(2013) 306 KLR 128 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON MONDAY, THE 20TH DAY OF MAY 2013/30TH VAISAKHA 1935 WP(C).No. 965 of 2010 (U) -------------------------- PETITIONER : -------------------------- THE MUTHOOT SKYCHEF (A UNIT OF MUTHOOT HOTELS & INFRASTRUCTURE VENTURES (P) LTD., AIRPORT ROAD, PERUNTHANNI, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 008, REPRESENTED BY ITS SENIOR MANAGER, SABU ZACHARIAS K. BY SMT.SUMATHI DANDAPANI,SENIOR ADVOCATE BY ADV. SRI.MILLU DANDAPANI RESPONDENT(S): ---------------------------- 1. THE SENIOR MANAGER,(COMMERCIAL), TRIVANDRUM INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 008. 2. AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA, RAJIV GANDHI BHAVAN, SAFDARJUNG AIRPORT, NEW DELHI-110 037, REPRESENTED BY ITS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR. 3. UNION OF INDIA, REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, MINISTRY OF AVIATION, RAJIV GANDHI BHAVAN, SAFDARJUNG AIRPORT, NEW DELHI-110 037. R1 & R2 BY ADV. SRI.V.SANTHARAM R3 BY ADV. SRI.P.PARAMESWARAN NAIR,ASG OF INDIA THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 23-03-2013, THE COURT ON 20-05-2013 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: sts WP(C)NO.965/2010 APPENDIX PETITIONER'S EXHIBITS:
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBITS:
/TRUE COPY/ P.S.TO.JUDGE sts P.R. RAMACHANDRA MENON J. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ W.P.(C) No. 965 of 2010 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Dated, this the 20th day of May, 2013 Head Note:- Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 226 - Enhancement of the licence fee - Payable by the In-flight caterers - the scope and power to interfere with - such matters involving fixation/quantum of licence fee, exercising the power of Judicial Review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is quite limited - this, is more a matter of policy and it depends on various facts and circumstances - Interference is possible, only if it is per se arbitrary and discriminatory, so as to hold it perverse - In the challenging life style and global economy, so as to be in the business, drastic policy decisions have to be conceived and implemented and at times it may appear to be unconventional - change in policy does not by itself vitiate the action taken pursuant thereto, if they are reasonable and rational - It will be wholly irregular to doubt the wisdom of the Administration, and for the only reason that it may not be agreeable to one's conventional views - the additional income does not go to private hands, and is pumped back to the system, to make it more healthy, and ultimately caters to better public interest. J U D G M E N T Enhancement of the licence fee (labelled as 'royalty') payable by the In-flight caterers like the petitioner as per Ext. P3 (leading to Exts. P10/P10(a) in view of the non-satisfaction of due amount), is the subject matter of challenge in this writ petition. An interim order of stay stands granted, in view of the interim order passed by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A. 958 of 2009, intercepting the direction in W.P(C) No. 11468 of 2009, to satisfy 50 % of the dues. 2. As mentioned above,the challenge was mainly against the exorbitant rate of enhancement and the retrospective enforcement. Based on the minutes of the meeting of the Advisory Board constituted as per the provisions of the Statute, the rate was later substantially scaled down, also taking away the retrospective operation and making the enhancement only prospective. A copy of the relevant order was produced before the Division Bench, based on which,WP (C) 11468/2009 itself was disposed of as per judgment dated 18.08.2011 (to which I was also a member), holding that no further orders were called for. Whether anything subsists to be considered further in this writ petition, is the remaining question. 3. The petitioner Company is stated as engaged in the business of providing catering facility in flights and is having operations presently in the Trivandrum International Airport. In connection with the business, the petitioner entered into an agreement with various Airlines and food cooked in the kitchen/premises of the petitioner situated outside the Airport area within a radius of 5km, is brought in their vehicle to the premises of the Airport and is being supplied to various Airliners; paying the requisite licence fee in terms of Ext. P1 dated 13.05.2003 (Rs.30,000/- per month); the turn over being above Rs. 3 Crores. 4. While so, the petitioner was served with Ext. P3 proceedings dated 25.11.2008, whereby it was let known that the rate of royalty payable would stand enhanced to 13 % of the Gross Turn Over (GTO) w.e.f. 01.04.2008 and was asked to meet the liability with supporting documents. The petitioner contends that the rate is exorbitant in all respects and that there is no rhyme or reason for having it implemented with retrospective effect; in view of the concluded contract and the liability of the petitioner to supply food items to various Airliners based on the terms of the relevant agreement. It is also contended that Ext. P3 enhancement was based on the discussions with some operators in Mumbai and Delhi and that the petitioner was never given an opportunity of being heard. In the said circumstances, Ext. P5 representation was preferred on 08.01.2009 before the first respondent, followed by Ext. P6 dated 30.06.2009 before the second respondent, seeking to scale down the liability to an affordable level and to make it effective from a future date i.e. w.e.f. 01.04.2009. 