does not affect their business in any manner. It is only their bars that would have to be closed down. Their hotels with the other avenues of business like restaurants, lodging etc, could be continued without any restriction. If their contention is that, the bars were the major source of their income, the said fact would justify the State action, for the reason that closure of such bars would definitely reduce liquor consumption. If the bars were not their main source of revenue, they are not seriously affected by the closure of their bars. Either way, their complaint lacks substance.

55. With respect to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Bombay Dancing Bars case, relied upon by the counsel for the petitioners, it is pointed out that the dictum in the said case has no application to the facts of the present case. The ban in the said case was to find a solution to the malady of obscene dancing and other criminal activities. Attempt to ban such activity had prevented all types of dance performances. It was the unqualified ban that was found to be unsustainable by the Supreme Court. The dictum in the said case has no application to the facts of the present case for the reason that it is only the consumption of intoxicating liquor in public places that include bars, that has been stopped. According to the counsel, the present policy is only part of a consistent policy that was being pursued by the State from 2002 onwards. Therefore, the present measure is not a sudden decision but a decision at which, the State has arrived in a phased manner, over a period of 12 years. Since the petitioners do not have a right to trade in liquor, they cannot question the present policy. The fundamental right to conduct trade or business or the freedom of industrial trade and commerce constitutionalised by Article 301 to 304 are not applicable in respect of a trade in liquor. It is for the said reason that the various restrictions imposed by the State on the trade have been sustained by the Apex Court over the years.

56. It is the further contention of the learned Senior Counsel that, Section 29 of the Abkari Act confers power on the State to frame rules. Section 69 provides that such rules would have the force of law. In other words, the rules so made would become part of the enactment. Therefore, the amendment presently made also has become the part of the enactment by the force of Section 69. Section 26(e) confers power on the Excise Commissioner to cancel the licence where the conditions thereof permitting such cancellation, apply. The provisions of the FL-3 licence contains such a condition. Therefore, the cancellation of the licences of the petitioners is in order. Rule 26 of the Foreign Liquor rules also confers power on the Excise Commissioner to cancel the licence after giving 15 days notice. Such notice has been given. Therefore, the cancellation in these cases is proper.

57. The learned Senior Counsel further points out that the FL-3 licenses issued to the petitioners had been renewed only provisionally. Though the Abkari Policy was being formulated at the beginning of each financial year, the present Abkari Policy could not be formulated at that time for the reason that, the Lok Sabha elections had been notified and the Model Code of Conduct promulgated by the Election Commission was in force. In view of the above peculiar situation, as per Government Order dated 02.04.2014, permission was granted for renewal of the existing bar licenses, provisionally and subject to the Abkari Policy to be formulated later. It was in accordance with the said Government Order that the licenses of the petitioners were renewed. It is specifically stipulated that the licenses were renewed only provisionally and subject to the Abkari Policy to be formulated. Though the petitioners had paid the licence fee for the entire financial year and the State had received such payment, the petitioners very well knew that the renewal was only provisional and subject to the Abkari Policy that was awaited. Therefore, they very well knew that they had no right to continue their operations for the entire financial year. For the above reason, it cannot be said that they were taken by surprise. The provisional licence that was granted, was liable to be cancelled, on the basis of the stipulations contained in the Abkari Policy that has come into force. Therefore, the present cancellation is not on any one of the grounds that are mentioned in Section 26. Since the power of cancellation is available to the Excise Commissioner in view of Section 26(e) and also in view of the conditions subject to which the licence was provisionally granted, the same was cancelled after complying with the mandate of Rule 36 of Foreign liquor Rules. The action is fully justified.

58. The learned Senior Counsel further submits that the recommendations of the One Man Commission as well as those of the Taxation Secretary were not binding on the Government. They were only recommendatory in nature and the Government was at liberty to take its own decision while formulating the policy. It was not necessary for the Government to justify its policy with reasons for the reason that, what is framed was its policy. The policy is one that has been made mention of in its Election Manifesto. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the contentions of the petitioners are only to be rejected and the writ petitions dismissed. 

Reply on behalf of the petitioners 

59. In reply, Senior Counsel Sri Aryama Sundaram points out that, since the Government Policy is aimed at prohibiting drinking in public places, it has to be examined whether the policy can achieve the said purpose. There are absolutely no allegations in the policy that any problems are created by the hotels classified as two, three and four star. The production and availability of liquor in the market remains unaltered. There is also no restriction in increasing the production of liquor on the basis of demand. Only one avenue has been singled out for closure that is the bar hotels. The bar hotels represents the smallest avenue of consumption of liquor. The major avenues are retained and left untouched. The citizen has a right to carry on business in liquor, he also has a right not to be discriminated in the manner of placing restrictions on the exercise of the said right.

60. A perusal of the policy shows that the same is silent with respect to the mischief that is sought to be remedied. The issue has not even been addressed though it is claimed that the policy is intended to achieve prohibition. The materials obtained by the State for the purpose of formulating its policy have neither been referred to or considered. On the contrary, the materials available in the present case viz, the report of the One Man Commission as well as the report of the Taxation Secretary do not justify the policy. Therefore, the policy is arbitrary.

61. According to the counsel, the petitioners have been subjected to discrimination in the matter of enforcing controls on their trade. The classification does not protect any public interest, in view of the fact that, even on implementation of the policy, the availability of liquor would continue unaffected. Therefore, there is no justification for the classification. It is the further contention of the counsel that, an executive action cannot enforce the restriction contemplated by Article 19(6) of the constitution. A fundamental right can be denied only by a plenary legislation and not by an executive action. The petitioners being existing hotels had right of renewal of their licences that has been denied to them without any justification. Therefore, according to the learned Senior Counsel, the writ petitions are only to be allowed. 

Contentions of the Prohibitionists

62. Apart from the above contentions raised by the petitioners and the respondent State, the protagonists of prohibition who have got themselves impleaded, pro bono publico, have also addressed the Court supporting the Abkari Policy. Advocate Basil Attipetty has referred to the evil effects of excess consumption of alcohol. According to the counsel, the fact that investments running to crores of rupees have been made does not confer any right on a person to conduct trade in liqour. It is the settled position of law that no citizen has a right to trade in liquor. The counsel referred to the liquor tragedies that had occurred in the State, in the past and contended that only complete prohibition could root out the malady of consumption of alcohol. The licences of the petitioners were renewed only on provisional basis and subject to the Abkari Policy. Therefore, the cancellation thereof cannot be found fault with.

63. Advocate Johnson Manayani also draws my attention to the evil effects of the use of alcohol. The social problems created by excess drinking, of families driven to the streets by the profligacy of the bread winner also was narrated in justification of the present policy.

64. Advocate Kaleeswaram Raj justifies the termination of the Bar licences by pointing out that, since the action was on the basis of the policy that has been formulated, no notice was necessary. In view of the amendments made, incorporating the policy into the amended Rule 13(3), the policy has acquired the status of a legislation. Therefore, the principles of Natural Justice have no application. According to the counsel, therefore, no interference with the Abkari Policy is either called for or necessary. The writ petitions are only to be dismissed. 

Does the citizen have a right to trade in potable liquor?

65. Since it has been argued before me that the petitioners have a fundamental right to trade in liquor, I shall address the same first. Potable Alcohol is nothing but diluted ethyl alcohol having a chemical formula C2H5OH. Ethyl Alcohol is a versatile chemical, capable of being put to a wide variety of uses in the field of industry as well as medicine. Of course it is also capable of being consumed as an intoxicant, in its diluted form. The fact that Ethyl Alcohol is capable of being put to a variety of uses, has been recognized in our Constitution itself. It is for the said reason that the constitutional duty in Art.47 has been limited "to bring about prohibition of consumption" of intoxicating drinks, "except for medicinal purposes". Thus, consumption for medicinal purposes has been exempted. The power to legislate on Ethyl Alcohol has been divided among the Centre and the States. As per the Seventh Schedule, Entry 8, list II, the States have been conferred with legislative competence only over intoxicating liquors that is to say production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors. Similarly as per Seventh Schedule, Entry 51, list II, the power to levy duties of excise on alcoholic liquors for human consumption alone is conferred on the states. The above division of powers is clear from Entry 84, list 1 Seventh Schedule, by which the Centre has been conferred with power to levy duties of excise on tobacco and other goods manufactured in India except, inter alia, alcoholic liquors for human consumption. Therefore, the power of the State to legislate in respect of alcohol is confined to alcoholic liquor capable of human consumption. The above position has been settled by the Constitution Bench in 

Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1990)1 SCC 109]. 

Inasmuch as the legislative competence of the State does not extend to any substance other than potable liquor, the scope of the enquiry here is also limited to whether the citizen has a right to trade in liquor capable of human consumption.

66. According to the Senior Counsel Shri.Aryama Sundaram, a Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court has held in 

K.K.Narula v. State of Jammu and Kashmir [AIR 1967 SC 1368] 

that the citizen has a fundamental right to trade in potable liquor. Though the said dictum has been the subject matter of consideration of a subsequent Constitutional Bench of equal strength, in 

Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka [(1995) 1 SCC 574]

since the earlier Constitutional Bench has not been overruled, the petitioners are entitled to take the benefit of the said dictum. The resultant position therefore is that, the citizen has a fundamental right to trade in potable liquor as held in the case of K.K.Narula, it is contended. The said right is of course subject to reasonable restrictions that the State may impose under Art.19(6) of the Constitution. It is also contended that, the Constitutional Bench in the case of Khoday Distilleries has not held that a citizen has no fundamental right to trade in liquor. Though it cannot be denied that the State is at liberty to prohibit the trade altogether under Art.19(6) of the Constitution, where it permits such trade, the courts would examine whether the restrictions imposed are reasonable or not. In the above perspective it is contended that the petitioners herein have a fundamental right to trade in liquor along with the State which does not enjoy a monopoly. Consequently, the petitioners who are licence holders are entitled to claim renewal of their licences, as of right, provided they satisfy all the other conditions.

67. In the context of the above contention, it is necessary to note that, the Constitutional Bench has, in the decision in K.K.Narula considered the scope of the right available to a citizen to trade in liquor, analysed the dicta laid down by the previous decisions on the point and has concluded the issue in paragraphs 13 and 14 in the following words:- 

"13. A scrutiny of these decisions does not support the contention that the courts held that dealing in liquor was not business or trade. They were only considering the provisions of the various Acts which conferred a restricted right to do business. None of them held that a right to do business in liquor was not a fundamental right.

14. We, therefore, hold that clearing in liquor is business and a citizen has a right to do business in that commodity but the State can make a law imposing reasonable restrictions on the said right, in public interests." 

68. In the case of Khoday Distilleries Ltd., a similar contention was advanced. It was contended that, a citizen has a fundamental right to trade or business in liquor and that the State has power only to place reasonable restrictions on the said right in the interests of general public by law made under Art.19(6) of the Constitution. The State cannot therefore prohibit completely the said trade or business under the guise of regulating the trade. Any regulation would have to pass the test of reasonableness. The Constitutional Bench also considered whether the reasonable restrictions contemplated by Art.19(6) could be imposed by an Act of legislature only or by a subordinate legislation as well.

69. After a survey of the previous decisions on the point, the Constitutional Bench has interpreted the dictum in K.K.Narula case, in the case of Khoday Distilleries Ltd. at paragraph 54 of the judgment, as follows:- 

"It will thus be obvious that all the decisions except the decision in K.K.Narula case have unanimously held as shown above that there is no fundamental right to carry on trade or business in potable liquor sold as a beverage. As pointed out above, the proposition of law which is put in a different language in K.K.Narula case has been explained by the subsequent decisions of this Court including those of the Constitution Benches. The proposition of law laid down there has to be read in conformity with the proposition laid down in that respect by the other decisions of this Court not only to bring comity in the judicial decisions but also to bring the law in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution. The fundamental rights conferred by our Constitution are not absolute. Article 19 has to be read as a whole. The fundamental rights enumerated under Article 19(1) are subject to the restrictions mentioned in clauses (2) to (6) of the said article. Hence, the correct way to describe the fundamental rights under Article 19(1) is to call them qualified fundamental rights." 

The Court has further observed as follows in the same paragraph:- 

"The correct way, therefore, to read the fundamental rights enumerated under Article 19 (1) of our Constitution is to hold that the citizens do not possess the said rights absolutely. They have the said rights as qualified by the respective clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19. That is apart from the fact that Article 47 of the Constitution enjoins upon the State to prohibit consumption of intoxicating drink like liquor, which falls for consideration in the present case and, therefore, the right to trade or business in potable liquor is subject also to the provisions of the said article. Whether one states as in K.K.Narula case that the citizen has a fundamental right to do business but subject to the State's powers to impose valid restrictions under clause (6) of Article 19 or one takes the view that a citizen has no fundamental right to do business but he has only a qualified fundamental right to do business, the practical consequence is the same so long as the former view does not deny the State the power to completely prohibit, trade or business in articles and products like liquor as a beverage, or such trafficking as in women and slaves." 

70. The further contention that if the citizen does not have a fundamental right to carry on trade or business in potable liquor the State is also interdicted from carrying on such trade has been considered and negatived in paragraph 55 of the judgment which reads as follows:- 

"The contention that if a citizen has no fundamental right to carry on trade or business in potable liquor, the State is also injuncted from carrying on such trade, particularly in view of the provisions of Article 47, though apparently attractive, is fallacious. The State's power to regulate and to restrict the business in potable liquor impliedly includes the power to carry on such trade to the exclusion of others. Prohibition is not the only way to restrict and regulate the consumption of intoxicating liquor. The abuse of drinking intoxicants can be prevented also by limiting and controlling its production, supply and consumption. The State can do so also by creating in itself the monopoly of the production and supply of the liquor. When the State does so, it does not carry on business in illegal products. It carries on business in products which are not declared illegal by completely prohibiting their production but in products the manufacture, possession and supply of which is regulated in the interests of the health, morals and welfare of the people. It does so also in the interests of the general public under Article 19(6) of the Constitution." 

The Court has further held that even if a prohibition has not been imposed a citizen has no fundamental right to carry on trade or business in potable liquor. Paragraphs 56 and 57 have concluded the above issue, as under:- 

"56. The contention further that till prohibition is introduced, a citizen has a fundamental right to carry on trade or business in potable liquor has also no merit. All that the citizen can claim in such a situation is an equal right to carry on trade or business in potable liquor as against the other citizens. He cannot claim equal right to carry on the business against the State when the State reserves to itself the exclusive right to carry on such trade or business. When the State neither prohibits nor monopolises the said business, the citizens cannot be discriminated against while granting licences to carry on such business. But the said equal right cannot be elevated to the status of a fundamental right.

57. It is no answer against complete or partial prohibition of the production, possession, sale and consumption etc. of potable liquor to contend that the prohibition where it was introduced earlier and where it is in operation at present, has failed. The failure of measures permitted by law does not detract from the power of the State to introduce such measures and implement them as best as they can." 

(Emphasis supplied) 

71. In view of the above authoritative pronouncement of the law by the Constitutional Bench there cannot be any doubt that a citizen has no fundamental right to carry on trade or business in liquor. The conclusions have been summarized as follows in paragraph 60 of the said judgment as under:- 

"60. We may now summarise the law on the subject as culled from the aforesaid decisions: 

a) The rights protected by Article 19(1) are not absolute but qualified. The qualifications are stated in clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19. The fundamental rights guaranteed in Article 19(1)(a) to (g) are, therefore, to be read along with the said qualifications. Even the rights guaranteed under the Constitutions of the other civilized countries are not absolute but are read subject to the implied limitations on them. Those implied limitations are made explicit by clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 of our Constitution. 

b) The right to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business does not extend to practising a profession or carrying on an occupation, trade or business which is inherently vicious and pernicious, and is condemned by all civilised societies. It does not entitle citizens to carry on trade or business in activities which are immoral and criminal and in articles or goods which are obnoxious and injurious to health, safety and welfare of the general public, i.e., res extra commercium (outside commerce). There cannot be business in crime. 

c) Potable liquor as a beverage is an intoxicating and depressant drink which is dangerous and injurious to health and is, therefore, an article which is res extra commercium being inherently harmful. A citizen has, therefore, no fundamental right to do trade or business in liquor. Hence the trade or business in liquor can be completely prohibited. 

d) Article 47 of the Constitution considers intoxicating drinks and drugs as injurious to health and impeding the raising of level of nutrition and the standard of living of the people and improvement of the public health. It, therefore, ordains the State to bring about prohibition of the consumption of intoxicating drinks which obviously include liquor, except for medicinal purposes. Article 47 is one of the Directive Principles which is fundamental in the governance of the country. The State has, therefore, the power to completely prohibit the manufacture, sale, possession, distribution and consumption of potable liquor as a beverage, both because it is inherently a dangerous article of consumption and also because of the Directive Principle contained in Article 47, except when it is used and consumed for medicinal purposes. 