5. It is seen from the pleadings and proceedings that various correspondences followed between the petitioner and the concerned respondents. The petitioner brought it to the notice of the first respondent that the issue was pending consideration before the Advisory Board, as borne by Ext. P11 proceedings dated 13.04.2009 of the second respondent and hence that, the due amount was not liable to be enforced for the time being. Since this was not acceded to, the petitioner chose to approach this Court in view of the proposed coercive proceedings, by filing the present writ petition, which was admitted by this Court on 12.01.2010 also granting interim stay, which was extended from time to time till 16.07.2010, when it was extended until further orders. 6. A counter affidavit was filed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 explaining the sequence of events. Supplemental pleadings have been effected from both the sides, in the form of reply affidavit, additional counter affidavit, additional reply affidavit etc. Apart from this, other incidental proceedings by way of different I.As for accepting documents (from both sides) and also an I.A. to vacate interim order of stay filed by the respondents 1 and 2 have become part of the records. 7. During the pendency of the above proceedings, Ext. P3 came to be modified by Ext. P15 dated 23.09.2010, whereby the rate of enhancement was substantially reduced and it was decided to be given 'prospective effect', in the manner as specified therein. Despite this, the petitioner chose to challenge Ext.P15 as well and the writ petition was got amended, bringing additional statement of facts, additional grounds and additional prayers; in turn seeking to set aside Ext. P15. 8. Heard Smt. Sumathi Dandapani, the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. Santharam, the learned standing counsel appearing for the respondents 1 and 2 on different dates and finally on 23.03.2013. 9. The crux of the contentions raised from the part of the petitioner is that, the petitioner is satisfying the 'licence fee' as originally fixed vide Ext. P1, without fail and that there is no basis for enhancing the same to the extent as under challenge. It is stated that the petitioner is not provided with any space in the Airport and that no service is being rendered to the petitioner other than granting permission to take the petitioner's vehicles carrying in-flight catering articles, to the premises of the Airport, to be boarded on, to the flight and to be taken back from the crew cabin/flight. The emphasis sought to be placed by the petitioner is that there is no 'quid- pro-quo'. 10. The next point urged is that the petitioner was never given an opportunity of being heard, before enhancing the rate vide Ext. P3 and that the enhancement was made after discussions held with some operators in Mumbai and Delhi as borne by Ext. P3. It is the further contention of the petitioner that there is no provision for payment of royalty, as it does not have any legal or factual footing. It is also pointed out that the petitioner stands apart from the In-Flight Caterers in North India, as sufficient space has been alloted to the latter within the Airport premises with liability to satisfy royalty, based on the Gross Turn Over, which cannot be made applicable to the petitioner, for not rendering any service to the petitioner. 11. The pleadings and prayers are vehemently opposed from the part of the respondents 1 and 2, who contend that the writ petition itself is not maintainable being belated; as Ext. P3 was issued as early as on 25.11.2008; while the writ petition was filed only on 11.01.2010. It is stated that the representation preferred by the petitioner has already been considered and the same has been rejected by the competent authority, which position was let known as per Ext. R1(h) dated 19.06.2009. It is further pointed out that the challenge against Exts. P3/P10/P10(a) has lost significance, in view of the subsequent developments, whereby the liability/level of enhancement was substantially brought down vide Ext. P15 and the retrospective application has also been taken away, giving only prospective effect to the enhancement which in fact was brought to the notice of the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. 958 of 2009. Obviously, Ext. P15 is based on the relevant decision taken by the Advisory Board and Ext. R1 (m) communication dated 14.07.2010 issued by the second respondent. This was brought to the notice of this Court in W.A. 958 of 2009 and it was accordingly, that the Writ Appeal (preferred against the interim order passed in W.P.(C) No. 11468 of 2009) and Writ Petition itself were considered and disposed of as per Ext. R1 (n) judgment dated 18.08.2011. 