e) For the same reason, the State can create a monopoly either in itself or in the agency created by it for the manufacture, possession, sale and distribution of the liquor as a beverage and also sell the licences to the citizens for the said purpose by charging fees. This can be done under Article 19[6] or even otherwise. 

f) For the same reason, again, the State can impose limitations and restrictions on the trade or business in potable liquor as a beverage which restrictions are in nature different from those imposed on the trade or business in legitimate activities and goods and articles which are res commercium. The restrictions and limitations on the trade or business in potable liquor can again be both under Article 19[6] or otherwise. The restrictions and limitations can extend to the State carrying on the trade or business itself to the exclusion of and elimination of others and/or to preserving to itself the right to sell licences to do trade or business in the same, to others. 

g) When the State permits trade or business in the potable liquor with or without limitation, the citizen has the right to carry on trade or business subject to the limitations, if any, and the State cannot make discrimination between the citizens who are qualified to carry on the trade or business. 

h) The State can adopt any mode of selling the licences for trade or business with a view to maximise its revenue so long as the method adopted is not discriminatory. 

i) The State can carry on trade or business in potable liquor notwithstanding that it is an intoxicating drink and Article 47 enjoins it to prohibit its consumption. When the State carries on such business, it does so to restrict and regulate production, supply and consumption of liquor which is also an aspect of reasonable restriction in the interest of general public. The State cannot on that account be said to be carrying on an illegitimate business. 

j) The mere fact that the State levies taxes or fees on the production, sale and income derived from potable liquor whether the production, sale or income is legitimate or illegitimate, does not make the State a party to the said activities. The power of the State to raise revenue by levying taxes and fees should not be confused with the power of the State to prohibit or regulate the trade or business in question. The State exercises its two different powers on such occasions. Hence the mere fact that the State levies taxes and fees on trade or business in liquor or income derived from it, does not make the right to carry on trade or business in liquor a fundamental right, or even a legal right when such trade or business is completely prohibited. 

k) The State cannot prohibit trade or business in medicinal and toilet preparations containing liquor or alcohol. The State can, however, under Article 19 [6] place reasonable restrictions on the right to trade or business in the same in the interests of general public. 

l) Likewise, the state cannot prohibit trade or business in industrial alcohol which is not used as a beverage but used legitimately for industrial purposes. The State, however, can place reasonable restrictions on the said trade or business in the interests of the general public under Article 19[6] of the Constitution. 

m) The restrictions placed on the trade or business in industrial alcohol or in medicinal and toilet preparations containing liquor or alcohol may also be for the purposes of preventing their abuse or diversion for use as or in beverage." 

72. The Constitutional Bench decision in K.K.Narula having been interpreted and understood by the Constitutional Bench in the case of Khoday Distilleries in the manner reproduced above, a different interpretation is neither possible nor permissible for, the interpretation of the Constitutional Bench binds this Court. In view of the above it is held that a citizen has no fundamental right to conduct trade or business in potable liquor, as contended.

73. The further contention as to whether it is permissible for the State to prohibit the trade in potable liquor altogether, has also been decided conclusively by the Constitutional Bench as evident from paragraph 60 clause (d). It has further been held that it shall be open to the State to create a monopoly either in itself or in an agency created by it for the manufacture, possession, sale and distribution of liquor as a beverage and also to sell licenses to the citizen for the said purpose by charging fees. The restrictions to be imposed on trade or business in potable liquor could be different from those imposed on a trade or business in other trades or businesses that are "res commercium". The restrictions and limits on the trade or business in potable liquor can be both under Art.19(6) or otherwise. It has also been categorically held that the State while carrying on a business in potable liquor by itself, cannot be said to carry on an illegitimate business, in view of Art.47. It has further been held that the State can adopt any mode of selling the licences for trade or business with a view to maximise its revenue so long as the method adopted is not discriminatory. However, the only restriction is that, where the State permits trade or business in potable liquor with or without limitation, the citizen has a right not to be discriminated against. In other words, the State would have no right to pick and choose.

74. With respect to the question as to whether the restrictions to be imposed by the State should be by way of a legislative enactment, the Constitutional Bench has held as follows:- 

"64. The last contention in these groups of matters is whether the State can place restrictions and limitations under Article 19[6] by subordinate legislation. Article 13[3][a] of the Constitution states that law includes "any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law". Clauses [2] to [6] of Article 19 make no distinction between the law made by the Legislature and the subordinate legislation for the purpose of placing the restrictions on the exercise of the respective fundamental rights mentioned in Article 19 [1](a) to (g). We are concerned in the present case with Clause [6] of Article 19. It will be apparent from the said clause that it only speaks of "operation of any existing law in so far as it imposes... "from making any law imposing" reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights conferred by Article 19[1](g). There is nothing in this provision which makes it imperative to impose the restrictions in question only by a law enacted by the Legislature. Hence the restrictions in question can also be imposed by any subordinate legislation so long as such legislation is not violative of any provisions of the Constitution. This is apart from the fact that the trade or business in potable liquor is a trade or business in res extra commercium and hence can be regulated and restricted even by executive order provided it is issued by the Governor of the State. We, therefore, answer the question accordingly." 

(Emphasis supplied) 

It is clear from the above that, it is permissible for the State to impose restrictions on trade or business in potable liquor even by subordinate legislation, "provided it is issued by the Governor of the State." The Constitutional Bench decision in the case of Khoday Distilleries Ltd. therefore, contains the answers to the questions raised by the counsel for the petitioners on the basis of Art.19(1)(g), 19(6) and Article 47. Therefore, except for the purpose of examining whether the restrictions imposed have the effect of discriminating the citizens unreasonably in the manner of granting licences or permissions to carry on trade or business in potable liquor, the other contentions have to fail. It is so held. 

Scope of the challenge under Article 14 

75. As already noticed above, while emphatically laying down that the citizen has no fundamental right to trade in liqour under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has, as in the previous decisions on the point, taken care to put a limitation on the State power to impose regulations by providing that a regulatory measure would have to satisfy the rigour of Article 14. Thus in paragraph 56 of the judgment in Khoday Distilleries (already quoted above) it has been held that, when the State neither prohibits nor monopolizes the business in liquor, the citizens cannot be discriminated against, while granting licences to carry on such business. The above aspect has been summarized as clauses (g) and (h) of paragraph 60 of the said judgment (already quoted above). Consequently, while the State has sufficient powers to monopolize and to permit subject to regulations, trade in liquor, the grant of such permission or licence should be free from discrimination. Therefore, wherever and whenever an allegation of discrimination is raised against a regulatory measure of the State, the same would have to be subjected to judicial scrutiny for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is discriminatory, as alleged. If it is found to be discriminatory, the regulatory measure certainly would have to be set aside. That the said action would be subject to Article 14 of the Constitution has been the consistent view of the Supreme Court in all the decisions on the point.

76. In 

State of Kerala v. Kandath Distilleries [2013(6) SCC 573]

the question as to whether the High Court could issue a Writ of Mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution directing the State to part with its exclusive privilege in the matter of granting a licence to establish a distillery had come up for consideration. That was a case in which the Kandath Distilleries had applied for a licence to establish a distillery in Palakkad District under the Kerala Foreign Liqour (Compounding, Blending and Bottling) Rules, 1975 read with Section 14 of the Kerala Abkari Act. The application was rejected. Though this Court had directed the matter to be reconsidered, the application was repeatedly rejected. Finally, this Court directed the State to issue the licence by the issue of a Writ of Mandamus. Though the judgment of the Single Bench was confirmed by the Division Bench, the Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside both the judgments holding that this Court had no power to issue any such direction. The Supreme Court has incidentally held in the said case also that, a citizen has no fundamental right to conduct trade or business in liquor. However, the court has held that the power of the State would limited by the rigour of the Article 14 of the Constitution. Speaking for the Court, Radhakrishnan, J has held as follows in paragraph 32 of the judgment. It is trite law that, though, no citizen has a legal right to claim a distillery licence as a matter of right and the Commissioner or the State Government is entitled to either not to entertain or reject the application, they cannot enter into a relationship by arbitrarily choosing any person they like or discriminate between persons similarly circumscribed. The State Government, when decides to grant the right or privilege to others, of course, cannot escape of the rigour of Article 14, in the sense that it can act arbitrarily.