12. It is asserted by the respondents that the term "royalty" used in Ext. P3 and the subsequent communication is only in respect of licence fee payable to the petitioner and that the nomenclature of the term does not have any significance as, both the petitioner as well as the respondents have understood the same with same/proper level of understanding. Reference is made to Ext. P5 representation preferred by the petitioner (where the challenge is against exorbitant enhancement and retrospective operation) in this regard and at various places in the writ petition as to the enhanced licence fee/royalty. It is further stated that the classification is reasonable and that there is nothing arbitrary or illegal, in so far as the enhancement now ordered as per Ext.P15 (which is stated as due for revision now); simultaneously adding that, it is more a matter of 'policy', depending upon various facts and circumstances and that the scope of judicial scrutiny is only to a limited extent. It is further added that, in view of the finalization of the basic case (W.P.(C) No. 11468 of 2009) and the closure of W.A. No. 958 of 2009, nothing further remains to be considered in this writ petition. 13. It is true that the petitioner approached this Court challenging Ext. P3 dated 25.11.2008 only on 11.01.2010. Though there is no prescribed time limit for filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the challenge, if at all any, has to be raised within reasonable time. Reliance is sought to be placed on the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Bangalore City Co-Op. Housing Society Vs. State of Karnataka [2012 (1) KLT SN 92 (C. No. 101) SC]; from the part of the respondents; while the petitioner seeks to place reliance on the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in Smt. Sudama Devi Vs. Commissioner and others (AIR 1983 SC 653); Asok Kumar Vs. State of Bihar (AIR 2008 SC 2723); Ravindra Nath Vs. State Bank of India and Others [(2008) 15 SCC 256] to the effect that there is no water-tight formula in this regard and that reason for the delay is what matters more. It is pointed out that, after the issuance of Ext. P3, several communications were effected in between and that pendency of the matter before the Advisory Board, as borne by Ext. P11 communication, was brought to the notice of the first respondent. The question of delay is a relative aspect; and what matters is not the extent of delay, but the explanation. This is the law declared by the Apex Court in 1998 (7) SCC 123 (N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamoorthy). It is seen that the matter was pending consideration before the Advisory Board as borne by Ext. P11, and subsequent developments make it clear point blank, that the issue was considered by the Advisory Board; based on which, the liability was substantially scaled down and the retrospective operation ordered as per Ext. P3 was taken away as per Ext. P15 dated 23.09.2010. As such, the alleged delay cannot place any bar in challenging the proceedings; this is more so, in view of the fact that the challenge against Exts. P3/P10/P10 (a) has no more relevancy or significance, in so far as Ext. P3 has been modified/substituted by Ext. P15, issued during the pendency of the writ petition and the petitioner has amended the writ petition, challenging Ext. P15. The issue stands answered in favour of the petitioner. 14. The next point asserted by the petitioner is that, the petitioner is bound to satisfy only "licence fee" and not any "royalty". While Ext. P1 is in respect of the 'licence fee' payable, Ext. P3 is in respect of 'royalty' and that, since no service is being provided to the petitioner, there is no legal or factual basis in demanding 'royalty'. The petitioner has laboured much to explain the term 'royalty', with reference to various decisions, including those reported in (1985) Supp. SCC 280 (State of Orissa and others Vs. Titaghur Paper Mills Company Ltd. and another); (1995) 6 SCC 166 (Inderjeet Singh Sial and another Vs. Karam Chand Thapar and others); 1995 Supp. (1) SCC 642 (State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mahalakshmi Fabric Mills Ltd.); (2004) 10 SCC 201 (State of W.B. Vs. Kesoram Industries and others) and (2008) 17 SCC 645 (Principal Chief Conservator of Forests & Ors. Vs. Yamthong Haokip). The preposition is sought to be rebutted from the part of the respondents, stating that, there is absolutely no pith or substance in the said contention, as it is only 'hyper technical' and is with reference to the nomenclature of the term. It is stated that, what is enhanced is only the 'licence fee', though the expression used is 'royalty' as borne by Ext. P3, followed by Ext. P15. At no point of time earlier, had the petitioner any doubt with regard to the actual nature of payment to be effected, as discernible from the pleadings raised by the petitioner in the writ petition. The petitioner has consciously used the term 'licence fee' in Ground Nos. (i) (iii) and (iv) of the writ petition describing the adverse consequence resulted because of the increase in the amount. This shows that the petitioner had actually understood the meaning of the term 'royalty', as it appears in Ext. P3, to mean enhanced licence fee which is under challenge. 