77. In the present cases, it is the Abkari Policy, 2014-15 and the consequential amendments effected to the Rules that are under challenge. The question as to whether the policy of the Government could be the subject matter of challenge before this Court is a connected issue that arises for consideration. The law on the point is well settled that, it is the exclusive prerogative of the State to formulate policies. Policies are to be formulated on the basis of social as well as empirical data, the assessment of which fall within the exclusive domain of the persons who are in administration. Policies are not framed on the basis of legal principles. The State has to be conceded sufficient freedom to formulate its policies periodically, taking into account, the needs of the people as well as the social mores. Such policy decisions are not interfered with, lightly or as a matter of course. The Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Kandath Distilleries (Supra) has observed as follows while considering the challenge in the said case against the policy of the Government. It is trite law that a court of law is not expected to propel into 'the unchartered ocean' of the State's policies. The State has the power to frame and reframe, change and rechange, adjust and readjust policy, which cannot be declared as illegal or arbitrary on the ground that the earlier policy was better and suited to the prevailing situations.

78. In State of Kerala v. Surendradas (Supra), the legality and validity of two amendments introduced by the State of Kerala pursuant to its Abkari Policy 2011-12 to the Foreign Liqour Rules framed under the Abkari Act was the issue. The amendments had been struck down by this Court and the State had carried the matter to the Supreme Court. In paragraph 37 of the said judgment, referring to the scope of the challenge under Article 14 of the Constitution, this Court held as follows:- 

37. In the circumstances, although we do not dispute the power of the State Government to bring about the necessary reform, by modifying the rules, it has got to be justified on the touchstone of the correlation between the provision and the objective to be achieved. If that correlation is not established, surely the rule will suffer from the vice of arbitrariness, and therefore will be hit by Art.14.

79. In view of the authoritative pronouncement noted above, it is beyond doubt that a restriction or regulation imposed on a trade or business conducted in potable liquor is open to challenge on the ground that the same is arbitrary or discriminatory. Therefore, the above aspect of the matter would have to be considered vis-a-vis the Abkari Policy 2014-2015 and the amendments made to the Foreign Liquor Rules in implementation thereof, that are under challenge. But before I proceed to do so, there are few other contentions that require to be dealt with. 

Contention on the basis of 'Occupied Field'

80. According to Senior Counsel Smt. Indira Jaisingh, the field of prohibition is occupied by the Prohibition Act, 1950 and it is by suspending the operation of the provisions thereof that the provisions of the Abkari Act have been revived. Section 8 of the Prohibition Act has brought in prohibition. With the coming into force of the said Act, the Abkari Act and its provisions had been repealed. However, in exercise of the power under Section 2 of the said Act, the State Government has issued a notification suspending the provisions of the said enactment. Consequently, the provisions of the Abkari Act that stood repealed have been revived. According to the counsel, while the Prohibition Act deals with prohibition, the Abkari Act deals with only regulation. The legislature having enacted a specific law bringing about prohibition, the present policy that aims at complete prohibition in a phased manner is outside the scope of the object of the Abakri Act. Section 29 of the Act confers power on the Government to make rules only to give effect to the objects of the enactment. Prohibition being not one of the objects of the enactment, an amendment to attain the same cannot be supported by the power to frame Rules conferred by the Act.

81. It is true that, the object of the Abkari Act is regulation and not prohibition. It is also true that there is already an enactment, the Prohibition Act, 1950 that can be revived by withdrawing the notification issued by the Government, suspending the provisions thereof. However, according to the State, the time is not yet ripe for complete prohibition. Until the appropriate time, there has to be proper regulation. Since the State has a duty under Article 47 to strive towards achieving prohibition no law made in implementation thereof could be found fault with. It is well settled that, regulation includes prohibition also. 

82. The State can in exercise of its power to regulate limit the number of persons participating in the trade. Such limitation can even extend to prohibiting any person from conducting trade in potable liquor. Such regulation, unless it offends Article 14 has been held to be reasonable under Article 19(6) of the Constitution also. The Constitutional Bench has held, in Khoday Distilleries case (Supra), in Paragraph 12, while considering the nature of restrictions that could be placed by the State on a right under Article 19(1)(g), under Article 19(6), as follows:- 

Thus Article 19(1)(g) read with Article 19(6) spells out a fundamental right of the citizens to practise any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business so long as it is not prohibited or is within the framework of the regulation, if any, if such prohibition or regulation has been imposed by the State by enacting a law in the interests of the general public. It cannot be disputed that certain professions, occupations, trades or businesses which are not in the interests of the general public may be completely prohibited while others may be permitted with reasonable restrictions on them. For the same purpose, viz., to subserve the interests of the general public, the reasonable restrictions on the carrying on of any profession, occupation, trade, etc., may provide that such trade, business etc., may be carried on exclusively by the State or by a Corporation owned or controlled by it. The right conferred upon the citizens under article 19(1)(g) is thus subject to the complete or partial prohibition or to regulation, by the State. However, under the provisions of the Article 19(6) the prohibition, partial or complete, or the regulation, has to be in the interests of the general public.

83. It is clear from the above that, regulation could extend to prohibition also even in the case of a fundamental right enumerated in Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. A fortiori, therefore, in the case of trade or business in liquor also, the power to regulate could extend to complete prohibition of the trade or business itself.

84. Apart from the above, prohibition is inherent in the mechanism of licensing itself. It is not in dispute that, the petitioners have been conducting their businesses on the strength of licences issued to them and renewed periodically, for conducting bars. The mechanism of licensing regulates an activity by first prohibiting the same altogether. Thereafter, the activity is permitted in a restrictive manner by issuing licences to some. Therefore, when the petitioners admit that they are permitted to carry on their business activities on the strength of licences issued to them and renewed from time to time, it follows that they are only being permitted to engage in a prohibited activity, subject to the conditions governing the terms of the licence. In the present case, the Prohibition Act is remaining suspended while the State is trying to achieve the object of prohibition in a phased manner by imposing regulations on the trade or business in potable liquor. Even under the Abkari Act, trade in liquor is completely prohibited but permitted in a regulated manner by the issue of licences to the eligible persons. There is no question of the field being occupied by the Prohibition Act denuding the State of its power to progress towards prohibition though regulation.

85. The object of the Abkari Act being to regulate trade or business in potable liquor and the expression regulation having been interpreted to include the power to prohibit also, it has to be held that the power to frame rules for the purpose of the enactment would include prohibition also. In view of the above, the contention regarding lack of power to frame rules, is rejected.

86. According to Senior Counsel Sri O.V.Radhakrishnan, the Governor of the State of Kerala had resigned on 25.08.2014. The resignation according to the counsel comes into effect immediately. Therefore, as on 27.08.2014, the date on which amended rules were published in the gazette, there was no Governor in office. Though the publication expresses that it has been made in the name of the Governor, there was in fact, no Governor in office. Therefore, it is contended that, the said amendment is unconstitutional.

87. Article 156 of the Constitution deals with term of office of Governor, which reads as follows:- 

156. Term of office of Governor.--(1) The Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President. 

(2) The Governor may, by writing under his hand addressed to the President, resign his office. 

(3) Subject to the foregoing provisions of this Article, a Governor shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office: 

Provided that a Governor shall, notwithstanding the expiration of his term, continue to hold office until his successor enters upon his office. 

As per the above provision, even if the term of office of the Governor expires, the person in office shall hold office until his successor takes charge. The above provision ensures that, no administrative vacuum is created by the contingency, pointed out by the petitioners. Article 160 empowers the President to act in an unforeseen emergency not provided for by the Constitution. Article 160 reads as follows:- 

160. Discharge of the functions of the Governor in certain contingencies.-- The President may make such provision as he thinks fit for the discharge of the functions of the Governor of a State in any contingency not provided for in this Chapter. 

Since sufficient provisions are available in the Constitution to remedy the situation created by the resignation of the Governor and to ensure continuity in office, I do not consider it necessary to dwell on the above aspect in any further detail. No material or evidence is placed before me to justify a conclusion that any contingency of the nature pointed out was actually in existence. On the contrary, the presumption as to official acts under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, only supports the conclusion that the amendments were enacted and published properly. A further contention has been put forward regarding violation of the Rules of Business in Government. According to the counsel for the petitioners, the Abkari Policy was issued without the backing of a decision of the Council of Ministers. It is pointed out, by placing reliance on the statements in Paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit filed, that the Council of Ministers had ratified the decision on 27.08.2014. According to the counsel, such a procedure, of the Council of Ministers ratifying a decision is unknown to the Constitutional Law.