15. The scope of challenge is discernible from Ext. P5 representation as well, wherein reference is made to the term 'royalty' and the decision to realize the same @ 13 % of GTO w.e.f. 01.04.2008 as referred to, in the 'first and second' paragraphs (un-numbered) and also as given in the heading as 'reference'. It was after correctly understanding the term 'royalty', as referred to in Ext. P5 representation dated 08.01.2009, that the request was made to the first respondent to take up the matter with the second respondent, and to have it considered; with the specific prayer as follows : "We, therefore, request you that the matter be taken up with AAI Hqrs. For reconsidering the decision. If the increase seems to be unavoidable, it may be scaled down to a reasonable level affordable to us and be also made effective from a future date i.e. from 01.04.2009" The Scope and understanding as above, is further discernible from the subsequent representation dated 30.06.2009 filed by the petitioner vide Ext. P6, referring to the exorbitant 'royalty' and seeking to consider the representation already preferred, before proceeding with further coercive steps. No challenge was ever raised by the petitioner, while moulding the 'Grounds' in respect of the challenge against the enhanced rate of "royalty" ordered as per Ext. P3, as now put forth during the course of argument. After substitution of Ext. P3 vide Ext. P15 dated 23.10.2010, paragraphs 11,12, 13 and 14 of the writ petition came to be added in the statement of facts, simultaneously adding 'Ground Nos. (x) and (xi)' and prayer No. (v) whereby Ext. P15 was sought to be quashed. No where in the said additional pleadings/grounds, has it been projected by the petitioner that 'royalty' is something other than the 'licence fee' payable or as to the factual and legal difference in between. This shows that the petitioner has correctly understood the meaning of the term 'royalty', as it originally appears in Ext. P3, as nothing but 'licence fee', which according to the petitioner was enhanced to an exorbitant extent, and that too, with retrospective operation, which came to be reduced substantially vide Ext. P15. As such, the decisions sought to be relied on by the petitioner, as mentioned herein before, do not come to the rescue of the petitioner in any manner. 16. Incidentally, it is to be noted that a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in paragraph 8 of the decision reported in 1956 30 ITR 286 AP (Rajah Manyam Meenakshamma Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax) has held that the nomenclature used may not be decisive or conclusive, but for helping the Court to ascertain the intention of the parties, having regard to the other circumstances. Considering the factual position, the Bench observed that the meaning of the word 'Royalty' is rent, though on the facts of a particular case the mere use of that word is not decisive on the question of the character of payment. It was also held that the intention of the parties has to be ascertained on the facts of each case. On testing the factual position in the present case, in the light of the above observations, it is clear from 'Grounds (i), (iii) and (iv)' and also from Exts. P5 and P6 representations that the term 'royalty' was correctly read and understood as 'licence fee' by the petitioner and the dispute is only with regard to the quantum/rate of enhancement and the retrospective application of the enhancement, 17. A Division Bench of this Court, while considering the challenge raised by the Indian Railway Caterer's Association and some members, who are functioning as licensee of Vegetarian Refreshment Stall, Trivandrum (challenging the proceedings and Circular of the Railway Board) revising 'license fee' brought into force from July, 1999; made some observations in the decision reported in AIR 2002 Kerala 232 (K.N. Venkateswaran Vs. Government of India and Others). Paragraphs 55 and 56, are relevant and hence are extracted below: "55. The licence fee was always determinable on the turnover. The Court of catering services have been substantially increased and the licence fee has only been proportionately given a hike. If such increase is not there, the result would be that the contractors would be reaping a harvest unmerited. No Court can countenance a contention which gives an opportunity to persons for unjust enrichment. It has been pointed out by the Standing Counsel that Ext. P-1 policy has been successfully implemented. It is also emphasised that in respect of several major stations minimum quotation had been prescribed as 12 % of the turnover, but offers received show that contractors have expressed willingness to quote for the privilege even at as high as 25% of the income derived. 56. In the challenging life style and global economy, so as to be in the business, drastic policy decisions have to be conceived and implemented and at times it may appear to be unconventional. As the Supreme Court said in Government of India Vs. HDC, 1993 (3) SCC 499, change in policy does not by itself vitiate the action taken pursuant thereto, if they are reasonable and rational. The view has been reiterated in M.V. Al Quamar V. Tsavliris Salavage (International) Ltd., 2000 (3) SCC 278; (AIR 2000 SC 2826). It will be wholly irregular to doubt the wisdom of the Administration, and for the only reason that it may not be agreeable to one's conventional views. The additional income does not go to private hands, and is pumped back to the system, to make it more healthy, and ultimately caters to better public interest. In this view, the Court is constrained to adopt a realistic attitude. The Railway Board it appears have bestowed thought to revamp the organization and are introducing policies to cope up with the changing situation. The petitioners have therefore to adapt themselves to the changes, and cannot insist them to stick on to the old patterns." Based on the above observations, revised policies were held as reasonable and valid, and fixation of the 'licence fee' on the basis of Gross Turn Over was upheld, thus dismissing the writ appeals and writ petitions. Similarly in Inderjeet Singh Sial and another Vs. Karam Chand Thapar and Others [(1995) 6 SCC 166], the Apex Court observed that the interpretation of the word 'royalty' as used in the deed of assignment should be construed on its own terms and in substance and not on the basis of its 'label' or form. This Court finds that the challenge raised by the petitioner against the impugned orders fails, in the said circumstances. 18. With regard to the challenge raised by the petitioner as to the extent of enhancement, as it now stands vide Ext. P15 based on the Gross Turn Over, the contention is that, the petitioner has not been allotted any space within the Airport; that the catering operation is being carried out from the kitchen/premises situated outside the Airport and hence that the rate payable by the In-flight caterers having alloted space within the Airport cannot be made applicable in the case of the petitioner. It is true that Ext. P4 communication was issued with reference to discussions with some major operators in Mumbai/Delhi, fixing the rate referring to the Gross Turn Over, thus leading to Ext. P3 dated 25.11.2008 being issued to the petitioner. From Ext.P4, it is seen that the In-flight caterers, who were given space within the Airport premises, had made a request to permit them to serve the customers outside the Airport premises as well, apart from serving within the Airport. This was considered and permission was granted, fixing the rate on the basis of 'Gross Turn Over'. Here the fact remains that, in so far as the in- flight caterer who is alloted space within the Airport is concerned, the entire turn over is accountable and the rate of 'licence fee/royalty' is fixed on the percentage of GTO. Eventhough the same percentage is applicable to the petitioner, who is doing in-flight catering using own premises/kitchen outside the Airport, it has to be noted that the work out of figures applying the rate/percentage of the Gross Turn Over to be accounted by the petitioner is only in respect of the materials supplied to the Airliners alone. The turn over in respect of the service rendered by persons like the petitioner to outsiders, making use of the kitchen/premises, outside the Airport is not the concern of the Airport Authority and is not to be accounted to, for fixing the quantum of 'licence fee/royalty'. As such, this Court does not find any merit or bonafides in the contentions put forth from the part of the petitioner; neither with reference to the Gross Turn Over nor as to the nature of operation being performed by the petitioner, making use of the kitchen/premises situated outside the Airport. Ext. P15 is made applicable all over India and there is no discrimination in any manner. The norms adopted are on a uniform basis, relating the same to a fixed percentage of accountable Gross Turn Over, which is an instance of 'proper/reasonable' classification and not assailable on any ground. 19. With regard to the alleged denial of opportunity of being heard before passing Ext. P3, it is to be noted that the same is admittedly based on Ext. P4 and sought to be applied all over India. As borne out by the pleadings and proceedings, the case of the petitioner is that it was not liable to be enforced, as the matter (enhancement of rate and also retrospective operation) was already pending consideration before the Advisory Board constituted under the relevant provisions of law. The petitioner has also made reference to extracts of the Naresh Chandra Committee Report vide Ext. P12 and the presentation of the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority Bill 2007 and passing of the same by Lok Sabha as borne by Ext. P13 extracts, providing for the setting up of the Airports Economic Regulatory Authority. It has been asserted from the part of respondents 1 and 2 in paragraph No. 4 of their counter affidavit that the Airport Economic Regulatory Authority of India Act 2008 (Act No. 27 of 2008) has already received the assent of the President on 05.12.2008 and has been notified in the Gazette of India No. 36 dated 05.12.2008, simultaneously adding that the 'Act' provides establishment of an Airport Economic Regulatory Authority to regulate 'Tariff' and other charges for the aeronautical services rendered at Airports and that the term 'aeronautical services' defined under Section 2 (a) of the 'Act' does not include the services undertaken by the petitioner. This Court does not find it necessary to probe into these areas, in view of the limited extent of issue under consideration. 