88. It is true that, Article 163 mandates the existence of a Council of Ministers to aid and advice the Governor in the exercise of his functions. The case of the State is that, the policy had been ratified 27.08.2014 by the Council of Ministers. The said statement only shows that, the formal decision of the Council of Ministers though taken subsequently, the policy had the tacit approval of the Council of Ministers. Otherwise, the Council of Ministers would not have ratified the same. Procedural intricacies in the manner of functioning of a Government machinery need not be scrutinized with a hawk's eye to cull out lapses for the purpose of invalidating them. The practical difficulties in the working of the Government has to be given a sufficient elbow room, without which the smooth functioning of the Government would become impossible. No materials have also been placed before me to justify the conclusion that the policy announced on 22.08.2014 was not supported by a decision of the Council of Ministers. In the absence of any such materials, the said contention is also negatived.

89. It is further contended that, as per the Rules of Business in Government, a proposal has to originate from the lower level of the Administrative machinery and has to proceed upwards with the endorsement of the subordinate Officers. In matters involving financial implications, a draft has to be approved by the Law Department and sanctioned by the Finance Ministry, it is contended that, the above provisions have not been complied with. However, no materials or evidence have been placed before me in support of the above contention. The stand of the State in the counter affidavit filed is that, the action of the Government is strictly in accordance with law and that the policy has been issued after complying with all the statutory formalities. As already noticed above, absolutely no materials or evidence are available before me to doubt the above submissions in the counter affidavit. 

Legitimate Expectation 

90. According to Sri. P.Chandrasekhar, Advocate, the present policy is violative of the legitimate expectation of the petitioners that, the privilege granted to them would continue, provided the conditions for renewal of the licence were satisfied. It is contended that, the authorities had a duty to take into account the legitimate expectation of the petitioners while taking a decision. The authorities have not taken into consideration the above aspect. Legitimate expectation can be denied only in cases where there is an overriding public interest. The counsel has placed reliance on a number of decisions to drive home his point. The counsel has also contended that, this is a case in which the Proportionality principle as well as the Strict Scrutiny Test should be applied. Employing the said principles, it is canvassed that it is open for this Court to examine the entire record leading up to the present policy. This Court would thereupon have to be satisfied as to whether the measure adopted was really necessary, whether there was a legitimate nexus to the object and was there a lesser measure that could have been adopted to achieve the same result. According to the counsel, this Court has to undertake an act of balancing the hardship and the benefit flowing from the measure adopted. If the hardship is more than the benefit, the measure would have to be struck down. It is contended by the counsel that, in the present case, the examination of the relevant files would reveal that all the materials available to the Government therein are in favour of granting licences to the petitioners. However, a policy has been framed ignoring all the available material. Therefore, it is contended that the policy is violative of the principle of legitimate expectation of the citizen.

91. In 

Kuldeep Singh v. Government of NCT of Delhi, [(2006) 5 SCC 702] 

the Hon'ble Supreme Court had to consider whether rejection of the applications of the petitioners therein while granting licences to others was proper or not? The reason for denying licences to the petitioners was that there was a change in the policy. It was contended that, the principle of legitimate expectation applied to such cases and that, for the said reason, the impugned action was unsustainable and liable to be set aside. Sinha J. has in paragraph 25 of the said judgment, negatived the contention in the following words:- It is, however, difficult for us to accept the contention of the learned Senior Counsel Mr Soli J. Sorabjee that the doctrine of "legitimate expectation" is attracted in the instant case. Indisputably, the said doctrine is a source of procedural or substantive right. (See R.v.North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan6) But, however, the relevance of application of the said doctrine is as to whether the expectation was legitimate. Such legitimate expectation was also required to be determined keeping in view the larger public interest. Claimant's perceptions would not be relevant therefor. The State actions indisputably must be fair and reasonable. Non-arbitrariness on its part is a significant facet in the field of good governance. The discretion conferred upon the State yet again cannot be exercised whimsically or capriciously. But where a change in the policy decision is valid in law, any action taken pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, cannot be invalidated. [6-2001 QB 213] 

92. Therefore, wherever a change of policy decision is valid in law, any action taken pursuant to such changed policy cannot be attacked or invalidated on the ground of legitimate expectation. It is not the expectation of the claimant that is relevant. A claimant cannot have an expectation that is impermissible. In view of the above, it would have to be decided whether the policy in the present case is valid or not. It has also to be borne in mind that, in the context of the business with respect to which the petitioners have raised the claim of legitimate expectation, what is important to be noted is that, a citizen has no right to claim that he should be permitted to conduct business in a substance that is res extra commercium. At the same time, the State has the exclusive right or privilege in respect of potable liquor either to restrict or prohibit trade in the said article. Therefore, it is held that the principle of legitimate expectation is not available to the petitioners to challenge the Abkari Policy in these cases.

93. According to Senior Counsel Shri. K.Ramkumar, Senior Counsel Shri. Ramesh Babu and Adv.George Poonthottam the FL3 licences in favour of the petitioners having been renewed under the provisions of the Act and the Rules, they are entitled to continue operations for the full term of the licence i.e., up to 31.3.2015. This is because, licences under the Foreign Liquor Rules are granted for the financial year concerned. The licence fee is also stipulated for the entire year. Accordingly, the petitioners have paid the entire licence fees. Having received the full licence fee, it is contended that it is not open to the Government to cancel the licences, as done in these cases. Though the licences have been renewed stating that the renewal was only provisional and subject to the Abkari Policy to be announced, since no provisional renewal is contemplated by the Act or the Rules, the action of the Government can only be considered to be a renewal in accordance with the rules, for the full term. According to the Senior Counsel Shri.S.Sreekumar it was for the said reason that the renewal though provisional was not challenged earlier. It was expected that, the petitioners would be permitted to conduct their Bars for the entire financial year.

94. The Senior Counsel Shri. K.Ramkumar further points out that the renewal having been granted, the licence granted to the petitioners could be cancelled only on one of the grounds mentioned under Section 26 of the Act. All the grounds mentioned therein relate to violation of the terms and conditions of the licence or the provisions of the Abkari Act. Therefore Section 26(e) has to be read down and restricted to apply only to similar violations. Otherwise, the power granted by Section 26 (e) would be unguided and arbitrary.

95. The above contentions have to fail for the reason that, the renewal was granted to the petitioners on the basis of G.O(MS)56/2014 issued by the Government. As per the Government Order it has been specifically stipulated that the renewal shall be purely provisional or ad interim, subject to its cancellation or withdrawal before its date of completion. It has further been provided that, the renewal shall be subject to the decision to be taken by the Government as a matter of policy on the recommendations of the One Man Commission. It is a further condition that the full rental shall be collected, with the rider that the licensees shall be entitled for proportionate reduction with respect to the unexpired portion of the licence period. The above Government Order produced as Ext.P2 in WPC 23569/2014 was not objected to or challenged by any of the petitioners at that time (the said G.O is also under challenge in these proceedings). Instead, the petitioners accepted the renewal of their FL3 licences without demur. They have also been conducting their Bars on the strength of the renewed FL3 licences issued to them and subject to the conditions stipulated in Ext.P2. It is only upon realising that the policy of the Government was not in favour of renewal of their licences that they have mounted the present challenge against the Government Order. Therefore, it is held that the petitioners were fully aware of the fact that, their licences had only been renewed provisionally, as an ad interim measure "subject to its cancellation or withdrawal before its date of completion." Therefore, they cannot now turn around and contend that they are entitled to carry on their business for the entire term of the licence. The contention that they have stocked large quantities of liquor anticipating that they would be permitted to conduct business for the entire financial year is also without any basis. Such contentions are only put forward for the purpose of attacking the present policy of the Government.

96. It is further contended that the owners of the hotels have invested crores of rupees in their establishments, even securing funds from financial institutions all of which would be lost, because of the present policy adopted by the Government. It is worth noticing that, the licences were being issued under the Foreign Liquor Rules, for periods of one year duration. The Abkari policies were also being announced by the Government each year. Therefore, the petitioners were fully aware that the right to claim renewal of their licences was dependent on and subject to the policy of the Government for the particular year. The above being the position, the licensees have made the investments taking into account the stark reality that they had no vested right of renewal. The non-standard hotels had been issued with directions sufficiently in advance requiring them to upgrade their facilities. Therefore, nothing turns on the fact that, the petitioners have made substantial investments to upgrade their hotels, in some cases even by borrowing funds. It is held that they had done so, with the full knowledge that they had no right or guarantee for the renewal of their licences on the expiry thereof. 

The challenge on the basis of Article 14

97. The next contention of the petitioners is that, though the challenge in these cases is against the policy of the Government, even policy can be interfered with in appropriate cases. Policy can also be scrutinised by courts for the purposes of ascertaining whether the rigour of Article 14 has been satisfied or not. In the present case, it is contended that, the dichotomy between existing Bar hotels and applicants for fresh licences was being maintained over the past many years. This is for the reason that, existing licensees constitute a class by themselves. Since they are establishments already issued with licences, they have a right of renewal of their licences on the conditions for such renewal being satisfied. The parameters that would apply in the case of renewal as well as in the case of grant of a fresh licence are different. Fresh licences could also be denied for the reason that there were sufficient number of Bar hotels already in existence. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in 

State of Maharashtra and others v. Indian Hotel Restaurants Association and others (Dance Bar Cases) [2013(8) SCC 519] 

to contend that the quality of services rendered by two star hotels or three star hotels as well as five star hotels is the same. In all the establishments referred to above, liquor is being sold for consumption within the premises. The present policy makes a distinction on the basis of star classification, which according to the counsel is in fact a classification of the society itself. Consequently, the people belonging to the higher strata of the society or the affluent section are conferred with a privilege, without any basis. Such classification has been found to be bad by the Supreme Court in the Dance Bars cases, it is contended. For the above reason, according to the petitioners, the present policy is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

98. On behalf of the Government, the explanation is that, it has been the consistent policy of the Government traceable to its Election Manifesto, to bring about prohibition in a phased manner. Accordingly, every year restrictions were being imposed in the manner of issuing licences. It was decided that no new licences for three star hotels would be permitted from 31.3.2012 onwards and four star hotels would be permitted only up to 31.3.2013. No new FL1 licences are issued to the Beverages Corporation or the Consumerfed for opening additional outlets in the State. The timings of Bar hotels have also been reduced by three hours. It is as part of the said progressive implementation of prohibition that, the present restrictions have been imposed. Reliance is placed on the dictum of the Supreme Court in various decisions to contend that judicial interference with policy is impermissible.

99. In 

Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Administration and others {(2001)3 SCC 635} 

the Supreme Court has laid down as follows in paragraph 18:- 

"It is well settled that the courts, in exercise of their power of judicial review, do not ordinarily interfere with the policy decisions of the executive unless the policy can be faulted on grounds of mala fide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness etc. Indeed, arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and mala fide will render the policy unconstitutional. However, if the policy cannot be faulted on any of these grounds, the mere fact that it would hurt business interests of a party, does not justify invalidating the policy. In tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial restraint, if not judicial deference, to judgment of the executive. The courts are not expected to express their opinion as to whether at a particular point of time or in a particular situation any such policy should have been adopted or not. It is best left to the discretion of the State." 

It is clear from the above that, a policy can be challenged only on grounds of malafides, unreasonableness, arbitrariness, unfairness etc.

100. In 

Union of India and others v. Dinesh Engineering Corporation [(2001) 8 SCC 491] 

the Supreme Court has reiterated the above position in paragraph 12 of the judgment in the following words:- 

"On behalf of the appellants, it has been very seriously contended before us that the decision vide letter dated 23.10.1992 being in the nature of a policy decision, it is not open to courts to interfere since policies are normally formulated by experts on the subjects and the courts not being in a position to step into the shoes of the experts, cannot interfere with such policy matters. There is no doubt that this Court has held in more than one case that where the decision of the authority is in regard to a policy matter, this Court will not ordinarily interfere since these policy matters are taken based on expert knowledge of the persons concerned and courts are normally not equipped to question the correctness of a policy decision. But then this does not mean that the courts have to abdicate their right to scrutinise whether the policy in question is formulated keeping in mind all the relevant facts and the said policy can be held to be beyond the pale of discrimination or unreasonableness, bearing in mind the material on record." 

(Emphasis supplied) 

To the same effect is the dictum in State of Kerala v. Surendra Das (supra) already quoted above. Therefore, what needs to be examined is whether the present policy of the State is liable to be interfered with by this Court, on any of the grounds referred to above. 

Two Star and Three Star hotels

101. From the year 1992 onwards, only hotels having two star and above were entitled to the grant of an FL3 licence. There were a lot of complaints regarding the manner of functioning of the two star hotels which according to the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) were functioning without proper facilities. Therefore, by the Abkari Policy for the year 2011-2012 hotels with three star classification were also held not eligible to be granted Bar licences. The policy further restricted the grant of Bar licences to a hotel located within one kilometer in Municipal areas and within 3 kilometers in Panchayat areas of another Bar attached hotel. The above policy was the subject matter of challenge before this Court in a number of writ petitions and writ appeals. All the cases were disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court holding that the policy in so far as it prohibited issue of fresh Bar licences to new cases three star hotels was discriminatory. The restriction based on the distance from another Bar hotel was also held to be unsustainable by the decision in Surendra Das v.State of Kerala (supra). The state of Kerala challenged the said decision before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court after considering the entire issue set aside the judgment of the Division Bench on all points, except to the extent of sustaining the setting aside of the restriction imposed on the basis of distance from other Bar hotels. The Supreme Court held that though licences were being issued for the purpose of promoting tourism, the promotion of tourism should be balanced with general public interest. Concluding the issue the Supreme Court has held in paragraph 33 as follows:- 

"In paragraph 30 this Court held that promotion of tourism should be balanced with general public interest. Paragraph 31 permits a periodical reassessment of policy, and holds that if policy is not open to challenge the amendment of the rules to effect the policy can also not be challenged . This being the position the grievances made by the hoteliers with respect to the deletion of three star hotels, and to insist on a Bar licence, cannot be sustained, on this ground. Deletion of three star hotels falls in the same genre as the deletion of two star hotels, which was done earlier. This Court has upheld the deletion of two star hotels in the said judgment. This being the position the State cannot be faulted for deletion of three star hotels after a periodical revision of the policy." 

(Emphasis supplied) 

102. The Court has thereafter allowed the appeals filed by the State with the following directions:- 

"41. For the reasons stated above we allow these appeals in part and hold as follows:- 

i) The judgment rendered by the Division Bench is set-aside to the extent it interferes with the amendment brought in the year 2011. The deletion of three star hotels from the category of hotels eligible for FL3 licenses under R.13(3) is held valid. 

ii) As far as the amendment brought in 2012 introducing the distance rule by way of addition of Rule (3E) in Rule 13(3) is concerned, the same is held to be bad in law. The judgment of the High Court is confirmed to that extent. 

iii) The State Government will not proceed to deny FL3 licenses to hotels with a classification of four star and above by resorting to their deletion under R.13(3) until the report of the one-man commission is received, and until it takes action against the non-standard restaurants which have been permitted under the sixth and seventh proviso of Rule 13(3). 

iv) No order is necessary on the contempt Petitions and they stand disposed of. 

v) All parties will bear their own costs." 

103. The resultant position therefore is that, the Supreme Court has already found that the deletion of two star and three star hotels from the classes of hotels eligible to be granted FL3 licences was perfectly in order. Of course, the said decision concerned the grant of licences to fresh applicants. However, since the licences to conduct Bars are being granted annually, to be renewed on the expiry thereof it cannot be said that the existing licensees have any subsisting right to claim renewal thereof. Rule 14 of the Foreign Liquor Rules which is extracted hereunder, further clarifies the above aspect:- 

"14. If any of the licences referred to in Rule 13 is granted in the course of a financial year, the full annual fee shall be paid and the licence shall expire at the end of the financial year." 

104. The position therefore is that, a Bar licence issued to an existing hotel expires at the end of the financial year. Thereupon, the licencee would have to seek renewal of the licence. The licence is to be granted on the applicant satisfying the conditions stipulated by Rule 13(3) of the Foreign Liquor Rules. In view of the above provisions, it cannot be said that existing two star and three star hotels have a vested right to renewal of the licences granted to them. The contention that the classification made is discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution is no longer res integra in view of the dictum of the Supreme Court, referred to above. 

Four Star Hotels 

105. The remaining question to be decided is whether exclusion of hotels with four star classification by the present Abkari Policy amounts to an unreasonable classification and whether it is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. An examination of the Abkari Policy, an English translation of which has been provided by the counsel for the petitioners, apart from the original in vernacular, is necessary for the purpose.