20. Yet another aspect to be noted is that, even the licence fee fixed earlier, as borne by Ext. P1 was of course based on the 'Gross Turn Over'. Admittedly, the petitioner was having annual turn over of more than 3 crores, in respect of which the maximum 'monthly licence fee' payable was fixed as Rs.30,000/- as per Ext. P1 (based on Ext. R1(a) dated 13/17 June, 2002 issued by the second respondent). When Ext. P3 came to be passed, instead of mentioning the quantum of amount payable, the fixed percentage was specified, simultaneously making the same effective retrospectively. This was considered by the Advisory Board and based on the minutes of the meeting, Ext. R1 (m) communication dated 14.07.2010 of the second respondent was issued, leading to Ext. P15 dated 23.09.2010 issued to the petitioner, reducing the rate to a substantial extent and also dispensing with the retrospective application. This Court finds it better to have it [Ext. R1(m)] extracted for convenience of reference : "Consequent upon representations received from various Flight Kitchen Operators regarding review of payment of royalty to Airports Authority. The issue has since been considered by Commercial Advisory Board in its 105th Meeting held on 7th July 2010. 2. It has been decided that the Flight Kitchen Operators (Supplying catering services from outside) to whom land had not been leased by AAI at Airports, such FKOs will be charged following percentage of royalty for the period as mentioned below: Period Domestic International April 2008 to As per existing As per existing September 2008 arrangement arrangement October 2008 to 5 % GTO 5 % GTO March 2008 April 2009 to 5 % GTO 8 % GTO September 2009 Period Domestic International October, 2009 to 6 % GTO 9 % GTO March 2010 April, 2010 onwards 8 % GTO 10 % GTO 3. The above is subject to that wherever specific arrangements are there they will be covered by respective agreements/clauses and the above levy will be applicable only in respect of Airports providing catering services from outside airport i.e. land not leased by AAI. 4. The above royalty rates will be reviewed after a gap of three years." This Court is of the firm view that the scope and power to interfere with such matters involving fixation/quantum of licence fee, exercising the power of Judicial Review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is quite limited. This, is more a matter of policy and it depends on various facts and circumstances. This Court finds support from the law declared by the Apex Court in this regard in 1989 (2) SCC 116 (Bareilly Development Authority Vs. Ajai Pal Singh and Ors.) and 2002 (7) SCC 135 (Delhi Development Authority Vs. Ashok Kumar Behal and Ors.). Interference is possible, only if it is per se arbitrary and discriminatory, so as to hold it perverse. The pleadings and proceedings reveal that no such interference is possible at the hands of this Court, in respect of Ext. R1(m)/P15. 21. Admittedly, there is no Agreement between the petitioner and the respondents 1 and 2. The Agreement is actually between the petitioner and the concerned Airliners, to supply the concerned food items as evident from Ext.P16. Since the retrospective operation originally contemplated as per Ext. P3 and the rate fixed therein, have already been withdrawn by virtue of Ext. R1(m)/P15, providing lesser rate and giving only prospective operation, the petitioner cannot be heard to say that the contract already entered into between the petitioner and the subscriber Airliners has suffered adverse hardships. It is for the concerned respondent to fix the appropriate extent of 'licence fee', taking note of the relevant facts and circumstances, for permitting parties like the petitioner to make use of their premises for giving effect to the contract/agreement executed between the petitioner and the concerned Airliners for whom the 'in-flight catering service' is being provided by the petitioner. The petitioner cannot dictate terms to the respondents in this regard nor is it proper for this Court to make any such directions; more so these are matters of policy, depending upon various circumstances, including cost, maintenance, security and such other relevant aspects. 22. The petitioner can never be termed as a loser in any manner, as Ext.P15 is equally applicable to all other similarly situated persons/parties concerned. It is open for the petitioner to incorporate appropriate terms in the 'Agreement' to be executed between the petitioner and the concerned Airliners, specifying the cost/rate for the food items to be supplied, also with respect to the the fixed percentage of the 'Gross Turn Over' towards the 'licence fee/royalty' to be paid to the respondents 1 and 2. Whether the figures are to be given separately or as a consolidated one and what should be the extent or the terms of the Agreement are all matters for the parties to decide and it is definitely not for this Court to spend time on. The petitioner has been provided with a level playing field and the Rules of the Game are common to all, who are similarly situated like the petitioner. No undue advantage is being extended to anybody nor is there any instance of discrimination as far as the petitioner is concerned. It is also brought to the notice of this Court that, another person similarly situated like the petitioner who is providing catering services on similar terms at the very same Airport at Trivandrum, is satisfying the due amount payable in terms of Exts(m)/P15. If the petitioner finds it not feasible to run the show, it is for the petitioner to take appropriate decision. This Court does not find any ground raised in the writ petition as tenable. The writ petition fails and it is dismissed accordingly. Sd/- P. R. RAMACHANDRA MENON, (JUDGE) kmd |