106. The Abkari Policy opens by referring to the concern of the Government to the increasing demand for alcohol in the society and the spread of the habit of drinking indiscriminately and without any restriction in the society. Reference has been made to the litigation that followed the announcement of the Abkari Policy for the year 2011-2012, the appointment of the One Man Commission manned by a retired Judge of this Court, Justice M.Ramachandran, the orders of the Supreme Court as well as the need to formulate the Abkari Policy urgently so as to comply with the directions issued by this Court. Thereafter, the various measures undertaken have been set out. The policy as contained in G.O.(MS) No:139/2014/Taxes Department dated 22.8.2014, in so far as it is relevant for the present purpose is reproduced hereunder:- 

"6. The Government has convinced that in spite of the various measures adopted by the Government to reduce the production and availability of liquor, still liquor continues as a social evil in the Kerala Society. This adversely affects our nation, family and individuals in various manners. Government feels that more actions are necessary at this juncture. Therefore, abkari policy has to be declared considering the orders of Hon'ble Supreme Court, High Court and Human Rights Commission and also the recommendations in report of Justice M.Ramachandran Commission.

7. The Government being convinced the fact that in order to achieve the goal of "Liquor- Free Kerala", strict and urgent measures are to be adopted, the Abkari policy 2014-15 is hereby declared subject to the following criteria.

1. Hereinafter Bar licenses will be issued only to 5 star hotels. The licenses of existing bar hotels which are functioning on the basis of provisional renewal of licenses except the licenses of 5 star hotels will be cancelled. The Government has decided not to renew the licenses of 418 non standard bar hotels mentioned in the judgment of the Supreme Court.

2. 10% of outlets out of 338 FL-1 outlets of Kerala State Beverages Corporation and 46 outlets of Consumer Fed will be closed each year from 2nd October, 2014 onwards.

3. The sale of high strength alcoholic liquor through Beverages Corporation will be gradually reduced.

4. In order to rehabilitate the employees who lose their job due to the closing of bar and to rehabilitate the persons who are addicted to alcohol a special plan namely "punarjani 2030" will be commenced. For that purpose, 5% cess will be imposed on the liquor sold through the K.S.B.C.

5. The Liquor - Free propaganda programme will be strengthened in the society at large and especially in educational institutions.

6. All Sundays will be declared as dry-days. This will be implemented from the Sunday of 5th October, 2014.

7. The traditional toddy tapping business will be protected and job security will be ensured for toddy tappers.

8. In order to rehabilitate the employees of closing Bars and employees engaged in the job of affixing stickers, measures will be adopted. Kerala Alcohol Education Research, Rehabilitation & Compensation Fund (KAERCF) Fund will be formed in order to protect the retrenched employees. The said fund will be utilized for the following purposes such as making propaganda against drinking of alcohol, for collection of data regarding this matter, to protect those who destroyed themselves by alcohol consumption, rehabilitation of the persons who lost job. The fund for this purpose will also be found out from public.

9. To implement the order urgently the Excise Commissioner, K.S.B.C Managing Director have to take measures to submit the recommendations urgently to the Government." 

107. A perusal of the above shows that the first paragraph merely contains a statement to the effect that Bar licences could be issued only to five star hotels and that all hotels except five star hotels, functioning on the basis of provisional renewals granted by the Government would be cancelled. The licences of 418 non-standard Bar hotels would not be renewed.

108. According to the policy the materials considered for formulating the same included the judgments of this Court,the Supreme Court, the report of the One Man Commission as well as the recommendations of the Secretary (Taxation) on the report of the One Man Commission. As per the above policy, only hotels with five star classification are presently entitled to apply for a Bar licence. Consequently, hotels having classification of four star and heritage (Grand & Classic) categories have become ineligible to apply for Bar licences. The question to be considered is whether the above classification is reasonable or not. It is settled law that, a classification in order to be reasonable must satisfy two conditions viz., i) The classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from the others left out of the group; ii) The differentia must have a rationale nexus to the object sought to be achieved.

109. In the present cases, the contention is that there is no substantial difference between hotels that enjoy four star or heritage classification from those categorized as five star and above. It is also contended that there are only 20 Five Star hotels within the State of Kerala and 33 hotels in the Four Star and Heritage categories. All the other categories of Bar hotels numbering more than 700 have been denied their licences. There would in addition be Beer/Wine parlours conducted by the Kerala Tourism Development Corporation and Clubs selling liquor in retail. Only 10% of the FL1 retail outlets are proposed to be shut down each year. Since hotels belonging to the four star, five star and heritage categories form a single, homogeneous class by themselves, conferring a preference or advantage on five star hotels alone violates the principle of equality enshrined under Art.14 of the Constitution, it is contended. It is also pointed out that, the only materials on the basis of which the State has formulated the policy, viz., the report of the One Man Commission, the judgments of this Court and the Supreme Court, as well as the report of the Secretary (Taxation) do not support the denial of FL3 licences to hotels with Four star and Heritage categories. The files leading up to the formulation of the policy also do not contain any material to justify the classification, according to the petitioners. Therefore, it is contended that the classification is also arbitrary. Reliance is placed by all the counsel appearing for the petitioners on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and another v. Indian Hotel and Restaurants Association (the Dance Bars Case) (supra).

110. In the Dance Bars case the Supreme Court had to consider whether the prohibition imposed by Sections 33A and 33B of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 by which a prohibition was imposed on dancing of any kind in eating houses, permit rooms or beer Bars having classification of less than three star was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The new provisions had been introduced by the Bombay Police (Amendment) Act, 2005. It was contended that, the classification made on the basis of the star category of the hotels was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has in the said case, after a survey of the authorities on the point summarized the principles on the basis of which it has to be examined whether a particular classification is violative of Article 14 or not. Paragraph 107 of the judgment is reproduced hereunder, for clarity of reference:- 

"107. The aforesaid principles have been consistently adopted and applied in subsequent cases. In Ram Krishna Dalmia, this Court reiterated the principles which would help in testing the legislation on the touchstone of Article 14 in the following words: "a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; c) that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the Court may take into consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation; and f) that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of the legislature are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the law or the surrounding circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation. These principles were reiterated by this Court in Shashikant Laxman Kale. The relevant observations have already been noticed in the earlier part of the judgment" 111. In the said case, the measure was adopted for the reason that the State had received a lot of complaints regarding the manner of functioning of the dance Bars. It was alleged that, the dresses worn by the dancers were revealing and provocative and, the dances vulgar. There was an unhealthy practice of the customers showering money on the dancers during the performance. There were also allegations that, such dance Bars were functioning as pick up joints for traffic in women and girls besides, being a haven of criminals. It was contended on behalf of the State that, the ban was imposed, considering the reports obtained by the authorities in this regard. The Supreme Court has, on a consideration of the materials in the case, held that the materials were insufficient to justify the classification made. Paragraphs 120 and 121 of the said decision read as follows:- 

"120. The next justification given by the learned counsel for the appellants is on the basis of degree of harm which is being caused to the atmosphere in the banned establishments and the surrounding areas. Undoubtedly as held by this Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia case, the legislature is free to recognise the degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest. We also agree with the observations of the US Court in Patsone case that the State may direct its law against what it deems the evil as it actually exists without covering the whole field of possible abuses, but such conclusion have to be reached either on the basis of general consensus shared by the majority of the population or on the basis of empirical data. In our opinion, the State neither had the empirical data to conclude that dancing in the prohibited establishment necessarily leads to depravity and corruption of public morals nor was there general consensus that such was the situation. The three reports presented before the High Court in fact have presented divergent viewpoints. Thus, the observations made in Patsone are not of any help to the appellant. We are also conscious of the observations made by this Court in Mohd. Hanif Quareshi, wherein it was held that there is a presumption that the legislature understands and appreciates the needs of its people and that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. In the present case, the appellant has failed to give any details of any experience which would justify such blatant discrimination, based purely on the class or location of an establishment.

121. We are of the opinion that the State has failed to justify the classification between the exempted establishments and prohibited establishments on the basis of surrounding circumstances, or vulnerability. Undoubtedly, the legislature is the best judge to measure the degree of harm and make reasonable classification but when such a classification is challenged the State is duty-bound to disclose the reasons for the ostensible conclusions. In our opinion, in the present case, the legislation is based on an unacceptable presumption that the so-called elite i.e rich and the famous would have higher standards of decency, morality or strength of character than their counterparts who have to content themselves with lesser facilities of inferior quality in the dance Bars. Such a presumption is abhorrent to the resolve in the Preamble of the Constitution to secure the citizens of India "equality of status and opportunity and dignity of the individual". The State Government presumed that the performance of an identical dance item in the establishments having facilities less than three stars would be derogative to the dignity of women and would be likely to deprave, corrupt or injure public morality or morals; but would not be so in the exempted establishments. These are misconceived notions of a bygone era which ought not to be resurrected." 

112. In the light of the above principles it has to be examined whether the State had sufficient material to justify the classification made, treating five star hotels alone as eligible for the grant of FL3 licences. As already noticed above, the materials referred to and made mention of in the Abkari Policy are the reports of the One Man Commission and the Secretary (Taxation) of the Government, apart from the decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court. It has to be examined whether the said materials justify the impugned action.

113. In the wake of the decision of this Court in Surendra Das v. State of Kerala (Supra) the Government by G.O.(Ms) No.12/2013/TD dated 23.01.2013 constituted a One Man Commission for recommending the parameters for formulating future Abkari Policies. The said Government Order states that the decision to appoint the One Man Commission is for the purpose of recommending comprehensive changes in the Abkari Policy including renewal of FL-3 licences already granted. It has been further stated that the Government have already taken a conscious policy decision not to grant any more bar licences till such time the Government considers the recommendations of the One Man Commission and takes a final policy decision. Thereafter, the terms of reference were incorporated in G.O.(M.S) No.28/2013/TD dated 04.03.2013 reference Nos. 4 and 5, relevant for the present purpose are extracted hereunder.

4. Review of the yardstick/criteria for issue of FL-3 license for the promotion of tourism, in the context of the guidelines issued by the Government of India, and the present structure of classification of hotels.

5. Review of the FL3 licences currently in operation without 2 star classifications, and suggest measures for streamlining the procedures for renewal/transfer of licences/reconstitution of partnership and shifting of these bars.

114. Therefore, the Government had directed a review of the yardstick for issue of FL-3 licence for the promotion of tourism as well as review of the FL-3 licences currently in operation without two star classification. It is therefore clear that, the objective of promotion of tourism for the purpose of granting FL-3 licences was very much in the mind of the Government while making the reference.

115. After going into the terms of reference in detail, the One Man Commission has submitted an elaborate report recommending that, after the term of expiry of the present licences issued, renewal be granted only to those hotels having eligibility of at least 3 star or four star classification. As a measure of sympathy, it has been recommended that the licences of hotels having lesser standards be kept in hibernation and reissued only on their securing the requisite certification from the competent authority. It has also been noticed by the One Man Commission that, the crowds frequenting the three star and four star categories of hotels were in general, orderly and disciplined. In other words, the One Man Commission did not find any reasons to be apprehensive of the activities of the hotels with higher classification, namely three star and above. The recommendation of the Government Secretary (Taxes) is to the effect that licences of bars having two star standards and above could be renewed on condition that such hotels provide Two Star classification certificates at the time of renewal of their licences for 2014-15. Therefore, both the One Man Commission as well as the Taxation Secretary had recommended the grant of licences to hotels having sufficient facilities. However, three star hotels had been held to be ineligible to be granted fresh FL-3 licences, by the Abkari Policy of 2011-12. The said exclusion has been found to be proper by the Supreme Court.

116. It is necessary to notice here that in paragraph 37 of the Judgment in State of Kerala v. Surendra Das (Supra), the Supreme Court has laid down as follows:-

37. In the circumstances, although we do not dispute the power of the State Government to bring about the necessary reform, by modifying the rules, it has got to be justified on the touchstone of the correlation between the provision and the objective to be achieved. If that correlation is not established, surely the rule will suffer from the vice of arbitrariness, and therefore will be hit by Art.14.

117. Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear in the above passage that, any rule made, if it was not sustainable under Article 14 of the Constitution, would be bad.

118. It is clear from the above that, nowhere in any of the materials that were before the Government, was any proposal to exclude Four Star and Heritage category hotels from the criterion of eligibility to apply for bar licences, either contemplated or recommended. The Government files made available to me for perusal also do not contain any material to justify the exclusion of hotels of Four Star and Heritage categories. The measure has surfaced for the first time, all on a sudden, in the Abkari Policy 2014-15. As laid down by the Supreme Court in the Dance Bars case, though the Government is presumed to have full knowledge of the social aspects of the controls proposed, in the absence of any materials on record, from which some justification could be found out to support the measure, the presumption cannot be pushed to the extent of presuming that the State could have been possessed of some undisclosed and unknown reason or material to justify its action. In the present case, the materials available on record are in fact, supportive of the contra. Both the report of the One Man Commission as well as the report of the Secretary (Taxation) have recommended grant of licences to hotels with sufficient facilities. As already found above, since the fate of both two star and three star hotels have been concluded by the previous decision of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. Surendra Das (Supra), the challenge against the said exclusion can no longer survive. However, in the case of hotels with Four Star and Heritage classification, there is absolutely no material to justify a conclusion that there were any complaints with respect to their functioning. It has been noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 34 of the decision in State of Kerala v. Surendra Das (Supra) that three star, four star and five star hotels form a different class. Paragraph 34 reads as follows:- 

34. We must as well note that the two star and three star hotels stand on a different footing as against the hotels with four star and higher classification under the tourism policy of the Government of India. It is relevant to note that the Ministry of Tourism (H&R Division) of the Government of India has issued the amended guidelines for classification/re- classification of hotels on 28.6.2012. The classification of the hotels into star categories and heritage categories is done thereunder, and it is a voluntary scheme. Annexure-2 contains the provisions concerning classification/re-classification of operational hotels. Para 8 (f) thereof provides as follows: 

"8(f). Bar License (necessary for four star, five star, five star deluxe, heritage classic & heritage grand categories). Wherever bar license is prohibited for a hotel as per local law, the bar will not be mandatory and wherever bar is allowed as per local laws, then the hotel will have to obtain bar license first and then apply for classification to the Ministry of Tourism." 

This being the position, it is not necessary for a three star hotel to have a bar licence. In fact as can be seen the para 8(f) above also states that if a local law prohibits the issuance of a bar licence to four star, five star, five star deluxe, heritage classic and heritage grand categories, which is otherwise necessary, such local law will prevail. In any case three star hotels will have to be placed in a different category as against the hotels with four star and higher classification, since it is not necessary for three star hotels to have an FL-3 licence.

119. It is also common knowledge that, hotels with classification of four star and above are not frequented by the youth, students or the less affluent sections of the society. The One Man Commission has noticed that the customers frequenting such hotels are more responsible and orderly in their behavior and that the ambience in such establishments were also conducive to such orderly conduct. It is also worth noticing, as rightly contended by the counsel appearing for the petitioners that, the above aspect has received legislative recognition also inasmuch as in Rule 13(3) of the Foreign Liquor Rules, a distinction is maintained while prescribing the distance from educational and religious institutions. Hotels with classification of four star and above have to maintain only a distance of 50 meters. There is nothing on record to indicate that, the above aspects have received the attention of the Government while formulating the Abkari Policy, 2014-15. As already noticed above, with the present Abkari Policy, all other bars in the state would be closed down leaving only the limited number of higher category hotels in the field. Though the Abkari Policy proclaims that it has been issued considering the One Man Commission Report and the report of the Secretary (Taxation), except for a passing reference, no consideration of the recommendations of the Commission is available in the policy. It is no doubt true that, the Government is not bound by the recommendations of the One Man Commission. However, the Government should have at least stated that it was rejecting the recommendations. The Abkari Policy 2014-15 ignores the recommendations of the One Man Commission altogether. Therefore, it has to be held that there was absolutely no material before the Government for the classification that has been adopted, of picking out hotels having five star classification and above for the purpose of the preferential treatment of granting FL-3 licences or bar licences. The said action therefore is held to be arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In the result, it is ordered as follows:- 

1. The challenge against the Abkari Policy 2014- 2015, by the hotels classified as two star, three star and by hotels having no classification fails. The writ petitions filed by them are therefore dismissed.

2. The Abkari Policy 2014-15, to the extent, it excludes hotels having Four Star and Heritage category hotels from the eligibility to be granted FL-3 licences under the Foreign Liquor Rules is set aside, being arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The consequential amendments to the Foreign Liquor Rules as well as the proceedings of the Excise Commissioner cancelling the licences of such hotels are also set aside. The writ petitions filed by them are allowed as above.

3. The Abkari Policy 2014-2015 is sustained in all other respects, except to the extent indicated above. 

Sd/- K.SURENDRA MOHAN JUDGE 

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